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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE 
SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, 
and CLINTON SWANSON, an 
individual, and NIKKI SHUMWAY, 
an individual, all dba SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES; and SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah 
Business, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
PRO SE 
Case No 980285-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is from two Judgments, the first a Partial 
Summary Judgment (see Addendum A.) entered December 10, 
1996, in favor of the Individual Defendants, the second, a 
Judgment (see Addendum B.) entered on or about May 13, 
1 
1997, in favor of the Corporate Defendant, Swanson 
Enterprises, Inc., and a Ruling (see Addendum C.) on the 
Appellants* 60(b) Motion to Set Aside entered October 10, 
1997, which also certified the Judgment(s) as final, 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) U.R.C.P. All of the foregoing 
actions were in the Fourth District Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah. The Utah Supreme Court had appellate 
jurisdiction and accepted our Notice of Appeal (see 
Addendum D.) pursuant to U.R.A.P. On May 28, 1998, 
pursuant to the authority vested in The Utah Supreme 
Court, this case was poured over to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, (see Addendum E.) which also has jurisdiction 
under U.R.A.P. An Order was issued (see Addendum F.) by 
the Utah Court of Appeals on July 13, 1998, withdrawing a 
prior Sua Sponte Motion for lack of jurisdiction, and 
Appellants were notified to file this brief on or before 
August 24, 1998. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Should the District Court have granted Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) and (7-
now-6) pursuant to the following subissues: 
(a) Was relief from the December 10th 1996 
Judgment in favor of the individual Defendants 
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available to the Plaintiffs, Chris & Laurie Swanson, 
under Rule 60 (b)(7-now-6). 
(b) Was there sufficient evidence of a 
meritorious defense to the counterclaims by the 
Defendants before the Court. 
(c) Were the actions of the Plaintiff's counsel 
so egregious that they were beyond excusable 
neglect, constituted fraud, malpractice, and gross 
negligence, and therefore attorney Stringer's actions 
should not be imputed to Chris & Laurie Swanson. 
(d) Were the Plaintiffs' and Appellants', Chris & 
Laurie Swanson's, actions reasonable and did they show 
due diligence in their pursuit of this case. 
(e) Did the District Court err in not allowing 
Chris & Laurie Swanson's subsequent attorney, Mr. 
Jerry Schollian, to fully argue and present the 
evidence before the Court. 
(f) Did the District Court err in not 
allowing three Affidavits (see Addendums G., H. , I.) 
presented on the day of the Joint Hearing to be 
entered as evidence or argued before the Court, 
although the Court referred to those Affidavits in 
it's Ruling as justification for the Court's decision. 
(g) Was the 60 (b) Ruling an abuse of the Court's 
3 
discretion in light of the evidence before the Court, 
and were the statements and conclusions by the Court 
in that Ruling correct. 
2. Was justice served, and did the Fourth District Court 
abuse it's discretion by it's denial of the 60 (b) Motion 
to Set Aside Judgment(s)? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"The Utah Court of Appeals accords Conclusions of Law no 
particular deference, but reviews them for correctness." 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
In reviewing the grant of Summary Judgment by the Trial 
Court: "we accept the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the losing party. Because Summary 
Judgment is granted as a matter of law, we may reconsider 
the Trial Court's legal conclusions." Wineaar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (1991 (Citation omitted). See 
also Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 
811 P.2d 184, 192 (Utah 1991). "In reviewing a grant of 
Summary Judgment, we view the facts in a light most 
favorable to the losing party." 
After viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the 
losing party, it is common to affirm a grant of Summary 
Judgment only if there is no disputed issue of material 
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fact and the moving party is entitled to Judgment as a 
matter of law. The Utah Court of Appeals grants no 
deference to the Trial Courtfs conclusions of law and 
reviews them for correctness. 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW OF ISSUES NOT 
PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT 
Chris & Laurie Swanson ask that The Utah Court of Appeals 
reverse the decision(s) by the District Court on the 
grounds that the Court abused it's discretion in not 
allowing relief under Rule 60 (b) (1) and (b) (7-now-6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (see Addendum FF.). 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in 
part that relief from Judgment or order may be obtained 
due to (1) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On Motion and upon 
such terms as are just, the Court may in the furtherance 
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final Judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistakes, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect, and (7-now-6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the Judgment... 
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The Motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the 
Judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arises out of a family business venture formed 
by Chris Swanson, Laurie Swanson, Beverly Swanson, and 
Clinton Swanson, who started a sub Chapter-S Corporation, 
Swanson Enterprises, Inc., filing such on March 9, 1995, 
(see Addendum J.) for the purpose of opening a restaurant. 
Each party owned 25% of the Corporation. As the project 
progressed and became more valuable, greed, personal and 
ethical business differences, and seemingly insurmountable 
disputes and problems arose. Although the Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, Chris & Laurie Swanson, made every attempt to 
resolve and settle the matter in any reasonable manner, 
the dynamics of a dysfunctional family made it impossible 
to reach any agreement. As a result, this legal action 
was instituted in the Fourth District Court of Utah by 
Chris & Laurie Swanson on or about May 16, 1996, against 
Beverly Swanson, Clinton Swanson, and Nikki Shumway as 
individuals, and Beverly Swanson, Clinton Swanson, and 
Nikki Shumway all dba Swanson Enterprises; and Swanson 
Enterprises, Inc., a Utah business. The Complaint, filed 
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on or about May 16, 1996, (see Addendum K.) was for 
damages, breach of contract, violation of state law, 
unfair business practices, theft by conversion, 
indemnification for unauthorized actions, a derivative 
suit. The Corporate Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim 
(see Addendum L.) was filed on or about June 12, 1996, by 
John Valentine. A Counterclaim (see Addendum M.) was 
filed by Thomas Seiler, attorney for the Individual 
Defendants, on or about July 9, 1996. A Response to this 
Counterclaim (see Addendum N.) was filed by Chris & Laurie 
Swanson1s prior attorney, Mark K. Stringer, on July 17, 
1996. In late August, 1996, as Chris & Laurie Swanson had 
been locked out of the business, and had limited income, 
Chris Swanson moved to Los Angeles, California, in order 
to seek employment to pay attorney fees; Laurie followed 
shortly thereafter. During this time, numerous requests 
for extensions were requested and granted by and to all 
parties. On August 16, 1996, Mr. Valentine, noted in a 
letter to Mr. Stringer, (see Addendum 0.) that he had 
delayed answering the first set of interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents served to Mr. 
Valentine, attorney for the Corporate Defendant, on May 
15, 1996. On November 7, 1996, Mr. Valentine finally 
produced (see Addendum P.) the delayed answers to 
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interrogatories and reply to requests for production of 
documents served May 15, 1996, along with a Stipulation 
(see Addendum Q.) to Mr, Stringer waiving each party's 
objections and stipulating that Mr. Stringer file the 
Response to the Corporate Counterclaim within 10 days. It 
is our understanding that Mr. Stringer did not respond to 
this Stipulation and Mr. Stringer did not provide a 
Response to the Corporate Counterclaim. Although we were 
continually in contact with Mr. Stringer and his office 
during this period, and were assured that everything was 
"on track" and all necessary extensions had been granted, 
a Partial Summary Judgment was entered in favor of the 
Individual Defendants on or about December 10, 1996, (see 
Addendum A.) and a Judgment (see Addendum B.) was entered 
in favor of the Corporate Defendant on or about May 13, 
1997. Chris & Laurie Swanson first learned of the 
Judgment in favor of the Corporate Defendant in June, 1997 
from Mr. Stringer; however, he refused to give us a copy 
of the Judgment and claimed it was "at his other office". 
He also misrepresented the nature of the Judgment. We 
only learned about the Partial Summary Judgment upon going 
directly to the Court in July, 1997. Upon discovery of 
Mr. Stringer's failure, we immediately terminated him, 
(see Addendum R.) and filed a 60 (b) Motion to Set Aside 
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the Partial Summary Judgment (see Addendum S.) in favor of 
the Individual Defendants on July 23, 1997. Chris and 
Laurie also filed a 60 (b) Motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment in favor of the Corporate Defendant (see Addendum 
T.) on July 2, 1996. The Hearing on these Motions was 
held on September 4, 1997 (see Addendum Y) . The Ruling 
against Chris & Laurie Swanson was filed October 10, 1997 
(see Addendum C ) . This Ruling was appealed to The 
Supreme Court of Utah on or about November 25, 1997 (see 
Addendum D.), and subsequently poured over to The Utah 
Court of Appeals on May 28, 1998 (see Addendum E.). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, contains 
several basis for setting aside a Judgment. The Summary 
Judgment in this case should have been set aside under 
Rule 60 (b) (1) or 60 (b) (7-now-6) . 
The circumstances under which these Judgment(s) were taken 
against Chris & Laurie Swanson warrant the setting aside 
of the Judgment in furtherance of justice and/or pursuant 
to Rule 60 (b). 
There was sufficient evidence of a meritorious defense 
against the Counterclaims of the Defendants to warrant 
setting aside of the Judgments• 
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The actions of the now suspended (see Addendum U.) and 
bankrupt (see Addendum V.) attorney Mark K. Stringer, as 
admitted in his sworn Affidavit (see Addendum W.) which 
was before the Court, and as outlined in the sworn 
Affidavits of Chris & Laurie Swanson on July 15, 1997 (see 
Addendum X.), constituted gross neglect on Stringer's part 
and misconduct of a nature that Chris & Laurie Swanson 
were not even nominally represented, and they should be 
absolved from his conduct in this case. If "the neglect 
of a party's attorney is of an extreme degree amounting to 
positive misconduct, the attorney's conduct is considered 
to obliterate the existence of the attorney-client 
relationship, and the party will not be charged with 
responsibility for the misconduct of his attorney". 
Aldrich v. San Fernando Vallev Lumber Co., (1985, 2d Dist) 
170 Cal App 3d 725, 216 Cal Rptr 300. 
Chris & Laurie Swanson were reasonable and diligent to 
rely upon the representations of Mark Stringer. "...where 
the client has acted as a reasonable prudent person in 
engaging an attorney...has relied on him to protect his 
rights, and has made reasonable inquiry concerning the 
proceeding...a court of equity is not bound to impute to a 
client everything his attorney does or omits to do." 
Paschona v. Hollenbeck, (1961) 13 Wis 2d 415, 108 NW2d 
10 
668. 
The District Court failed to allow Chris & Laurie 
Swanson's subsequent attorney, Jerry Schollian, to fully 
and fairly argue the issues at hand during the 60 (b) 
Hearing on September 4, 1997 (see Addendum Y.). 
Admittedly, Chris & Laurie Swanson's subsequent attorney, 
Schollian, should have presented the three Affidavits (see 
Addendums G., H., I.) before the day of the Hearing. 
However, Mr. Schollian was at a severe disadvantage due to 
Mr. Stringer's refusal to release our legal records, and 
hampered by his lack of knowledge of the case, due to the 
abrupt circumstances of Mr. Stringer's termination and the 
resulting time constraints. The Court referred to these 
Affidavits as justification for it's Ruling (see Addendum 
C.) against Chris & Laurie Swanson, yet ignores 
substantial information contained therein, that strongly 
rebuts the basis for the original Summary Judgments. 
The Court erroneously states that Chris & Laurie Swanson 
had taken no action at all since May, 1996, and had 
allowed the matter to languish; however, a Response to 
the Counterclaim of the Individual Defendants was filed 
July 17, 1996 (see Addendum N.). Furthermore, evidence 
not discovered or available to Mr. Schollian or us at the 
time of the 60 (b) Hearing, shows that the Corporate 
11 
Defendant had delayed answering responses to Plaintiff's 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents 
filed May 15, 1996, until November 7, 1996 (see Addendum 
P.). In addition, the attorney for the Individual 
Defendants delayed filing an Acceptance of Discovery (see 
Addendum Z.) and Certificate of Delivery (see Addendum 
AA.), both served in July, 1996, until December 31, 1996. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE DEFAULT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE UNDER RULE 60(b)(7) 
"The provisions of Subsection (b)(7-now-6) are 
sufficiently broad to permit a Court to set aside an 
Order, dismissing a Plaintifffs Complaint, which was 
entered upon an assumption that the Plaintiff was 
procrastinating and not answering interrogatories 
submitted to him, and to enter a new Order based upon the 
record before it that Plaintiff was represented by 
incompetent counsel and that Defendants were not being 
unduly prejudiced." Stewart v. Sullivan, 29 Utah 2d 156, 
506 P.2d 74 (1973). The actions of Mark K. Stringer go 
well beyond excusable neglect, mistake, surprise, or 
inadvertence as outlined under Rule 60 (b) (1) . The 
Partial Summary Judgment in favor of the Individual 
Defendants was entered December 10, 1996. Yet on or about 
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June 8, 1997, Mark Stringer told Chris & Laurie Swanson 
and Chris1 Aunt, Carolyn Christen, that the Lis Pendens 
(see Addendum BB.) was still in place. This was untrue, 
as it was released by the Partial Summary Judgment of 
December 10, 1996 (see Addendum A.). This proves that Mr. 
Stringer had completely abandoned his fiduciary 
responsibility, and we were effectively without 
representation. Mr. Stringer either lied to us in order 
avoid the consequences of his failure to respond in 
December, 1996, or was so disabled and incompetent that he 
was unaware of the Judgment. Relief was not available 
under Rule 60 (b) (1), as the 3 month limit had expired 
and his failure to act was so extreme and inexcusable that 
it constituted much more than inadvertence, mistake, or 
neglect, which if realized and communicated to his clients 
in a timely manner, could have been addressed under Rule 
60 (b) (1). This was clear misconduct, malpractice, and 
gross negligence. As outlined in his deposition, Mr. 
Stringer's problems were not confined to this case. Mr. 
Stringer has since been suspended from the practice of law 
by the Utah State Bar (see Addendum U.). Mr. Stringer has 
also declared bankruptcy (see Addendum V.). This was not 
an isolated incident, but constituted such negligence as 
having been proved a pattern, resulting in his suspension 
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from the practice of law, Mr. Schollian advised us that 
Mr, Stringer was under Federal Indictment which, if true, 
would have a bearing upon his standing and reputation in 
the legal community and his ability to effectively handle 
our case. Mr. Schollian also advised us that Judge Hansen 
recused himself from the case (see Addendum CC.) as a 
result of his contempt for Mr. Stringer. Mr. Stringer 
never advised us of Judge Hansen's recusal; however, 
regardless of the reason for Judge Hansen's recusal, Mr. 
Stringer had a duty to advise us of this important 
occurrence. It would have raised sufficient suspicion to 
warrant inquiry into Mr. Stringer's assertions and 
statements to us. We ask that the Utah Court of Appeals 
keep in mind that we were living in Los Angeles, 
California, at the time of the Partial Summary Judgment 
and Summary Judgment, yet we maintained continued 
communication via phone, fax, and mail, which can be 
proved now that we have finally obtained our legal records 
from Mr. Stringer. The Honorable Judge Schofield ruled 
that Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. D.T. Southern 
Properties , (see Addendum C , Page 2, Footnote 1) applies 
in this case. However, in Lincoln, "Defendant was 
provided notice of and adequate opportunity for timely 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment when he was 
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personally served Court's Order in supplemental 
proceedings seven weeks after entry of Default", Clearly, 
Chris & Laurie Swanson never had such knowledge or 
opportunity, especially as related to the Partial Summary 
Judgment, filed December 10, 1996 (see Addendum A.). Mr. 
Stringer was immediately terminated (see Addendum R.) and 
new counsel retained once we became aware of the Summary 
Judgment, Our actions were timely and reasonable, and 
relief should have been granted under Rule 60 (b) (7-now-
6) . 
ARGUMENT II 
PLAINTIFFS1 PLEADINGS SET FORTH SUFFICIENT CLAIMS TO AVOID 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT# AND WHICH JUSTIFY OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT 
THE ENTIRE CASE AT TRIAL. 
The Plaintiffs1 Complaint (see Addendum K. ) and other 
pleadings on file, present for adjudication, the issues 
and factual matters concerning theft, fraud, specific 
performance of contractual obligations, and shareholder 
derivative actions as outlined in our original Complaint, 
are a sufficient meritorious defense to the Counterclaims 
of the Defendants. The spurious allegations outlined in 
the Corporate Defendants Answer and Counterclaim (see 
Addendum L.) are effectively the same as those made by the 
15 
Individual Defendants (see Addendum M.). Chris & Laurie 
Swanson's Response to Counterclaim, (see Addendum N.) 
filed July 17, 1997, outlines our meritorious defense. In 
our first Affidavit, (see Addendum X.) dated July 15, 
1997, (point #10) which was part of the record before the 
Court on the date of the 60 (b) Hearing, we specifically 
swear and affirm that "We are confident that the findings 
of this Court, entered as a result of Mr. Stringer's 
failure to respond to the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgments and the finding of the Court as a result of the 
Summary Judgment entered on May 13, 1997, can be disproved 
if we are given the opportunity to present our own facts 
and evidence." Although the three Affidavits (see 
Addendums G., H., I.) submitted on the day of the Hearing, 
and relied upon to some degree by Judge Schofield, more 
strongly and specifically refute the spurious allegations 
in the Corporate Counterclaim, the legal threshold of 
meritorious defense was met by both the Affidavit of June 
15, 1997 (see Addendum X.), which was reviewed by the 
Court prior to the Hearing, and the July 17, 1997 Response 
to Counterclaim (see Addendum N.), filed by Chris & Laurie 
Swanson and other pleadings that were part of the record. 
"Because disposition of a case by Summary Judgment denies 
the benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt concerning 
16 
questions of fact, including evidence and reasonable 
inferences drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in 
favor of the party opposing the Motion." Beehive Brick Co. 
v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
ARGUMENT III 
JUDICIAL POLICY, AND CASE LAW# BOTH SUPPORT VACATING A 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT OR SUMMARY DISMISSAL WHERE THERE IS 
REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION OR EXCUSE FOR THE PARTY'S FAILURE 
TO RESPOND OR PLEAD, AND WHERE TIMELY APPLICATION IS MADE 
TO SET IT ASIDE 
The widely recognized case, Westinahouse Electric Supply 
v. Paul W. Larsen, Contractor, Inc.. 544 P2d 876 (Utah 
1975), sets the standard for relief under Rule 60 (b). In 
that case, the Supreme Court reversed the Trial Court and 
established higher priority of resolving issues on the 
merits, stating that: 
"the Courts generally tend to favor granting 
relief from default Judgments where there is 
any reasonable excuse, unless it will result 
in a substantial prejudice or injustice to the 
adverse party". 
By relieving the Plaintiffs of the Judgments and holding a 
trial on the merits, the Defendants will suffer no 
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injustice. The Defendants have had sole control, 
opportunity and profits from this endeavor. As a result 
of these Judgments, the Plaintiffs have lost all ownership 
in a valuable and potentially lucrative business. 
Further, the hardship on the Defendants, if any, when 
compared to the hardship on the Plaintiffs should the 
Judgment stand, supports the Plaintiffs' Request to Set 
the Judgment(s) Aside, and to decide the matter on the 
merits. 
Further, the policy of granting relief from Default 
Judgments was restated in the Helaesen case: 
"Discretion should be exercised in furtherance 
of justice and should incline towards granting 
relief in a doubtful case to the end that the 
party may have a hearing...It is quite uniformly 
regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to 
vacate a default Judgment where there is 
reasonable justification or excuse for the 
Defendant's failure to appear and timely application 
is made to set it aside." 
Helaesen v. Invanaumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981). 
As previously stated, the circumstances surrounding the 
default of the Plaintiffs in this case amount to 
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"reasonable justification" for relief from the Judgment. 
ARGUMENT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S CONCLUSIONS WERE INCORRECT# BASED 
BOTH UPON THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT, AND EVIDENCE NOT 
AVAILABLE TO CHRIS & LAURIE, AS A RESULT OF MR. STRINGER'S 
REFUSAL TO RELEASE OUR LEGAL FILE. 
On Page 3 of the District Court's October 10, 1997 Ruling 
(see Addendum C ) , The Honorable Judge Schofield states 
that "Now the Plaintiffs assert that they were misled by 
their counsel and they were not neglectful. I disagree." 
This conclusion is not supported by the evidence before 
the Court: a) Mark Stringer's sworn and notarized 
Affidavit of Counsel (see Addendum W.) dated June 8, 1997, 
states in point #23, that "I never notified my clients, as 
the matter was not discovered until, late, and the 
communication from the office to clients was limited to 
known immediate and emergency matters, and the response to 
the Order did not require their direct participation." b) 
Chris & Laurie Swanson's sworn and notarized Affidavit 
(see Addendum X.) of July 15, 1997, states: "Mr. Stringer 
never informed us of the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment filed by the Individual Defendants, by and 
through their attorney of record, Mr. Thomas Seiler, on 
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November 6, 1996." Point #7 states: "We have been 
diligent in following up with Mark Stringer and his office 
by phone and fax." Point #9 states: "We had been assured 
by Mark Stringer and his office that all necessary 
extensions to respond to discovery had been granted and no 
adverse actions had occurred as recently as June 10, 1997, 
We were never informed by Mr. Stringer or his office that 
our stock certificates had been voided by this Court's 
Summary Judgment." In addition, Mr. Valentine had delayed 
answers to interrogatories and reply to requests for 
production of documents until November, 1996 (see Addendum 
P.). Mr. Valentine also sent Mr. Stringer a Stipulation 
(see Addendum Q.) that the Reply to the Corporate 
Counterclaim was due within ten days from the date of the 
Stipulation, (enclosed with his letter of November 7, 
1996); therefore, it was evident that the Corporate 
Defendant also delayed and allowed the matter to languish. 
The Response to the Corporate Counterclaim was not due 
until approximately November 17, 1996--not July 5, 1996, 
as stated in the October 10, 1997 Ruling. The Court also 
erred when it denied relief from the Partial Summary 
Judgment of December 10, 1996, when it erroneously stated 
"Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a meritorious defense". 
The Court either overlooked the Response to Counterclaim 
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(see Addendum N.), filed on or about July 15, 1996, or 
erred in finding that this Response did not meet the legal 
definition of a meritorious defense. A meritorious 
defense is described to include a "proposed answer (that) 
contains a defense that is entitled to be tried". 
Erickson v. Schenkers Int'1. Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 
1147 (Utah 1994). We had met that criteria in our filings 
prior to the Joint Hearing of September 4, 1997. 
ARGUMENT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN IT'S DECISION# AS IT DID NOT 
ALLOW THE NEW ATTORNEY FOR CHRIS & LAURIE SWANSON TO 
PRESENT HIS ARGUMENTS AND BE HEARD BEFORE THE COURT. 
Reference is made to the Transcript of the Hearing (see 
Addendum Y.) of September 4, 1997, and we ask that the 
Utah Court of Appeals take note of Judge Schofield's 
comments on Page 7, Line 7, at the very beginning of the 
Hearing, 
Judge Schofield: "Isn't their remedy not in this Court 
but against Mr. Stringer?" 
i 
Page 7, Line 13-16, Our Attorney Schollian: "Perhaps for 
the issues of their damages arising from him but as far as 
their equity in this case it is here and they never had 
the opportunity to --"(CUT OFF BY THE COURT). 
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Page 7, Line 17-22, The Court: "What do you mean they 
never had the opportunity. They clearly had the 
opportunity. Their rights were never taken away from them 
without them being parties to this lawsuit. They are 
parties to this lawsuit. They have a claim that their 
attorney malpracticed, not that the Court entered a 
Judgment improperly." 
Page 7, Line 23, Mr. Schollian: "Well, the Court entered 
its Judgment on the presumption that the Plaintiffs had 
procrastinated and not responded to - -"(CUT OFF BY THE 
COURT). Page 8, Line 1, The Court: "On the record before 
the Court that is exactly what happened." 
Page 8, Line 3, Mr. Schollian: "That isn't what happened 
according to my clients' Affidavit which is before you. 
They had made continued - - "(CUT OFF BY THE COURT). 
Page 8, Line 6, The Court: "Go ahead and make your Rule 
6OB arguments." 
The above portion of the Transcript clearly shows that The 
Court did not allow our attorney, Mr. Schollian, to 
complete or make our arguments, and The Court was not open 
to hearing our arguments at the time of the Motion to Set 
Aside. 
With all due respect, The Court may have made the correct 
and only possible decisions in favor of the Individual 
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Defendants and Corporate Defendants prior to Chris & 
Laurie Swanson having the knowledge and opportunity to be 
aware of the Judgments and take corrective actions. 
However, once the clear and unrefuted evidence, including 
Mark Stringer's Affidavit and our Affidavits, were 
presented, it was clearly an abuse of The Court's 
discretion to deny Chris & Laurie Swanson the opportunity 
to seek alternate counsel and refute the spurious and 
unfounded "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." 
ARGUMENT VI 
THERE IS NO COGNIZABLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT OR JUSTIFY THE 
RESULTS OF THESE SUMMARY JUDGMENTS 
The Corporate Defendants, in their Answer and 
Counterclaim, filed June 12, 1996 (see Addendum L.), state 
no specific dollar claim for damages. Those damages must 
be established by an Evidentiary Hearing. Chris & Lcturie 
Swanson did not have the opportunity to refute the vague 
claims made in both the Counterclaim and Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Answer and Counterclaim, filed June 
12, 1996, by the Corporate Defendant, states on Page 11, 
#11: " . . . There is approximately $56,000.00 unaccounted 
for in corporate funds..." Yet the Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc.'s Motion 
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for Summary Judgment (see Addendum DD.), filed February 
11, 1997, states on page 4, #15: ". . • Altogether, about 
$3 0,000 to $56,000 of corporate funds remain unaccounted 
for." It seems that $26,000 may have been accounted for 
in the interim. To accuse or imply that Chris & Laurie 
Swanson misused Corporate funds, yet be unable to offer 
specific proof or evidence beyond a vague $30,000.00 to 
$56,000.00 figure, should not be a basis for Summary 
Judgment. Most importantly, Argument Point I in the 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Swanson Enterprises, 
Inc. Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 11, 1997, 
is completely without supporting evidence. There is no 
claim that the stock was issued fraudulently as in Flore 
(see Addendum DD., Page 5). The sub Chapter-S filing, 
which is a matter of record (see Addendum J.) from the 
beginning of this suit, and undisputed, shows that 2500 
shares each were issued to Chris Swanson, Laurie Swanson, 
Beverly Swanson, and Clinton Swanson. The Corporate 
Defendant has provided no contract, agreement, or other 
tangible evidence regarding what, if any, consideration 
was required in exchange for ownership in the corporation. 
This property had been in the family of Chris and Beverly 
Swanson since 1948. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
indicating that any stock was issued fraudulently. In 
24 
addition, no claim for specific damages was made and no 
relative value was placed upon the stock which was lost by 
Chris & Laurie Swanson as a result of the Summary 
Judgment. All evidence referred to in the above mentioned 
Memorandum relies upon "the Shumway Affidavit." By all 
accounts, Shumway was not a party to the formation, 
original agreements, understandings, or initial operations 
of this corporation. There is no relationship shown to 
justify the draconian sanctions against Chris & Laurie 
Swanson: total loss of substantial shares in a valuable 
property and corporation with gross assets near One 
Million Dollars, versus the untrue Counterclaims alleging 
only vague and unsubstantiated claims of damages. 
The balance of the Summary Judgment falls like a house of 
cards when the preposterous notion, that any shares owned 
by Chris & Laurie Swanson are void for lack of 
consideration, is thoughtfully reviewed. 
Special notice should be paid to the statement in the 
Answer and Counterclaim of the Corporate Defendant (see 
Addendum L.), filed June 12, 1996, which states on Page 
11, point 12: "Upon information and belief, this 
Defendant alleges that the Plaintiffs may (emphasis added) 
have even repaid themselves for their capital contribution 
or their share of the payment on the property contributed 
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as capital to the corporation." However, in the 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Swanson Enterprises, 
Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (see Addendum DD.), 
filed February 11, 1997, Page 6, the Corporate Defendant 
states that "There is no record of the Plaintiffs making 
any capital contributions to the corporation." This is a 
clear contradiction. No independent evidence of any 
contract or agreement as outlined in Flore (see Addendum 
DD., Page 5) is provided, no evidence of any transfer of 
stock, no proof or evidence that $30,000.00-$56,000.00 was 
improperly used by Chris & Laurie Swanson is presented. 
More importantly, there is no correlation between the 
amounts claimed by the Defendants and the value of the 
shares lost by Chris & Laurie Swanson. The evidence 
before the District Court at the 60 (b) Hearing was as 
summarized in our Affidavit of July 15, 1997 (see Addendum 
X.): "We never had the opportunity to respond to the 
allegations set forth in the Affidavits that form the 
basis of the Summary Judgment. We are confident that these 
false allegations can be disproved if given the 
opportunity, and welcome the opportunity to present our 
own facts and evidence." 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence before the District Court at the time of the 
60(b) Hearing, on September 4, 1997, was clear and 
convincing that Chris & Laurie Swanson had been misled by 
their now disgraced, bankrupt, suspended, and indicted 
attorney Mark K. Stringer. Chris & Laurie Swanson were 
reasonable under the circumstances to rely upon the 
representations of Mr. Stringer. However, Stringer's 
failure to disclose material matters and his actions 
effectively negated the attorney-client relationship; his 
failings should not be imputed to us. Chris & Laurie 
showed due diligence in pursuit of the case and brought 
the Motion to Set Aside in a timely manner. The Summary 
Judgment resulted in a substantial loss to Chris & Lciurie 
Swanson and should require a review of the basis and 
amount of the Judgments, especially when (a) We did not 
have the opportunity to refute the allegations in the 
Corporate Counterclaim; (b) The claims of the Corporate 
Defendant are vague and contradictory in the time between 
their original Counterclaim and later Motion in Suppo3rt of 
Summary Judgment. The District Court erred in it's 
conclusion that Chris & Laurie Swanson had not presented 
adequate evidence of a meritorious defense. The totality 
of facts before the District Court do not support the 
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Ruling by The Honorable Judge Schofield of October 10, 
1997. We respectfully ask The Utah Court of Appeals for 
the following relief: (a) The Partial Summary Judgment 
in favor of the Individual Defendants, Beverly Swanson, 
Clinton Swanson, and Nikki Shumway all dba Swanson 
Enterprises, Inc., of December 10, 1997, should be 
reversed. (b) The Summary Judgment entered in favor of 
the Corporate Defendant, Swanson Enterprises, Inc., on or 
about May 13, 1997, should be reversed. (c) The Ruling to 
certify the Judgment(s) as final, granted October 10, 
1997, should be reversed. (d) The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (see Addendum DD.), signed May 12, 
1997, should be voided. The case should be returned to 
the Fourth District Court, allowed to go forward with 
discovery, and Chris & Laurie Swanson should be afforded 
adequate time to retain competent counsel, and a pre-trial 
Hearing should be set. 
All of the above should be set aside under Rule 60 (b) (1) 
and (b) (6) because justice demands and the circumstances 
of the case justify setting them aside. 
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Dated tJais ^ ^ day of August, 1998 
iris Swanson 
Plaintiff and Appellant PRO SE 
/anson 
?f and Appellant PRO SE 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE 
SWANSON. 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON 
SWANSON, NIKKI SHUMWAY 
individually; and BEVERLY 
SWANSON, CLINTON SWANSON 
and NIKKI SHUMWAY, all dba 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES; and 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES, INC.. 
a Utah business. 
Defendants. 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960400307CN 
Judge: Steven L. Hansen 
The Court having reviewed the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, and the Affidavit of Beverly Swanson, all submitted by the Defendants 
Beverly Swanson, Clinton Swanson, and Nikki Shumway, by and through their counsel of 
rx ^ v U I OUT Vs) 
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record, Thomas W. Seiler of Robinson, Seiler & Glazier, LC, and good cause appearing 
therefore, the Court does, hereby, ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs have no claim in and to the real property described in 
Exhibit "J" to the Plaintiffs' Complaint, and to which the Plaintiffs apparently claim an 
interest in Count II and County IX of the Plaintiffs1 Complaint, which real property is more 
particularly described as follows: 
Commencing 22.44 feet East and 811.14 feet North 35°22' West along 
Easterly line of State highway from the Southeast corner of Section 26, 
Township 6 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 
35°22' West 86 feet along Easterly line of Highway; thence North 34° East 
76 feet; thence South 35°22' East 86 feet to center line of West Union Canal; 
thence South 34° West 76 Feet along the canal to the place of beginning 
2. The Notice of Lis Pendens filed by the Plaintiffs in this matter as 
Entr\ No. 40379, in Book 3968, at Pages 860 and 861, and describing the propert) set forth 
above, is hereby ordered released. The Defendants Beverly Swanson, Clinton Swanson, and 
Nikki Shumway are hereby authorized to record with the Office of the Utah County 
Recorder, Utah County, State of Utah, a certified copy of this Partial Summary Judgment, 
which,by this Order, has the effect of releasing, the Notice of Lis Pendens described herein. 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that correct copies of the foregoing were hand delivered this 
fft> day of November, 1996, addressed as follows: 
Mark K. Stringer 
Blakelock & Stringer 
37 East Center, 
Second Floor, Front 
Provo, UT 84606 
John L. Valentine 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, UT 84603 
./^^wL^a £L ^f «~ - —*T- »-*% f' 
3 
JOHN L. VALENTINE (3310), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
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Our File No. 23,628 
Attorneys for Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
JN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE 
SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON 
SWANSON, NIKKI SHUMWAY, 
individually; and BEVERLY SWANSON, 
CLINTON SWANSON and NKKI 
SHUMWAY, all dba SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES; and SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah business, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT1 
Case No. 960400307CN 
Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
The above-captioned matter came regularly before the Court on defendant Swanson 
Enterprises, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court having entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, now enters judgment in favor of the defendant Swanson 
Enterprises, Inc. as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Any shares of stock issued, owned or claimed to be owned by the plaintiffs 
Chris Swanson and Laurie Swanson are void for lack of consideration. Any certificates issued 
by Swanson Enterprises, Inc. to said plaintiffs shall be recalled and cancelled as void. 
2. All claims against the defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc. by the plaintiffs are 
dismissed with prejudice for the reasons set forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
3. The issue of whether to award attorney fees in favor of the defendants and 
against the plaintiffs is reserved. 
DATED this \Z day of-AfHl, 1997. 
BY THE COURT 
ANTHQ 
DISTRIC 
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NOTICE TO PLAINnFFS' ATTORNEY 
AND ATTORNEY FOR THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON SWANSON, AND NCKKI SHUMWAY 
TO: MARK K. STRINGER, ESQ. 
THOMAS W. SEILER, ESQ. 
You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for defendant Swanson 
Enterprises, Inc., will submit the above and foregoing Judgment to the Honorable Anthony W. 
Schofield for his signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus 
three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 
4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration of the State of Utah. 
DATED this ^ day of April, 1997. 
^XJJ.QWQV-
JOHN L. VALENTINE, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this JA— day of April, 1997. 
Mark K. Stringer, Esq. 
Blakelock & Stringer 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, UT 84606 
Thomas W. Seiler, Esq. 
Robinson, Seiler & Glazier, LC 
80 North 100 West 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
4 
FILED 10 -IP ^1 
Fourth Judicial Districlt Court 
of Utah CounW, S ate of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
_ (J$v Deputv 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, et al., 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 960400307 
DATED: OCTOBER 10, 1997 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This case is before the Court on plaintiffs1 motion under Rule 60(b) for relief 
from a judgment entered on December 10, 1996 in favor of the individual defendants 
and a judgment entered May 10, 1997 in favor of the corporate defendant; and on the 
motion of the defendant to certify these judgments as final pursuant to Rule 54. Jerry 
Schollian represented plaintiffs, Thomas W. Seiler represented the individual 
defendants and John L. Valentine represented the corporate defendant. Having 
received arguments of counsel on September 4, 1997,1 now issue this ruling. 
Motion for relief from judgment in favor of individual defendants entered 
December 10, 1996. 
When plaintiffs failed to respond to a motion for partial summary judgment 
filed by the individual defendants, the Court granted the motion. Now plaintiffs assert 
that the failing was their attorney's, not theirs. 
1 
(E?<H/3/r u c 
While plaintiffs assert this motion is brought under Rule 60(b)(7), claiming that 
their counsel was incompetent, it properly belongs under Rule 60(b)(1) which 
authorizes relief from a judgment based upon excusable neglect Plaintiffs claim that 
their counsel did not provide them meaningful assistance and that any negligence was 
his, not theirs. This is a claim of excusable neglect which properly should be brought 
under rule 60(b)(1). Where relief is available under that subsection of Rule 60(b), 
relief is not available under and the Court will not reach the catch-all of subsection 
(7).1 
Because this motion properly falls under Rule 60(b)(1), the motion must have 
been brought within three months of entry of the judgment. Undeniably it was not. 
This motion is untimely. Further, there has been no showing that plaintiffs have a 
meritorious defense to this counterclaim. Because the motion was not brought within 
three months and because plaintiffs have not demonstrated a meritorious defense, the 
motion is not well-taken. It is denied. 
Motion for relief from judgment in favor of corporate defendant entered May 
13, 1997. 
The corporate defendant obtained a judgment against plaintiffs, again based 
upon an unopposed motion for partial summary judgment. In this case, however, the 
motion was brought within three months of entry and thus is timely. While I find 
neglect, I struggle to find that it truly is excusable. The counterclaim at issue here 
1
 "Furthermore, subsection (7) may not be employed for relief when the grounds asserted are 
encompassed within subsection (1).H Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties. 
838 P.2d 672, 674 (Utah App. 1992). 
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was filed on June 12, 1996 and served by mailing on that date. A reply was due not 
later than July 5, 1996. As of this date no reply to that counterclaim ever has been 
filed. 
When a reply was not forthcoming, the corporate defendant repeatedly asked 
plaintiffs, through counsel, to file a reply. Then, rather than simply defaulting the 
plaintiffs, the corporate defendant filed its motion for summary judgment. Still there 
was no response of any sort by plaintiffs and summary judgment was granted. 
Now plaintiffs assert that they were misled by their counsel and that they were 
not neglectful. I disagree. 
This case has been pending since May 10, 1996. Yet since that time, plaintiffs 
have taken no action to move the case forward. Their last affirmative action in the 
case was the filing of discovery requests in May 1996. Now they ask the Court for 
relief so they can prosecute an action which they have allowed to languish. 
On the day of hearing plaintiffs filed three additional affidavits. Defendants 
ask that I ignore these affidavits. I agree that any affidavits filed on the day of 
hearing, in a circumstance where the other parties have not had any opportunity to 
even review them before the hearing, should not be considered. Thus this ruling is 
based upon the record prior to the filing of those three affidavits. 
The corporate defendant is entitled to a resolution on its counterclaim. Long 
ago it was entitled to a reply. Plaintiffs are in default for failure to file a reply. That 
default was compounded when plaintiffs failed to respond to the motion for summary 
judgment. I find neglect, but, where over a year passed from the time the reply was 
3 
due to the time of hearing on this motion, and where plaintiffs have not taken action 
to ensure that their cause was diligently prosecuted, I cannot find that neglect 
excusable.2 Further, I do not find meaningful evidence that plaintiffs have a 
meritorious defense to the counterclaim. I deny this motion. 
Motion to certify the judgments as final pursuant to Rule 54. 
Defendants1 motion to certify the judgment as final is well taken. I grant this 
motion. 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Mr. Seiler is 
directed to prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this J£_ day of October, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
°4 J - ; I * a ANTHONY W. SCHOFDELD, JUDGE 
N?: V 
2
 I note that the late filed affidavits make clear that plaintiffs claim to have been actively 
involved and speaking with their prior counsel from April 1996 through September 1996. The reply 
was due during this time. Yet, plaintiffs have taken no action at all with respect to this action since 
they first filed this action and served discovery requests in May 1996. 
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Jerry Schollian (6326) 
A Professional Corporation 
37 East Center Street, Suite 208 
Provo, UT 84601 
Tel: (801)-377-6500 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
fiLED IK 
4TH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH r.niNTY 
Hon 25 I I 5 2 AIT97 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON & LAURIE SWANSON 
Plaintiffs/Appellant, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, et al. 
Defendants/Appellees. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 960400397 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiffs and Appellants, Chris Swanson and Laurie Swanson, 
by and through counsel, Mr. Jerry Schollian, appeal to the Utah Supreme Court the final order 
and judgment of the Honorable Anthony Schofield, entered in this matter on November 10, 1997. 
The appeal is taken from the entire order and judgment. 
1997. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this S) f f " 
CERTlFICfl 
or Plaintiffs/Appellants 
MAILING 
This certifies that the undersigned has mailed a true and accurate copy of the preceding 
document to the following parties: 
Mr. Tom Seiler 
80 North 100 West 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
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^ E X H / 6 / T V O 
Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capital Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
>) 
DATED this A S "day of November, 199 
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
450 S. STATE 
P.O. BOX 140210 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0210 
May 28, 1998 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
tJrs 2?ti2«^ 
CHRIS SWANSON 
823 PALM DR 
GLENDALE CA 91202 
Chris Swanson and 
Laurie Swanson, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
V. No. 970578 
Beverly Swanson, 960400307 
an individual, et al., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in this Court, this case 
is poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
All further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to 
that Court. 
The address is 450 S. State, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114-0230. 
Please direct all questions to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Pat H. Bartholomew 
Clerk of Court 
(cxHi&ir'V) 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Chris Swanson and Laurie 
Swanson, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
Beverly Swanson, an 
individual, and Clinton 
Swanson, an individual, and 
Nikki Shumway, all dba Swanson 
Enterprises, and Swanson 
Enterprises, Inc., a Utah 
business, 
Defendants and Appellees, 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUL 1 3 1998 
Julia D'Alesandit) 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 980285-CA 
This case is before the court on a sua sponte motion to 
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based upon the 
docketing statement. Based upon a review of the entire trial 
court record, the notice of appeal was filed within thirty days 
after entry of a November 11, 1998 order memorializing the trial 
court's ruling and certifying the order as final for purposes of 
appeal under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On 
the basis of the foregoing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sua sponte motion for summary 
disposition is withdrawn. 
1998 
Appellant's brief shall be filed on or before August 24, 
Dated this .{&k. day of July, 1998 
FOR THE COURT: 
•f ^ T r MT! / ^ 9 * * . i « 1 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
y 
fexHrn.-rV^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
T i n 1QQR a true and correct copy 
1?'£%<Z£Z O R D ^ w a f ieposlte^ the unite. States »il to 
the parties listed below: 
Chris and Laurie Swanson 
823 Palm Dr 
Glendale CA 91202 
Thomas W. Seiler 
Robinson, Seller & Glazier, LC 
80 N 100 W 
PO Box 1266 
Provo UT 84603-1266 
John L. Valentine 
Howard, Lewis, & Petersen 
120 E 300 N St 
PO Box 1248 
Provo UT 84603 
Dated this July 13, 1998. 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 980285-CA 
Jerry Schollain, (6326) 
A Professional Corporation 
37 East Center Street, Suite 208 
Provo, UT 84601 
Tel: (801)-377-6500 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE COUNTY OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON & LAURIE SWANSON 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, et al. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAURIE SWANSON 
• Civil No. 960400307 
Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
STATE OF UTAH } 
ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH } 
Laurie Swanson, being first duly sworn, do hereby deposes and state: 
1. I am of the age of majority and do possess the capacity and personal knowledge 
to attest to the facts stated herein; 
2. From April 1996 up through September 1996, I was in regular contact with Mr. 
Stringer to check on development on the case. During this period of time, I was told by Mr. 
Stringer and his staff that there was extensive negotiations going on between him, Mr. Valentine 
and Mr. Seiler. 
4. in September 1996, my husband moved to Glendale, California, and I remained 
in Utah until late November 1996. 
5. During the time my was husband was living in California and I was living in Utah, I 
called Mr. Stringer's office several times. I was told by Mr. Stringer, his wifeLinda and members 
of his staff that the case would take several months before anything happened. I was told by Mr. 
Stringer, his wife Linda and members of this staff that he was on top of the case and that he was 
moving things forward. 
6. I was never informed by Mr. Stringer that a motion for partial summary judgment 
\vss filed ! was only icid that the plaintiffs were attempting to drag the case out as long a<: 
-
 r
 ni i V :> 
1 of 2 Pages 
possible. 
7. Once I moved to California, my husband and I contacted Mark Stringer by fax and 
phone on at a regular basis. We were never told of any motion for partial summary judgment or 
motion for summary judgment. 
8. From March 1997 up through April, 1997, My husband and I contacted Mr. 
Stringer's office on a regular basis to check up on the progress of the case. I was told by Mr. 
Stringer's office staff on numerous occasions that the case was being moved forward. 
9. In April 1997, I contacted the office of Mark Stringer. I had previously heard from 
members o* my husbands family that we had lost the case. I ask** Mr Sfnnnar's secretary to 
specifically ask Mark Stringer if we had lost the case. Mr. Stringer's secretary specifically stated 
that we had not lost the case and that all was fine. 
10. On or about June 10, 1997, I had a conference with Mr. Stringer, my husband, 
my husband's Aunt and my husband in which he stated to me that the Lis Pendens was still in 
place and that it had not in fact been released. 
11. To the best of my knowledge and information, the above stated facts are true and 
accurate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED o ) j U h i s t j ^ d a v of 
^ ^ A , 
JERRY SCHOLLIAN 
Notary Public 
^ State of Utah 
My Commission Expires June 18,2001 , _ 
37 £. Center St, Provo. UT 84606 I y\ 
r SliBftCBI&CP Iw dwiLhsvieih before me on thisHfl 
September, 1997. 
Member, 1997 
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Jerry Schollian (6326) 
A Professional Corporation 
37 East Center Street, Suite 208 
Provo, UT 84601 
Tel: (801)-377-6500 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE COUNTY OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON & LAURIE SWANSON 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, et al. 
Defendants 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIS 
SWANSON 
Civil No. 960400307 
Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
STATE OF UTAH } 
ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH } 
Chris Swanson, being first duly sworn, do hereby deposes and states: 
1. I am of the age of majority and do possess the capacity and personal knowledge 
to attest to the facts stated herein; 
2. The following statements are my responses to the affidavit of Nikki Shumway, filed 
in support of the individual defendant's motion for summary judgment. I was not aware of the 
affidavit of Nikki Shumway until around June 27, 1997, when my wife, Laurie Swanson, 
discovered the affidavit and motion for summary judgment in the Court's file. 
3. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 1 of the affidavit, I do not 
believe that Ms. Shumway has sufficient personal knowledge to many of the facts she has stated 
in her affidavit. Ms. Shumway became a shareholder in Swanson Enterprises, Inc. only after the 
corporation's stock was redistributed for the benefit of SBA financing. 
4. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 2 of the affidavit, all 
allegations of fact therein are true to the best of my knowledge and information; 
5. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 3 of the affidavit, the 
scope of the remodeling project changed continually through the development of the project; 
however, the concept uf the restaurant was constantly being developed during the remodeling 
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project, and many changes to the existing structure were necessary. All other allegations of fact 
therein are true to the best of my knowledge and information. 
6. In response to Ms. Shumways statements in paragraph 4 of the affidavit, I and 
my wife gave up well paying jobs with excellent benefits, our house, and security to devote the 
necessary time and effort to complete the project. My wife and I contributed our own experience 
and skills for no money, until the restaurant business began to operate. My wife and I worked on 
the project full-time with no reimbursement for our out of pocket expenses, and the use of our 
apartment as the corporate office. The capital contributions by Beverly Swanson were in the 
from of land she conveyed to the corporation; 
Furthermore, my own interest in the real property was conveyed to the corporation 
because the city of Orem required that the property be all under one deed before any 
improvements could be approved. A deed reconveying my interest in the real property was 
conveyed to me to secure my interest in the real property. The deed was not recorded because 
by doing so, the city of Orem would not issue a permit for further improvements. I trusted my 
family members to look out for my best interests. I contributed my experience and expertise to 
the Corporation by assisting in the design of the kitchen and operating the business; 
7. In response to Ms. Shumways statements in paragraph 5 of the affidavit, the 
officers as outlined therein are correct to the best of my own knowledge and information;" 
however, due to the extended time required to finish construction, the agreements regarding 
compensation were changed; 
8. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 6 of the affidavit, it was 
not necessary to construct a new building. Upon the insistence of Beverly Swanson, a new 
building was constructed. Beverly Swanson did not contribute any more additional capital, only 
additional equity in the real property. 
Nikki Shumway was not initially included as a stockholder. Ms. Shumway was 
given a probationary period to see if her inclusion in the operation of the business would be 
possible. The success of the probation was contingent upon her ability to work with me, who 
was the creator and facilitator of the project. Ms. Shumway's inclusion as a shareholder and 
participation in the management of the restaurant was subject to approval by myself and my wife. 
The inclusion of Ms. Shumway in the business was only considered after she left her position at 
Jakes Restaurant, in Draper, Utah. 
9. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 6 of the affidavit, the 
restructuring of ii**? corporate ovw^ nership was done in order to qualify for the G3A financing. The 
restructuring of the corporate shares of stack was contingent upon a private agreement between 
myself and Beverly Swanson to write a will to transfer her shares to me upon her death, in order 
to insure my position as a majority stock holder. I was also to receive options to repurchase 
shares back up to my original 25% at a nominal fee, ($1.00 per share). I did prepare the SBA 
loan documents; however, the SBA loan was contingent upon a viable, equipped, capitalized 
business as presented in the business plan. 
10. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 7 of the affidavit, the 
changes i n ownership of the Corporate Shares were not made until the plaintiff initiated this 
lawsuit. As indicated by Ms. Shumway, I was responsible for the day to day operations of the 
business, including dong business with the City, obtaining permits, working with subcontractors, 
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consultants, purchases and negotiations. Managing the accounts payable and other 
bookkeeping matters required significant amounts of my wife's time. Beverly Swanson was 
informed of the reimbursements to my wife for her time, which only amounted to $1,600 for 
sixteen (16) weeks of work. 
11. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 9 of the affidavit, Laurie 
was familiar with the bookkeeping system purchased by the Corporation. All prior records had 
been kept on an Apple Macintosh and a Quick Books program. The platform to transfer the 
Apple data to an IBM format was simply unavailable. Upon information and belief, the 
bookkeeping data entered by Ms. Shumway was inaccurate and self-serving. 
12. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 10 of the affidavit, All 
disbursement of Corporate funds were fully authorized and documented. All records of 
disbursements of Corporate Funds have been given to the Corporate and Individual Defendants. 
Upon information and belief, the Defendants have misplaced and misrepresented the Corporate 
Disbursements. 
13. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 11 of the affidavit, The 
allegations of fact therein are false. All disbursements are fully documented and no funds were 
misappropriated for my use of the use of my wife, any checks for our personal use were 
repayments of loans made to the corporation or of our personal funds. 
14. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 12 of the affidavit, the 
allegations of fact therein are false. I have Video tape of myself being physically thrown out of 
the restaurant by Nikki Shumway. I do not have a key to the restaurant and the employees have 
been instructed to keep me out. 
15. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 13 of the affidavit, all 
allegations of fact therein are false. All account and loan records were turned over to the 
defendants. No corporate funds were transferred to our personal use and all funds can be 
accounted for. Many of the equipment and expenses were paid in cash. Clinton Swanson, 
Beverly Swanson and Nikki Shumway have all asked for case on numerous occasions and no 
receipts were ever supplied. Clinton Swanson was the contractor of record and ultimate was 
responsible for employee payments, taxes, workman's compensation, etc. Any cash funds 
released were done at his specific instructions. 
16. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 14 of the affidavit, all 
allegations stated therein are false. Any funds deposited from my account to the Corporation 
were loans to the Corporation 
17. In response to Ms. Shumway's statement's in paragraph 15 of the affidavit, all 
allegations of fact therein are false. A corporate kit was purchased from Utah Office Supply on 
Center Street in Provo prior to the formation of the Corporation. The only legitimate stock 
certificates issued by the corporation were the certificates issued upon the formation of the 
corporation and are documented on the Corporation's application for S Corporation status to the 
IRS. See Exhibit A, 2553 application for S Corp. 
18. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 16 of the affidavit, 
plaintiff have no information to form any opinion as to these allegations, and therefore deny the 
same. Defendants have always refused to provide any profit/less statements or tax returns of 
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the Corporation. 
y 
19. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 17 of the affidavit, my 
property and my wife's property was stolen; however, any claims of stolen property against Nikki 
Shumway are irrelevant to this matter. 
20. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 18 of the affidavit, I do 
not have enough information to form any believe as to such allegations, and therefore deny the 
same. 
21. In response to Ms. Shumway's statements in paragraph 19 of the affidavit, there 
was never any intention on my partXo v.roagfuliy-report any facts to any agency of the state or 
city. It is only my intent to prevent the defendant's from continuing to engage in unauthorized, 
ultra varus acts. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this {Ttfltfu of S o m b e r , 1997. 
WUs^foS* 
CFfrisiSWanjon 
Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED to and sworn before me on this day of September, 1997 
V A A, 4-^«l. 
JERRY SCHOLLIAN 
Notary Public 
State of Utah 
My Commission Expires June 18,2001 
37 E. Center St.. Prove. UT 34606 
0 m w w i» w *v"' w Ki* ^r ,*J v* 
Public 
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(Rev* December 1990) 
Department of the Treasury 
Internal Revenue Service 
LIUII uy a small Business Coronation 
Under section 1362 of the Internal Revenue 
• For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see page 1 of Instructions. 
• See separate Instructions. 
0MB No. 1545-0146 
Expires 11-30-93 
Notes: 1. This election, to be treated as an "S corporation," can be accepted only if all the tests in General Instruction 8 are met; all signatures in Parts I 
and III are originals (no photocopies); and the exact name and address of the corporation and other required form information are provided. 
2. Do not file Form 1120S until you are notified that your election is accepted. See General Instruction E. 
Election Information 
Name of corporation (see instructions) 
Number, street, and room or suite no. (If a P.O. box, see instructions.) 
5-
Employer Identification number 
(see instructions) 
8? - 053 7o^/ 
Name and telephone number (including area code) of corporate 
officer or legal representative who may-bexalled for information 
Chr)£ So3cZ/9£ on 
lh 
CsoQ 2^<a-2?£-( 
City or town, state, and ZIP code Election is to be effective for tax year beginning (month, day year) 
0 L Lhe corporation the outgrowth or continuation of any form of predecessor? . . Q Yes" H I No 
If "Yes," state name of predecessor, type of organization, and period of its existence • , 
F Check here • L—1 if the corporation has changed its name or address since applying for the 
employer identification number shown in item A above. 
t Date cf incorporation 
3-9-96 
G State of incorporation 
urr 
H If this election takes effect for the first tax year the corporation exists, enter month, day, and year of the earliest of the following: (1) date the 
corporation first had shareholders, (2) date the corporation first had assets, or (3) date the corporation began doing business. • o _ <o ^ -
I Selected tax year: Annual return will be filed for tax year ending (month and day) • l££C£/2VJb£/T.'.v?./ 
If the tax year ends on any date other than December 31, except for an automatic 52-53-week tax year ending with reference to the month of 
December, you must complete Part II on the back. If the date you enter is the ending date of an automatic 52-53-week tax year, write "52-53-week 
year" to the right of the date. See Temporary Regulations section 1.441-2T(eX3). 
J Name of each shareholder, person having a 
community property interest in the 
corporation's stock, and each tenant in 
common, joint tenant, and tenant by the 
entirety. (A husband and wife (and their 
estates) are counted as one shareholder in 
determining the number of shareholders 
wunout regard to the manner in which the 
stock is owned.) 
3&oesLu (2. SiD<zs)<>o/r 
Chris ^tOcunson 
ClUnJron E. Sudon^r^ 
Loubt/i-e C. Sthepctrd- S&i 
i 
K Shareholders' Consent Statement. 
We, the undersigned shareholders, consent to 
the corporation's election to be treated as an 
"S corporation" under section 1362(a). 
(Shareholders sign and date below.)* 
Signature 
y^^^^^^^ 
y //}. LT — 
nsoii ^^- LmJ 
u — \ 
Date 
3k/*5 
\ ' I—' 
^/?/*5 
3 ? / ? * 
L 
Stock owned 
Number of 
shares 
TL6OD 
Z5^o 
2cT«c?o 
2L5oo 
Dates 
acquired 
3/^ /^5-
* t 
-"—" T * 
f JT *« • ~ 
u» 
. 
T d 
M Social security number 
or employer identification 
number (se* instructions) 
Sz?-*f4-342o 
633 - 9 * -554? 
5 O I » - V V - 3 V A ? 
565-/3 - 5 ^ / ^ P 
* - -» ^ "> x ^ < ^ r -
>.r- > 1. 'J U v / J 
N Share-
holder's ' 
tax year 
ends 
(month 
and day) 
/z /3 / 
' 2 / 3 / 
/Z./3/ 
/ 2 / 3 / 
•For this election to be valid, the consent of each shareholder, person having a community property interest in the corporation's stock, and 
each tenant in common, joint tenant, and tenant by the entirety must either appear above or be attached to this form. (See instructions for 
Column K if continuation sheet o^r separate consent statement is needed.) 
Under penalties of perjury, I dectafe thaf/have examined this election, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, 
correct, and complete. / // I 
Signature of officer • / YAIdMJ4% Title - ?r*<)AuJh Date I- im 
S«* Parts II and III on Back. Form 2 5 5 3 (Rev. 12-90) 
Jerry Schollian (6326) 
A Professional Corporation 
37 East Center Street, Suite 208 
Provo, UT 84601 
Tel: (801)-377-6500 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE COUNTY OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON & LAURIE SWANSON 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, et al. 
Defendants. 
THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIS SWANSON 
Civil No. 960400307 
Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
STATE OF UTAH } 
ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH } 
Chris Swanson, being first duly sworn, do hereby deposes and states: 
1. I am of the age of majority and do possess the capacity and personal knowledge 
to attest to the facts stated herein; 
2. The following statements are my responses to the affidavit of Beverly Swanson, 
(hereinafter "affidavit"), filed in support of the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. ; 
3. In response to Ms. Swanson's statements in paragraph 1 of the affidavit, to the 
best cf my knowledge and infr^i^tion th**' rrs true. 
4. In response to Ms. Swanson's statements in paragraph 2 of the affidavit, all 
allegations of fact therein are true to the besi of my knowledge and information; 
5. In response to Ms. Swanson's statements in paragraph 3 of the affidavit, 
the fact stated therein are true to the best of my knowledge and information; however, it is 
important to note that Ms. Swanson had tried for years to purchase the real property from her 
brother Ray Christen. I was able to negotiate the purchase the real property. 
6. In response to Ms. Swanson's statements in paragraph 4 of the affidavit, I do not 
have enough information to confirm the statement* of fact made therein; 
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7. In response to Ms. Swanson's statements in paragraph 5 of the affidavit, I 
conveyed my interest in the real property only because it was required by the city of Orem that 
the property be held in one deed in order to obtain a building permit. I was given no 
consideration for my interest in the real property. Ms. Swanson gave me a deed to the real 
property to secure my interest therein; however, the deed was never recorded. 
8. In response to Ms. Swanson's statements in paragraph 6 of the affidavit, My 
release of my own interest in the real property was only to facilitate in the obtaining of a building 
permit from the city of Orem. It was not my intention to simply give away my interest in the real 
property. 
9. In response to Ms. Swanson's statements in paragraph 7 of the affidavit, Ms. 
Swanson is an experienced business woman. Ms. Swanson's assertion that she did not know 
what she was doing is completely false. The document was in quid pro quo for my release of 
ownership in the property in order to obtain the necessary building permits. The retransfer was 
to secure my position in case anything went wrong. 
10. In response to Ms. Swanson's statements in paragraph 8 of the affidavit, all 
statements of facts stated therein are false. 
11. In response to Ms. Swanson's statements in paragraph 9 of the affidavit, I had no 
part in the preparation or execution of documents transferring ownership of my share of the 
property purchased from Ray Christen to Swanson Enterprises. 
12. In response to Ms. Swanson's statements in paragraph 10 of the affidavit, this 
was an act of fraud. Beverly Swanson was fully aware that ownership of the property purchased 
from Ray Chirstensen had been signed back to me and Beverly Swanson as joint tenants. 
13. Beverly Swanson is well aware of my efforts and hard work in the Resturant Roy. 
See Letter written 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this (/-7ft da^of September, 1997. 
Tris Swi 
Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED to and sworn before me on this day of September, 1997. 
-?.< 
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rppnFirATF OF MAILING 
This certifies that the undersigned has mailed a true and accurate copy of the preceding 
document to the following parties: 
Original to: 
Fourth District Court 
Attention Civil Clerk 
125 North 100 West 
Provo, UT 84603 
Copy to: 
Mr. John Valentine 
c/o Howard, Lewis & Peterson 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
Mr. Tom Seiler 
80 North 100 West 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
DATED this j £ _ day of September, 1997 w 
n f 
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Form 2553 
(R«v. December 1990) 
Department of the Treasury 
Internal Revenue Service 
E> .tion by a Small Business Corporation 
(Under section 1 3 6 2 of the Internal Revenue Code) 
• For Paperwork Reduct ion Act Not lc * . see P*g» 1 o f instructions. 
• See separate Instructions, 
0MB No. 1545*0146 
Expires 11-30-93 
Notts: \. This election, to be treated as an "S corporation." can be accepted on)y ft a)) tne teste m Geneiai tasuutton B M * m*V, att signatures in Pans 
find III art originals (no photocopies); and the exact name and address of the corporation and other required form information are provided. 
2. Do not file Form 1120S until you are notified that your election is accepted. See General Instruction E. 
lyTllfl Flection Information 
$ 
5 
SI 
Name 0/ corporation (see instructions) 
ScQa-nsan Srvferpri zes. Tnc. 
Number, street, and room or suite no. (If a P.O. box, see instructions.) 
City or tt>wn. state, and ZIP code 
A Employer identification number 
(see instructions) 
g 7 - 053 ^O^l 
B Name and telephone number (including area code) of corporate 
officer or legal representative who may. be jelled for information 
C Election is to be effective for tai year beginning (month, day, ye*r 
/ - / - <?£ 
D Is the corporation the outgrowth or continuation of any form of predecessor? . . D Yes^S No 
If •Yes." state name of predecessor, type of organization, and period of its existence • 
F Check here • U if the corporation has changed its name or address since applying for the 
employer identification number shown in item A above. 
E Date of incorporation 
3-9-96 
6 State of incorporation 
urr 
H If this election takes effect for the first tax year the corporation exists, enter month, day, and year of the earliest of the following: (1) date the 
corporation first had shareholders, (2) date the corporation first had assets, or (3) date the corporation began doing business. • j j _ <P _ <P /? 
*S&4oytec.£L 
If the tax year ends on any date other than December 3 1 , except for an automatic 52-53-week tax year ending with reference to the month of 
December, you must complete Part II on the back. If the date you enter is the ending date of an automatic 52-53-week tax year, write '52-53-week 
year" to the right of the date. See Temporary Regulations section 1.441-2T(eX3). 
I Nam* of ea^h shareholder, person having a 
community property interest in the 
corporation's stock, and each tenant in 
common, joint tenant, and tenant by the 
entirety. (A husband and wife (and their 
estates) 9re counted as one shareholder in 
determining the number of shareholders 
without regard to the manner nn which the 
stock is owned.) 
CAiflJcon £ . SuOon^r 
K Shareholders'Consent Statement. 
We, the undersigned shareholders, consent to 
the corporation's election to be treated as an 
"Scorporation" under section 1362(a)-
(Shareholders sign and date below.)* 
Signature 
^vtz^w^ 
Oatt 
3 ) f / 4 5 
M** 
^Hfis 
Stock owned 
Number of 
shares 
-Z-5<x> 
2 & 9 0 
1Z.SOO 
Dates 
acquired 
foH 
3/3/75 
fo/4* 
M Social security number 
or employer identification 
number (see instructions) 
5z?-44-342o 
53L9-9O-554* 
5,a2-VV-3V^ 
N Sh»'»-
hoWef's 
tixye*' 
ends 
(month 
»ndd»y) 
Izjo. 
zjfcl 
i2
-hi Lduu/i-e C. ^ hepund- Sedop iil± 7LSo< MsJm 5b5-i5-5<f>/¥ 
\::^\±; i \ * ; i s srnv 
TRH 
ClfrCCT&R .frr 
SALT] LAKE CITY. UT^H 
TAKP^YESSERVirF ' 
•For this election to be valid, the consent of each shareholder, person having a community property interest in the corporation's stock, and 
each tenant in common, joint tenant, and tenant by the entirety must either appear above or be attached to.this form. (See instructions fof 
Column K if continuation sheet o^f separate consent statement is needed.) 
Under penalties of penury. I decttfiithaf/have examined this election, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, 
correct, and compete. / // ( . . 
Signature of officer • / S7/f/Mtr VAl/JAJyj*y J . «n* i - ^ Y<r*j» \ A *^-*~ « - • - - Z>\ Q M n 
yrfark K. Stringer, #4418 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER, P.A. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
37 East Center 
Second Floor, Front 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: 375-7678 
<H^ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, 
and CLINTON SWANSON, an individual, 
and NIKKI SHUMWAY, an individual? 
and BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON 
SWANSON, and NIKKI SHUMWAY, all dba 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES; and SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC. a Utah business 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES: 
BREACH OF CONTRACT, 
VIOLATION OF STATE LAW, 
UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES, 
THEFT BY CONVERSION, 
INDEMNIFICATION FOR 
UNAUTHORIZED ACTIONS, 
DERIVATIVE SUIT 
CIVIL NO .%&<fi62oi 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs in the above entitled matter, by and 
through counsel of record, and as and for a Complaint against the 
Defendants, separately and as joint agents, allege, demand, assert, 
and complain as follows: 
JURISDICTION, PARTIES. VENUE 
1. The Plaintiffs are and at all times complained of have been 
actual or intended residents of Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. The individual Defendants are or were at all times 
complained of residents of and/or doing business in Utah County, 
state of Utah. 
3. The Agreements and Contracts which form the basis of the 
business relationships at issue, were entered into or performed in 
part, or were to be performed in whole or in substantial part in 
Utah County, State of Utah. 
4. The acts complained of by the Plaintiffs took place, wholly 
or in substantial part in the County of Utah, State of Utah. 
5. The damages in this matter will exceed $100,000.00. 
6. The parties were or are the shareholders, officers, 
directors and agents for the business known as Swanson Enterprises, 
Inc. 
7. The individual or corporate Defendants will be referred to 
by their separate names where individual or specific action or 
liability is plead, and will be referred to generally as 
"Defendants" where joint action or liability is plead. 
8. For the most part, and for purposes of liability and 
damages, the Defendant persons were acting as the agents for 
eachother in all matters. 
9. The acts complained of include theft of business 
opportunity, breach of contract, violations of state laws, fraud 
and deception, all by the Defendants acting in concert to 
circumvent the Plaintiffs, to divert business opportunity from the 
Plaintiffs to the Defendants, to breach the agreements of good 
faith and fair dealing between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants, 
by fraud, theft and deceit. 
10. The Plaintiffs have been damaged, and therefore claim the 
right to recover from the Defendants, jointly and severally, in an 
amount not less than $100,000.00 for the lost opportunity, the 
value of the shares at 50% equity, and in an amount of not less 
than $100,000.00 in punitive damages, and in an amount not less 
than $5,000.00 for legal fees and costs incurred, the exact amounts 
to be proven at the time of trial. 
COUNT I: 
BREACH OF CONTRACT / CONSPIRACY 
11. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the allegations 
of the foregoing paragraphs 1 through 10, as if fully set forth 
hereat. 
12. In or about the 9th day of March, 1995, the individual 
persons Plaintiffs and Defendants, agreed to form a business 
venture registered with the state of Utah as SWANSON ENTERPRISES, 
INC. See Exhibit A Articles, and see also Exhibit B 10 March, 1995 
Minutes, incorporated hereat by this reference. 
13. Under the terms of the agreement for the said venture, the 
two Plaintiffs were equal share holders of the business, holding 
2500. shares each, representing a total of 50% of the business. 
Likewise, the two individual defendants, Clinton and Beverly 
Swanson were equal share holders of the business, holding 2500 
shares each, representing a total of 50% of the business. 
See Exhibit C Form 2553 Small Business Election, incorporated 
hereat by this reference. 
14. Under the terms of the agreement for the said venture, 
the Plaintiff Chris Swanson was the President and a Director, and 
the Plaintiff Laurie Swanson was the Secretary of the said 
business. See Exhibit D First Annual Report filed 3-14-95, 
incorporated hereat by this reference. See also Exhibit E. 
15. Under the terms of the agreement for the said venture, 
the parties through the business entity were to own and operate a 
restaurant at 2005 S. State, Orem, Utah, under the dba THE 
RESTAURANT ROY. See Exhibit E, DBA Filing 190579, incorporated 
hereat by this reference. 
16. Shortly after formation of the business venture, and as 
part of the venture, the parties applied for an SBA Loan (No. CDC-
863,014,3007) for the financing of the business venture and the 
development of the land. See Exhibit F, SBA Loan Authorization and 
504 Guaranty, incorporated hereat by this reference. 
17. In discussing the SBA requirements, it was discovered that 
having the Plaintiffs remain as 50% shareholders was detrimental to 
(and possibly fatal to) the SBA funding. 
18. Accordingly, the parties discussed informally as 
shareholders and Board, and agreed in principle that the Plaintiffs 
would allow an informal restructuring of the shares of the 
corporation, for purposes of facilitating the SBA loan, with the 
express understanding that the Plaintiffs would be able to 
repurchase the shares back up to the 50% level, for a nominal/token 
payment only. 
19. On the basis of this informal understanding and relying on 
the promises and agreements of the Defendants, the Plaintiffs 
allowed the informal proposed restructuring of shares to be filed 
with the SBA as part of the loan package. See Exhibit F. 
20. The SBA rejected the informal arrangement for the shares, 
and requested that the company formalize the restructuring of the 
shares, provide new certificates, and draft and pass formal minutes 
of appropriate meetings — all of which was never accomplished. 
21. Under the terms of the agreement for the said venture, 
and as an explicit condition of his coming to Utah to participate 
in the acquisition of the land and the organization of the 
restaurant, the Plaintiff Chris Swanson was to be the sole day-to-
day management of the restaurant, and to receive a regular full 
time salaried position therefore. 
22. In reliance upon the agreements between the parties, and 
in furtherance of the venture, the Plaintiffs gave up their home, 
terminated their employment, and moved to Utah, at a cost to them 
in excess of $7,500 per month. 
23. In spite of, and in breach of the agreement reached 
between the parties, the Defendants have refused to allow the 
Plaintiffs further access to the property, have denied access to 
the records of the corporation, and have refused to disclose the 
day-to-day operations of the proposed restaurant. 
24. The Defendants have refused to honor the original 
agreement to provide the Plaintiff Chris with full time employment 
as management of the restaurant. 
25. As a result of the breach of the agreement by the 
Defendants, the Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount not less 
than $100,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial. 
26. As a result of the actions of the Defendants, the 
Plaintiffs have had to retain counsel for this suit, and demand the 
recovery of fees and costs in an amount to be proven at trial, but 
not less than $5,000.00. 
COUNT II; 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
AND VIOLATION OF STATE LAW AND CORPORATE REGULATIONS 
27. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the allegations 
of the foregoing paragraphs 1 through 26, as if fully set forth 
hereat. 
28. The Plaintiff is informed by the Utah State department of 
Business Regulation, Division of Corporations, and therefore 
believes that the Defendant persons, acting in and violating their 
(UCA 22-1-1 et seq fiduciary) capacities as officers, directors or 
shareholders, have unilaterally amended the corporate structure, 
changing officers, directors, registered agent, and reapportioning 
shares. 
29. The said Defendants have listed with the state of Utah the 
following officers: 
Beverly Swanson, Pres. 
Clinton Swanson, V.Pres. 
Nikki Shumway, Sec/Tres., and Reg. Agent. 
30. Plaintiffs are informed and therefore believe, that the 
said Defendant persons have misrepresented to third parties the 
financial structure of the corporation, including the allocation of 
shares, for purposes of obtaining financing and building permits, 
etc. 
31. The said changes in the corporate structure were taken by 
the Defendant persons, acting illegally and in violation of the 
rights of the Plaintiffs, and in violation of the Utah statutes 
governing the operation of corporations. 
32. The said changes in the corporate structure were taken by 
the Defendant persons, without Notice or a duly called and held 
meeting of the shareholders or directors. 
33. Plaintiff asserts the right to bring this Cause under URCP 
23.1 regarding derivative actions by shareholders for breach of 
fiduciary duty by officers, directors, and shareholders; and under 
UCA 16-10a-101 et seq, governing the operation of corporations and 
the rights and responsibilities of shareholders, officers, and 
directors. 
34. Plaintiffs are informed and therefore believe that the 
Defendants have conspired to defraud the Court and Geneva Steel, 
with regard to an interest in a law suit concerning certain pension 
payments made by Geneva to the Defendant Clinton Swanson. Because 
this action was taken in conjunction with the establishment and 
operation of the corporate business, and involved the corporate 
officers and directors and shareholders, the Plaintiff believe that 
some liability may attach to the corporate business. 
35. As part of the approval for the building of the 
restaurant, the City of Orem required that the land for the 
proposed restaurant be held by one entity. 
36. At the inception of the venture, one parcel (referred to 
hereinafter as parcel 2) was held by Chris Swanson and Beverly 
Swanson. See Exhibit G hereto, the Warranty Deed from Christen to 
Swanson dated 30 December, 1994, incorporated hereat by this 
reference. 
37. In or about 30 March, 1995, in reliance on the agreements 
and understandings, and to facilitate the approvals required from 
the city, the Plaintiff Chris Swanson signed a Quit Claim Deed in 
favor of Defendant Beverly Swanson, placing the said property into 
her name. See Exhibit H hereto, the Quit Claim Deed from Chris 
Swanson to Beverly Swanson dated 30 March, 1995, incorporated 
hereat by this reference. 
38. In or about 22 September, 1995, to facilitate the interim 
financing and city approvals, the Defendant Beverly Swanson signed 
a Warranty Deed in favor of Defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc., 
placing the said parcel 2, and the adjacent parcel 1 into the 
corporate venture. See Exhibit I hereto, the Warranty Deed from 
Beverly Swanson to the corporation, dated 22 September, 1995, 
incorporated hereat by this reference. 
39. To secure the Plaintiff's position in the land, and to 
secure their equity position in the corporation, and to secure 
Plaintiff Chris' position in management, and in consideration for 
Plaintiff Chris signing the Quit Claim to Beverly, Beverly 
simultaneously signed a Warranty Deed in favor of Chris, 
effectively reconveying the said land interest. See Exhibit J, 
Warranty Deed, incorporated hereat by this reference. 
40. The Defendants have managed the construction in such a 
manner that there exists an encroachment on an adjacent property, 
where the Defendants have had constructed sewage lines. 
41. Plaintiff asserts that these actions taken by the 
Defendant persons, were violations of the restrictions and 
provisions of UCA 76-10-701, et seq, and therefore constitute 
felony and misdemeanor crimes and grounds for this civil suit. 
42. The Plaintiffs affirmatively represent that (with the 
exception of the land deeds and the sewage problems) they neither 
consented nor assented to the said actions taken by the other 
officers, directors and shareholders. 
COUNT III 
INDEMNIFICATION FOR UNAUTHORIZED ACTIONS 
43. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the allegations 
of the foregoing paragraphs 1 through 42, as if fully set forth 
hereat. 
44. Plaintiffs7 assert that the Defendants' took the said 
actions without the knowledge of, and/or in direct contravention of 
the dissent from, the Plaintiffs. 
45. If there arise from the actions by the defendants suits or 
claims, seeking damages from the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs claim 
the right to recover the same from the Defendants. 
COUNT IV 
DERIVATIVE ACTION TO REMOVE OFFICER 
46. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the allegations 
of the foregoing paragraphs 1 through 45, as if fully set forth 
hereat. 
47. Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants have established 
Defendant Nikki Shumway as an officer of the corporation, without 
a duly constituted meeting of the Board or shareholders. 
48. Plaintiffs assert that if there was a valid agreement for 
the retention of Shumway as an employee of the corporation, it was 
conditioned upon her complete commitment as a full time pDsition, 
without conflicts, and conditioned further on her not disclosing to 
third parties any corporate confidential information or trade 
secrets. 
49. Plaintiffs assert that the said Defendant Shumway has 
breached her agreement with the corporation, if any, and violated 
her fiduciary duty to the company and shareholders, by: 
a. fraudulently receiving unemployment compensation while 
employed with the corporation, with the knowledge and assistance of 
some or all other Defendants, and 
b. revealing to third parties confidential information, 
including without limitation, restaurant theme concept, menu, 
design, kitchen layout, and operations. 
50. The actions of the said Defendant Shumway are damaging to 
the corporation, but the other (Defendant) officers, directors and 
shareholders, have refused to terminate Shumway. 
51. The Court should order the termination of Shumway 
forthwith. 
COUNT V 
CONVERSION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
52. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the allegations 
of the foregoing paragraphs 1 through 51, as if fully set forth 
hereat. 
53. The defendants are unlawfully holding personal property 
belonging to the Plaintiffs, and have unlawfully taken some of the 
property from storage, and converted it to the use and benefit of 
the corporation, without compensation to the Plaintiffs. 
54. Defendant Shumway is holding at her residence, or stored 
elsewhere, the personal [property of the Plaintiffs, including, 
without limitation, electronic equipment, audio systems, Christmas 
decorations, clothing, wedding dress, personal records and 
documents, with an aggregate value in excess of $15,000.00. 
55. Plaintiffs have repeatedly demanded, but the Defendants 
refused to release the said personal property. 
56. Plaintiffs are informed and therefore believe that the 
Defendants have begun to convert this property to the benefit of 
the corporation, specifically taking and installing a $5,000 
chandelier and a $2,500 alarm system in the restaurant property, 
without compensation to the Plaintiffs. 
57. Plaintiffs claim the right to recover the amount of $7,000 
for the two converted property items, and the right to recover the 
balance of the personal property itself; only in the alternative 
that the personal property is no longer available or so damaged as 
to be effectively destroyed or worthless, the Plaintiffs should 
recover an amount not less than $15,000 as the reasonable value of 
the undelivered property. 
58. If the said property is recovered and delivered to the 
Plaintiffs, the Defendants should be liable to the Plaintiffs for 
the damage or waste resulting from improper use or storage. 
COUNT VI 
URCP 66 
RECEIVERSHIP OR INDEPENDENT MANAGEMENT 
59. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the allegations 
of the foregoing paragraphs 1 through 58, as if fully set forth 
hereat. 
60. The Plaintiffs were at first in charge of the day-to-day 
operations and books, and were later coerced and forced under 
duress to acquiesce to the demands of the defendants to turn over 
control to them. 
61. Since the Defendants have taken control, the Plaintiffs 
have discovered evidence of records alteration and tampering, and 
are afraid of additional records tampering. 
62 The Plaintiffs pray for the Court to install at the 
Defendants' sole expense, a receiver or independent business 
manager, to take interim control of the corporate assets and the 
operations of the restaurant business, during the pendency of these 
matters. 
63 The nature of the operation of a retail business is such 
that unrestricted operation would allow the Defendants the 
opportunity to siphon off assets and income, and tamper with or 
alter the records, to the detriment of the corporation and the 
Plaintiffs. 
64. In this regard, the Receiver should be appointed to review 
the books and records of the corporation and all accounts, since 
it's inception. 
COUNT VII; 
COMMON LAW CONSPIRACY / FRAUD — PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
65. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the allegations 
of the foregoing paragraphs 1 through 64, as if fully set forth 
hereat. 
66. Plaintiffs assert that when the Defendants acted in 
concert to unfairly profit from and abuse the corporate assets and 
opportunities, in a manner to restrict and interfere with the 
Plaintiffs existing rights, it was a common law conspiracy. 
67. As a result of the Defendants' actions in conspiring to 
interfere with and unfairly trade on the Plaintiffs' business 
interests and rights, the Plaintiffs have been damaged, as set 
forth herein above, and as more fully proven at the time of trial. 
68. Additionally, because of the intentional acts of the 
Defendants, the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover punitive damages 
in an amount three times actual damages, but not less than 
$100,000.00. 
COUNT VIII: 
PERMANENT INJUNCTION ~ RECOVERY OF PROFITS 
69. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the allegations 
of the foregoing paragraphs 1 through 68, as if fully set forth 
hereat. 
70. Plaintiffs are entitled to immediate and permanent 
injunction against the Defendants, and each of them jointly and 
severally, restraining each of them, and all acting with or for any 
of them, from: 
a. restricting the Plaintiffs access to the property. 
b. restricting the Plaintiffs access to the books and 
records of the corporation. 
c. the transfer, encumbering, or otherwise diminishing in 
value of any corporate assets or opportunities. 
71. Plaintiffs are entitled to an Order directing the 
Defendants to disgorge the profits, sales receipts, and accounts 
deposits and withdrawals of the corporation. 
COUNT IX: 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
72. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the allegations 
of the foregoing paragraphs 1 through 71, as if fully set forth 
hereat. 
73. To secure the Plaintiff's position in the land, and to 
secure their equity position in the corporation, and to secure 
Plaintiff Chris' position in management, and in consideration for 
Plaintiff Chris signing the Quit Claim to Beverly, Beverly 
simultaneously signed a Warranty Deed in favor of Chris, 
effectively reconveying the said land interest. 
74. The agreement between the parties included the following 
specific promises and commitments to the Plaintiffs: 
a. The employment of the Plaintiff Chris, as full time 
management of the restaurant. 
b. The equity position owning 50% of the shares of the 
corporation/restaurant. 
c. The reconveyance to Chris of the one half /joint 
interest in parcel 2. 
75. Plaintiffs pray for an Order directing the Defendants to 
specifically perform on the said obligations, or in the 
alternative, and only as an alternative, to pay the damages for the 
breach thereof, as set forth above, and as more fully proven at 
trial. 
COUNT X; 
JUDICIAL EVALUATION AND DISSOLUTION 
76. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the allegations 
of the foregoing paragraphs 1 through 75, as if fully set forth 
hereat. 
77. The Plaintiffs pray, as the last alternative for justice, 
that the Court conduct a judicial evaluation of the shares of the 
corporation, and give the Plaintiffs the opportunity to buy out the 
Defendants' interest. 
78. If the Plaintiffs are unable to buy out the Defendants, 
the Defendants should have the opportunity to do so. 
79. If neither party can or will buy out the other, the 
corporation should be dissolved, and the assets used to retire the 
agreed debts, then used to pay the Plaintiffs' damages as plead, 
then the balance used to pay all other debts, and the net balance, 
if any, split equally between the first four shareholders. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants 
as follows: 
COUNT I 
i. Judgment for damages in lost income and costs of not less 
than $7,500 per month, from the date the Plaintiffs moved to Utah 
for this opportunity. 
ii. General damages for breach in an amount not less than 
$100,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial. 
iii. Fees and costs in an amount to be proven at trial, but 
not less than $5,000.00. 
COUNTS II and III and VII 
i. An Order directing the Defendants to reestablish the 
officers and directors as first constituted, 
ii. An Order indemnifying the Plaintiff from all unauthorized 
actions taken by the Defendants 
iii. General damages in an amount not less than $100,000, the 
exact amount to be proven at trial. 
iv. Fees and costs in an amount to be proven at trial, but not 
less than $5,000.00. 
COUNT IV 
i. An Order removing Defendant Shumway as an officer of the 
corporation. 
ii. AN Injunction against Shumway, restraining her from 
unfairly competing with the Plaintiffs, or from revealing 
confidential trade secrets or corporate information. 
iii. Fees and costs in an amount to be proven at trial, but 
not less than $5,000.00. 
COUNT V 
i. Judgment in the amount of not less than $7,500 for 
converted personal property. 
ii. An order directing the immediate return of the balance of 
the property being unlawfully held. 
iii. In the event the property is lost or essentially 
destroyed, the award of $15,000.00 as compensation therefore. 
iv. If the said property is recovered and delivered to the 
Plaintiffs, awarding the Plaintiffs a fair amount for the damage or 
waste resulting from improper use or storage. 
v. Fees and costs in an amount to be proven at trial, but not 
less than $5,000.00. 
COUNT VI 
i. Ordering a Receiver appointed at Defendants' sole expense, 
to take interim control of the corporate assets and the operations 
of the restaurant business, during the pendency of these matters. 
In this regard, the Receiver should be appointed to review the 
books and records of the corporation and all accounts, since it's 
inception. 
ii. Fees and costs in an amount to be proven at trial, but not 
less than $5,000.00. 
VIII 
i. Issuing an immediate and permanent injunction against the 
Defendants, and each of them jointly and severally, restraining 
each of them, and all acting with or for any of them, from: 
a. restricting the Plaintiffs access to the property, 
b. restricting the Plaintiffs access to the books and 
records of the corporation. 
c. the transfer, encumbering, or otherwise diminishing in 
value of any corporate assets or opportunities. 
ii. Fees and costs in an amount to be proven at trial, but not 
less than $5,000.00. 
COUNT IX 
i. Ordering the Defendant s to specifically perform under the 
agreement, to include: 
a. The employment of the Plaintiff Chris, as full time 
management of the restaurant. 
b. The equity position owning 50% of the shares of the 
corporation/restaurant. 
c. The reconveyance to Chris of the one half/joint 
interest in parcel 2. 
ii. General damages in an amount not less than $100,000, the 
exact amount to be proven at trial. 
iii. Fees and costs in an amount to be proven at trial, but 
not less than $5,000.00. 
COUNT X 
i. A judicial evaluation of the shares of the corporation, 
giving the Plaintiffs the opportunity to buy out the Defendants' 
interest. 
ii. If the Plaintiffs are unable to buy out the Defendants, 
the Defendants should have the opportunity to do so. 
iii. If neither party can or will buy out the other, the 
corporation should be dissolved, and the assets used to retire the 
agreed debts, then used to pay the Plaintiffs' damages as plead, 
then the balance used to pay all other debts, and the net balance, 
if any, split equally between the first four shareholders. 
ON ALL COUNTS 
i. Interest at the highest statutory rate. 
ii. such other relief as to the Court seems just under the 
circumstances. 
DATED AND SIGNED THIS DAY OF , 19 . 
MARK K. SpiXifGER 
Attorj^ ey for Plainti€fs 
/JOHN L. VALENTINE (3310), for: 
J HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE 
SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, 
and CLINTON SWANSON, an 
individual, and NIKKI SWANSON, an 
individual; and BEVERLY SWANSON, 
CLINTON SWANSON, AND NIKKI 
SWANSON, all dba SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES; and SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah business, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Case No. 960400307CN 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW the defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc., a Utah corporation, and 
answers the Complaint of the plaintiffs as follows: 
J:\jlv\swanent.ans 
Our File No. 23,628 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted and, therefore, 
should be dismissed with this defendant being awarded its attorney fees and costs for the defense 
of the same, 
SECOND DEFENSE 
With respect to the specific allegations of the complaint, this defendant admits and 
denies the same as follows: 
1. This defendant admits the allegations contained under the caption "Jurisdiction, 
Parties, Venue," identified as paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7. 
2. This defendant denies the allegations contained under the caption "Jurisdiction, 
Parties, Venue," identified as paragraphs 5, 8, 9 and 10. 
3. With respect to Count I, this defendant admits and denies the allegations 
contained in paragraph 11 as it incorporates by reference its responses to paragraphs 1 through 
10 above. 
4. With respect to the allegations contained in the remainder of Count I, this 
defendant admits and denies the same as follows: 
a. This defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 15 and 
16 of said Count. 
b. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of Count I, 
this defendant admits that the plaintiffs were initially to be equal shareholders of the business, 
2 
but that circumstances changed shortly after the incorporation which caused stock to be issued 
in a form different than original envisioned by the parties. All other allegations of said 
paragraph are denied. 
c. With respect to paragraph 14 of Count I, this defendant admits that the 
plaintiff Chris Swanson was to be the original president and a director and that the plaintiff 
Laurie Swanson was to be the secretary of the corporation, but that those offices changed shortly 
after initial formation of the corporation. 
d. With respect to paragraph 18 of Count I, this defendant admits that 
restructuring of the shares of the corporation occurred, but the purpose for such restructuring 
was both the facilitating of the SBA loan and the additional capital contribution required by the 
SBA of the defendants Beverly Swanson and Clinton Swanson. This defendant denies all other 
allegations of this paragraph. 
e. With respect to paragraph 19 of Count I, this defendant admits that the 
restructuring did take place but denies each and every other allegation contained in paragraph 
19. 
f. This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 21, 22, 
23, 24, 25 and 26 of Count I and specifically also denies each and every other allegation 
contained in Count I not specifically admitted. 
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g. This defendant admits that the Articles of Incorporation were signed 
by the parties on or about March 9, 1995, as alleged in paragraph 12 of the Complaint, but 
denies each and every other allegation contained in said paragraph. 
h. In response to paragraph 17 of the Complaint, this defendant 
affirmatively alleges that the stock ownership changed due to a recapitalization of the corporation 
and infusion of new capital and services by the other defendants. This defendant denies each 
and every other allegation of said paragraph. 
i. In response to paragraph 20 of the Complaint, this defendant 
affirmatively alleges that the duty to have prepared the bylaws, appropriate minutes, and new 
stock certificates and submit them to the other directors for approval belonged to Chris Swanson. 
He has failed and refused to do so. This defendant denies each and every other allegation of 
said paragraph. 
5. In response to paragraph 27 of Count II, this defendant incorporates its 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 26 above. 
6. This defendant admits that it has filed a document with the Division of 
Corporations indicating the present status of the corporation, but denies each and every other 
allegation contained in paragraph 28 of Count II. 
7. This defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 29 of Count II of 
the Complaint. 
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8. This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of 
Count II. 
9. With respect to paragraphs 33 and 34 of Count II of the Complaint, this 
defendant is without sufficient knowledge as to form a basis of opinion or belief and, therefore, 
denies the same. 
10. In response to paragraph 35 of the Complaint, this defendant denies the 
allegations contained in said paragraph. 
11. In response to paragraph 36 of the Complaint, this defendant admits the 
allegations contained in said paragraph insofar as they accurately reflect the written documents, 
and deny all allegations inconsistent with such documents. This defendant further states that the 
documents were prepared by the plaintiffs or done at their direction, acting in a fiduciary 
capacity to this defendant. 
12. In response to paragraph 37 of the Complaint, this defendant admits that 
plaintiff Chris Swanson signed a quit claim deed in favor of the defendant Beverly Swanson, but 
denies each and every other allegation contained in paragraph 37 of the Compliant. This 
defendant affirmatively states that the parol evidence rule applies, as each of the documents are 
fully integrated documents and unambiguously state the facts shown thereon. 
13. In response to paragraph 38 of the Complaint, this defendant admits the 
allegations contained in said paragraph as long as they are consistent with the warranty deed 
(Exhibit I), but deny all other allegations of said paragraph. 
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14. In response to paragraph 39 of the Complaint, this defendant is without 
sufficient knowledge as to the allegations contained in said paragraph and, therefore, denies the 
same. 
15. This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 40, 41 and 42 of 
the Complaint, and further alleges that the plaintiff Chris Swanson had the duty to make certain 
that all approvals were obtained and that the construction occurred in a proper manner and at 
a proper location. 
16. In response to paragraph 43 of the Complaint, this defendant incorporates its 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 42 above. 
17. This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 44 and 45 of 
Count II of the Complaint. 
18. In response to paragraph 46 of the Complaint, this defendant incorporates by 
reference its responses to paragraphs 1 through 45 above. 
19. This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 47, 49, 50 and 
51 of Count IV of the Complaint. In further answering the allegations of paragraph 47 of the 
Complaint, this defendant affirmatively alleges that the plaintiff Chris Swanson prepared the 
"Corporation Information Form" with Nikki Shumway listed as an officer. 
20. This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 48 of the 
Complaint. 
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21. In response to paragraph 52 of Count V of the Complaint, this defendant 
incorporates its responses to paragraphs 1 through 51 above. 
22. This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 53, 56, 57 and 
58 of Count V of the Complaint. 
23. This defendant is without sufficient knowledge as to the allegations contained 
in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the Complaint upon which to form a basis of belief and, therefore, 
denies the same. 
24. In response to paragraph 59 of the Complaint as contained in Count VI of the 
same, this defendant incorporates its responses to paragraphs 1 through 58 above. 
25. In response to paragraph 60 of the Complaint, this defendant admits that the 
plaintiffs were initially in charge of the day-to-day operations and books of the corporation, but 
denies the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 60 of the Complaint. 
26. This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 61, 62, 63 and 
64 of the Complaint. 
27. In response to paragraph 65 of the Complaint, this defendant incorporates its 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 64 above. 
28. This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 66, 67 and 68 of 
the Complaint. 
29. In response to paragraph 69 of the Complaint, this defendant incorporates its 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 68 above. 
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30. This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 70 and 71 of the 
Complaint. 
31. In response to paragraph 72 of the Complaint, this defendant incorporates its 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 71 above. 
32. This defendant is without sufficient knowledge as to the allegations contained 
in paragraph 73 of the Complaint upon which to form a basis of opinion or belief and, therefore, 
denies the same. 
33. In response to paragraph 74 of the Complaint, this defendant finds said 
paragraph unintelligible, and since it cannot determine what agreement is being referenced, it, 
therefore, denies the allegations contained in said paragraph. 
34. In response to paragraph 75 of the Complaint, this defendant denies the 
allegations contained therein. 
35. In response to paragraph 76 of the Complaint, this defendant incorporates its 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 75 above. 
36. This defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 77, 78 and 79 of 
the Complaint. 
37. This defendant denies each and every allegation not specifically admitted herein. 
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THIRD DEFENSE 
(Affirmative) 
This defendant pleads laches, estoppel, waiver and unclean hands of the plaintiffs in 
regard to the allegations contained in plaintiffs' Complaint. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
(Affirmative) 
At all times relevant to the matters asserted in this action, the plaintiffs owed a fiduciary 
duty to this defendant as officers, directors and shareholders of the same. 
WHEREFORE, the defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc., having fully answered the 
Complaint of the plaintiffs, prays that the same be dismissed and that it be awarded its attorney 
fees and costs for the defense of the same, together with the relief prayed for in the 
Counterclaim below. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW the defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc., a Utah corporation, and 
complains of the plaintiffs by way of counterclaim as follows: 
1. At all times complained of herein, the plaintiffs were officers, directors and 
shareholders of the defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
2. The plaintiff Chris Swanson was the initial president of Swanson Enterprises, 
Inc. and had the primary responsibility for the formation and initial operations of the 
corporation. 
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3. The plaintiff Laurie Swanson was the initial secretary of the corporation and 
had the primary responsibility for the preparation and maintenance of certain records of the 
corporation. 
4. By virtue of the offices held by the plaintiffs, they owed a fiduciary duty to the 
defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
5. Upon the initial set-up of the corporation, the plaintiff Chris Swanson assumed 
the day-to-day affairs of the corporation and was responsible for disbursements of funds. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Accounting) 
6. This defendant incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 
5 of this counterclaim as though fully set forth herein. 
7. The plaintiff Chris Swanson made disbursements from corporate funds which 
were not authorized by the board of directors but which required such authorization. Even 
though he had responsibility for day-to-day operations in the initial phases of the corporation, 
certain disbursements could not to be made without express authority of the board of directors 
of the corporation. 
8. Specifically, the plaintiffs were to receive no compensation until the business 
of the corporation was open and profitable. 
9. The plaintiffs commenced to pay themselves wages for services rendered to the 
corporation without authorization by the board of directors. 
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10. The plaintiffs caused health insurance premiums for themselves to be paid by 
the corporation without authorization by the board of directors. 
11. Upon information and belief, this defendant alleges that the plaintiffs removed 
other funds from the corporation and paid personal bills. There is approximately $56,000.00 
unaccounted for in corporate funds for which the records are in the exclusive possession of the 
plaintiffs. 
12. Upon information and belief, this defendant alleges that the plaintiffs may have 
even repaid themselves for their capital contribution or their share of the payment on the 
property contributed as capital to the corporation. 
13. The defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc. is entitled to an accounting of the 
funds disbursed by the plaintiffs during the time they were in control of the corporation's 
financial affairs, and for an order of restitution or, in the alternative, judgment for amounts 
wrongfully distributed. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Failure of Consideration) 
14. This defendant incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 
13 of this counterclaim as though fully set forth herein. 
15. As alleged above and upon information and belief, the plaintiffs have repaid 
themselves for the capital contributions they have made to the corporation in exchange for stock. 
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16. Such repayment was done without the authorization of the board of directors 
and in violation of the required capital needed by the corporation to operate its affairs. 
17. The stock being issued to the plaintiffs was therefore issued without 
consideration and is void. 
18. The corporation is entitled to an order of restitution by the Court ordering that 
any shares issued to the plaintiffs are void. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgment) 
19. This defendant incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 
18 of this counterclaim as though fully set forth herein. 
20. The initial issuance of shares to the plaintiffs was as follows: 
Chris Swanson 2,500 shares 
Laurie C. Shepard-Swanson 2,500 shares 
21. As an alternative to the allegations contained in the Second Cause of Action 
above, if the Court finds that the consideration for the shares initially issued was valid, the 
corporation is entitled to recall said shares and reissue new shares as follows as part of a 
recapitalization plan adopted by the corporation: 
Chris Swanson 1,900 shares 
Laurie Swanson 900 shares 
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22. A dispute has arisen between the parties as to the proper number of shares 
owned by the plaintiffs. 
23. The corporation is entitled to an order of the Court by way of declaratory 
judgment declaring how many shares are properly owned by the plaintiffs. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Malicious Prosecution) 
24. This defendant incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 
23 of this counterclaim as though fully set forth herein. 
25. The plaintiff Chris Swanson has employed this litigation and the use of the lis 
pendens to interfere with this defendant's business. 
26. Prior to the time of filing this litigation, the plaintiff Chris Swanson made 
threats to this defendant that he would interfere with the legitimate business relationships of this 
defendant as a means to acquire a settlement favorable to him. 
27. The use of civil litigation in this case has been done as a weapon to damage the 
defendant's business and is calculated to intentionally interfere with this defendant's economic 
relations by improper means. 
28. The plaintiff Chris Swanson has sent letters and faxes to various business 
contacts, creditors and taxing authorities of this defendant with the intent to interfere with its 
prospective economic relations. 
13 
29. Such actions constitute the tort of malicious prosecution, or, in the alternative, 
interferes with prospective economic relations of this defendant. 
30. This defendant is entitled to damages in an amount established at the time of 
trial incurred as a result of the filing of this action and the other interference by the plaintiffs 
with business relations and prospective relationships of economic advantage to the corporation. 
WHEREFORE, this defendant prays for relief on its counterclaim as follows: 
1. For an accounting of the funds disbursed by the plaintiffs during the time they 
were in control of the corporation's financial affairs, and for an order of restitution or, in the 
alternative for a judgment for amounts wrongfully distributed, and for attorney fees to force such 
accounting since plaintiff owed a fiduciary duty to this defendant and breached such duty by 
failing to so account. 
2. For an order of the Court ordering that any shares issued to the plaintiffs are 
void for lack of consideration or failure of consideration. 
3. In the alternative, for a declaratory order declaring how many shares are 
properly owed by the plaintiffs. 
4. For damages, costs and attorney fees for malicious prosecution and interference 
by the plaintiffs with the business relations and prospective relationships of economic advantage 
to the corporation. 
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5. For such other relief as may be proper. 
DATED this \1* day of June, 1996. 
5HN U VALENTINE, for: 
IQVyXRD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this / "2 - day of June, 1996. 
Mark K. Stringer, Esq. 
Blakelock & Stringer 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, UT 84606 
Thomas W. S e l l e r , Esq . 
R o b i n s o n , S e l l e r & G l a z i e r 
P .O . Box 12i 
P r o y o , U/T /8y4603 
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Thomas W. Seiler, #2910 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
Attorneys for Defendants 
80 North 100 West 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE ] 
SWANSON, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
VS. ; 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON ) 
SWANSON, NIKKI SHUMWAY ] 
individually; and BEVERLY 
SWANSON, CLINTON SWANSON 
and NIKKI SHUMWAY, all dba 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES; and 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES, INC., 
a Utah business, , 
Defendants. ] 
I COUNTERCLAIM 
) Civil No. 960400307CN 
) Judge: 
COME NOW the Defendants Beverly Swanson, Clinton Swanson, and Nikki 
Shumway, and foi a cause of action against the Plaintiffs allege as follows: 
1. At all times complained of herein, the Plaintiffs were officers, 
(EKHlfciT V W ) 
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directors and shareholders of the Defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
2. The Plaintiff Chris Swanson was the initial president of Swanson 
Enterprises, Inc., and had the primary responsibility for the formation and initial operations 
of the corporation. 
3. The Plaintiff Laurie Swanson was the initial secretary of the 
corporation and had the primary responsibility for the preparation and maintenance of certain 
records of the corporation. 
4. By virtue of the offices held by the Plaintiffs, they owed a fiduciary 
duty to the individual Defendants. 
5. Upon the initial set-up of the corporation, the Plaintiff Chris Swanson 
assumed the day-to-day affairs of the corporation and was responsible for disbursements of 
funds. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Accounting) 
6. These Defendants incorporate the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1 through 5 of this Counterclaim as though fully set forth herein. 
7. The Plaintiff Chris Swanson made disbursements from corporate 
funds which were not authorized by the board of directors but which reqxiired such 
authorization. Even though he had responsibility for day-to-day operations in the initial 
phases of the corporation, certain disbursements could not be made without express authority 
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of the board of directors of the corporation. 
8. Specifically, the Plaintiffs were to receive no compensation until the 
business of the corporation was open and profitable. 
9. The Plaintiffs commenced to pay themselves wages for services 
rendered to the corporation without authorization by the board of directors. 
10. The Plaintiffs caused health insurance premiums for themselves to be 
paid by the corporation without authorization by the board of directors. 
11. Upon information and belief, these Defendants allege that the Plaintiff 
removed other funds from the corporation and paid personal bills. There is approximately 
$56,000.00 unaccounted for in corporate funds for which the records are in the exclusive 
possession of the Plaintiffs. 
12. Upon information and belief, these Defendants allege that the 
Plaintiffs may have even repaid themselves for their capital contribution or their share of the 
payment on the property contributed as capital to the corporation. 
13. These Defendants are entitled to an accounting of the funds disbursed 
by the Plaintiffs during the time they were in control of the corporation's financial affairs, 
and for an order of restitution or, in the alternative, judgment for amounts wrongfully 
distributed. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Failure of Consideration) 
14. These Defendants incorporate the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1 through 13 of this Counterclaim as though fully set forth herein. 
15. As alleged above and upon information and belief, the Plaintiffs have 
repaid themselves for the capital contributions they have made to the corporation in exchange 
for stock. 
16. Such repayment was done without the authorization of the board of 
directors and in violation of the required capital needed by the corporation to operate its 
affairs. 
17. The stock issued to the Plaintiffs was therefore issued without 
consideration and is void. 
18. These Defendants are entitled to an order of restitution by the Court 
ordering that any shares issued to the Plaintiffs are void. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgment) 
19. These Defendants incorporate the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1 through 18 of this Counterclaim as though fully set forth herein. 
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20. The initial issuance of shares to the Plaintiffs was as follows: 
Chris Swanson 2,500 shares 
Laurie C. Shepard-Swanson 2,500 shares 
21. As an alternative to the allegations contained in the Second Cause of 
action above, if the Court finds that the consideration for the shares initially issued was valid,. 
the Defendants are entitled to recall said shares and reissue new shares as follows as part of 
a recapitalization plan adopted by the corporation: 
Chris Swanson 1,900 shares 
Laurie Swanson 900 shares 
* 22. A dispute has arisen between the parties as to the proper number of 
shares owned by the Plaintiffs. 
23. The Defendants are entitled to an order of the Court by way of 
declaratory judgment declaring how many shares are properly owned by the Plaintiffs. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Malicious Prosecution) 
24. The Defendants incorporate the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1 through 23 of this Counterclaim as though fully set forth herein. 
25. The Plaintiff Chris Swanson has employed this litigation and the use 
of the lis pendens to interfere with the business of the Defendant corporation, in which the 
individual Defendants have significant interest as shareholders, officers and directors. 
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26. Prior to the time of filing this litigation, the Plaintiff Chris Swanson 
made threats to these Defendants that he would interfere with the legitimate business 
relationships of these Defendants as a means to acquire a settlement favorable to him. 
27. The use of civil litigation in this case has been done as a weapon to 
damage the Defendants' business and is calculated to intentionally interfere with these 
Defendants' economic relations by improper means. 
28. The Plaintiff Chris Swanson has sent letters and faxes to various 
business contacts, creditors, and taxing authorities of these Defendants with the intent to 
interfere with their prospective relations. 
29. Such actions constitute the tort of malicious prosecution, or, in the 
alternative, interference with prospective economic relations of the Defendants, and 
constitutes slander. 
30. These Defendants are entitled to damages in an amount established 
at the time of trial incurred as a result of the filing of this action and the other interference 
by the Plaintiffs with business relations and prospective relationships of economic advantage 
to the Defendants. 
WHEREFORE, these Defendants pray for relief on their counterclaim as 
follows: 
1. For an accounting of the funds disbursed by the Plaintiffs during the 
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time they were in control of the corporation's financial affairs, and for an order of restitution, 
or, in the alternative, for a judgment for amounts wrongfully distributed, and for attorney's 
fees to force such accounting since Plaintiffs owed a fiduciary duty to these Defendants and 
breached such duty by failing to so account. 
2. For an order of the Court ordering that any shares issued to the 
Plaintiffs are void for lack of consideration or failure of consideration. 
3. In the alternative, for a declaratory order declaring how many shares 
are properly owned by the Plaintiffs. 
4. For damages, costs, attorney's fees for malicious prosecution and 
interference by the Plaintiffs with the business relations and prospective relationships of 
economic advantage to the Defendants. 
5. For such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and 
proper in the circumstances. 
DATED this ft day of July, 1996. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
£ 
Thomas W. Seiler 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a correct copy of the foregoing was mailed this day 
of July, 1996, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Mark K. Stringer 
Blakelock & Stringer 
37 East Center, 
Second Floor, Front 
Provo, UT 84606 
John L. Valentine 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, UT 84603 
G.\SEO£R\SWANSON.CCL 
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Mark K. Stringer, #4418 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER, P.A. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs u 17 0 , 
37 East Center, Suite 200 %,UL ' ' -
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: 375-7678 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RESPONSE TO COUNTERCLAIM 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
ys 
BEVERLY SWANSON, et al, 
Defendants. : CIVIL NO.960400307 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs in the above entitled matter, by and 
through counsel of record, and as and for a Response to the 
Counterclaim by Defendants BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON SWANSON, and 
NIKKI SHUMWAY, admit, deny, allege, demand, and assert as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the allegations, 
assertions, and all other matters as set forth in paragraphs l 
through and including 79 of the Complaint on file herein, as if 
fully set forth hereat. 
2. Admit the allegations and consent to the relief requested 
in paragraphs 1, 2 (only as to the position of Chris Swanson as 
President), 3 (only as to the position of Laurie Swanson as 
Secretary), 4, 13 (only as to the need for and right to request an 
accounting of all corporate funds from inception to the present), 
( CxW/ft/T- V V / * 
and 22 of the Counterclaim. 
3. Plaintiffs deny the balance of the allegations and 
requested relief set forth in the Counterclaim, not specifically 
admitted to hereby. 
4. Plaintiffs affirmatively state and alledge that at no time 
have they misused their corporate office, misused or 
misappropriated corporate funds or opportunities, or in any manner 
breached their fiduciary duties to the other shareholders of the 
corporation. 
5. Because of the actions of the Counterclaimants, the 
Plaintiffs have had to incur and claim the right to recover from 
the Plaintiff, attorneys fees and costs in the minimum amount of 
$1000.00, the exact amount to be proven by affidavit at the time of 
trial or judgment. 
6. Defendants have attempted on numerous occasions to settle 
this matter amicably, and the Plaintiffs have refused to do so. 
7. The Counterclaimants have abused their positions as 
officers, directors and shareholders in the subject company, to 
attempt to force the Plaintiff to accept less than their agreed 
stock, or to forego participation altogether. 
8. The filing of this claim in the face of the aforesaid 
information, constitutes a bad faith claim under UCA 78-27-56, 
entitling the Defendants to recover fees and costs. 
9. The Defendant is entitled to recover sanctions and/or fees 
and costs in an amount not less than $1000.00, the exact amount to 
be proven at trial by testimony or affidavit. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
In addition to the Affirmative Defenses which may apply under 
the factual matters alleged, or the denials thereof, the Defendants 
allege the following specific Affirmative Defenses: 
A. ESTOPPEL / CLEAN HANDS. Counterclaimants do not have clean 
hands in this matter, with regard to the transactions between the 
parties, and with regard to the operation of the corporation and 
the development of the business, and therefore the Counterclaimants 
are estopped from asserting the right to recover any amount from 
the Plaintiffs, and are obligated to specifically perform on the 
various agreements. 
B. BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN. The Counterclaimants have already 
received the benefit of any agreement regarding the development of 
the business, as a result of the good faith efforts of the 
Plaintiffs, specifically having coerced and encouraged the 
Plaintiffs to provide the efforts and opportunities which made 
possible the development of the business. 
C. UNJUST ENRICHMENT. Having already received the benefit of 
any agreement regarding the development of the business, to now 
allow the Counterclaimants to rewrite or altogether avoid the 
agreements, would allow them to keep the benefits conferred in good 
faith, without paying the agreed MpriceM therefore, and would 
therefore constitute unjust enrichment. 
D. FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION. The Counterclaim fails 
to state a cause of action generally, and specifically fails as to 
the individual Plaintiffs. 
E. SET OFF. The Plaintiffs have and are entitled to claim set 
offs against the Counterclaims, in an amount to be proven at the 
time of trial. 
F. PARTIAL PERFORMANCE. The parties have made several oral 
agreements or amendments to the original agreements concerning the 
development of the business, on which the Plaintiffs have relied to 
their detriment in partial performance (arranging for financing, 
making improvements, foregoing other opportunities), which partial 
performance takes the agreements out of application of the Statute 
of Frauds. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs (incorporating by this reference, the 
judgment requested in the Prayer in the Complaint) pray the 
Counterclaim be dismissed and the Counterclaim Defendants take 
nothing thereby, but if the Counterclaims not dismissed, that the 
Defendants recover no more than the undisputed amounts and relief 
as set forth in the foregoing Response. 
DATED AND SIGNED THIS [** DAY OF V '^^fr- , 19 ?c 
jtikRK K 
^Attorn 
STRINGER 
C ey for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the /5" day of 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing RESPONSE via first-lass postage 
prepaid addressed to John Valentine, 120 E. 300 N., Provo, Utah, 
and to Top Seiler, 80 N. 100 E., Provo, Utah. 
vis 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS A N D COUNSELORS AT LAW 
Jackson Howard 
Don R. Petersen 
Craig M. Snyder 
John L. Valentine 
D. David Lambert 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
F. Richards Smith III 
Richard W. Daynes 
Phillip E. Lowry 
Kenneth Parkinson 
OF COUNSEL 
S. Rex Lewis 
File No 2 3 . 6 2 8 
Reply to: 
Provo Office • 
Salt Lake Office I 
August 16, 1996 
Provo Office: 
120 East 300 North Street 
Post Office Box 1248 
Provo% Utah 84603 
Telephone: (HOI) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801)377-4991 
In-State Toll Free: (800) 846-0283 
Salt Lake Office: 
Highland Park Plaza Bldg. 
3098 S. Highland Dr., Suite 354 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 463-9660 
Facsimile: (801) 487-8825 
Mark K. Stringer, Esq. 
Blakelock & Stringer 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, UT 84606 
Re: Swanson v. Swanson Enterprises 
Dear Mark: 
I recently discovered in a review of my files that the first set of interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents you served on Swanson Enterprises has never been 
answered. I have sent a copy of those discovery requests previously to the officers of the 
corporation, but I have not had a response on them. Enclosed, however are the responses to the 
requests for admissions. 
I will be out of town for approximately a week, and as soon as I get back, I will follow 
through with them. In the meantime, I have sent another copy of the remaining discovery to 
them and have asked that they prepare preliminary answers for my review. 
In a related matter, I note that you have not responded to the counterclaim which we filed 
on behalf of the corporation. I note that you have responded to Tom Setter's counterclaim, but 
apparently have not ever filed an answer to our counterclaim. 
I anticipate that the discovery will start moving forward once I return after August 27, 
1996. I look forward to talking with you more then. 
Sincerely, 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
JLV/lo 
Enclosure 
ExHlB IT O 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
Jackson Howard 
Don R. Petersen 
Craig M. Snyder 
John L. Valentine 
D. David Lambert 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
F. Richards Smith III 
Richard W. Dayncs 
Phillip E. Lowry 
Kenneth Parkinson 
OF COUNSEL 
S. Rex Lewis 
File No. 23 .628 
Replv to: 
Provo Office • 
Salt Lake Office C 
November 7, 1996 
Provo Office: 
120 East 300 North Street 
Post Office Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
In-State Toll Free: (800) 846-0283 
Salt Lake Office: 
Highland Park Plaza Bldg. 
3098 S. Highland Dr., Suite 354 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 463-9660 
Facsimile: (801) 463-6658 
Mark K. Stringer, Esq. 
Blakelock & Stringer 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, UT 84606 
Re: Chris Swanson, et al. v. Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
Dear Mark: 
Enclosed please find our delayed answers to interrogatories and reply to requests for 
production of documents. 
As I stated in my earlier letter, you still have not replied to our counterclaim. I have not 
taken a default judgment, since you have been considerate to allow me time to answer the 
interrogatories, requests for admissions and the requests for production of documents. So that 
we have an accurate record, I have prepared a Stipulation which accompanies this letter, so that 
your reply will be deemed timely to my counterclaim, and my answers and responses to your 
discovery will be deemed timely. 
Please sign 
counterclaim. 
the Stipulation and return the same to me along with your reply to our 
Sincerely, 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
JLV/lo 
Enclosure: Stipulation 
J:\JLV\STRlNGER.LO 
d J T V Uic 'V' ^ 
JOHN L. VALENTINE (3310), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Our File No. 23,628 
Attorneys for Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE 
SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON 
SWANSON, NIKKI SHUMWAY 
individually; and BEVERLY SWANSON, 
CLINTON SWANSON and NIKKI 
SHUMWAY, all dba SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES; and SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah business, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION 
Case No. 960400307CN 
Judge 
Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, Mark K. Stringer, and the defendant 
Swanson Enterprises, Inc., a Utah corporation, by and through its counsel of record, John L. 
Valentine, hereby stipulate as follows: 
1. The plaintiffs' reply to defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 's counterclaim shall 
be filed within ten days from the date of this Stipulation, and if so filed, shall be deemed timely. 
(OcHCB/r ^ 
2. The defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc/s answers and responses to plaintiffs' 
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Demand for Production of Documents shall be 
deemed to have been timely filed, and all parties waive any objection to any late filing of 
responses to said discovery. 
DATED this day^of-Ntfvember, 1996. 
MARK K. STRINGER, for: 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DATED this day of November, 1996. 
JOHN L. VALENTINE, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant Swanson 
Enterprises, Inc. 
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Jerry Schollian (6326) 
A Professional Corporation 
37 East Center Street, Suite 208 
Provo, UT 84601 
Tel: (801)-377-6500 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE COUNTY OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE SWANSON 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON SWANSON, 
NIKKI SHUMWAY individually; and BEVERLY 
SWANSON, CLINTON SWANSON and NIKKI 
SHUMWAY, all dba SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES; and SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' RULE 60(b)(7) MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND REQUEST FOR A 
HEARJN£=ANp PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE 
TO pLAINTIFF^ULE 54(B) MOTION 
Civil No. 960400397 
Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
^ 
*w ^ 
MOTION 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record, and hereby move this 
Court to set aside the partial summary judgment, (hereinafter "judgment"), entered in this matter 
on or about December 9,1997, on the grounds that said judgment was entered as a result of 
inadvertence, mistake, excusable neglect and incompetence of counsel and on the grounds that 
it would be in the furtherance of justice to try this matter on its merits. This motion is supported 
by memorandum which is set forth below and incorporated herein by this reference 
MEMORANDUM 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about November 9, 1996, the above-named individual defendants filed a 
( 
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motion for partial summary judgment, (hereinafter "motion"), in this matter with supporting 
memorandum. 
2. Plaintiffs* attorney did not reply to defendants' motion. 
3. On or about December 9, 1996, this Court entered a ruling, granting the 
defendants' motion. 
4. On or around June 12, 1997, the defendants entered a motion for a Rule 54(b) 
determination. 
5. On June 8, 1997, Mr. Mark Stringer, former attorney of the plaintiffs, prepared an 
affidavit in support of a Rule 60(b) Motion to set aside the Defendant Corporation's summary 
judgment in this matter. Seg Exhibit A, a true and accurate copy of affidavit of Mr. Mark Stringer. 
6. Mr. Stringer never informed plaintiffs of defendants' motion. See Exhibit B, a true 
and accurate copy of plaintiffs affidavit in support of this motion, at fl 3. 
7. Plaintiffs have never had the opportunity to respond to the allegations set forth in 
the defendants' motion. As a result of the partial summary judgment entered by this Court in this 
action on December 6, 1996, the Lis Pendens that was filed in this matter was released. See 
Exhibit B at K 4-5. 
8. Plaintiffs were told by Mr. Stringer as recently as June 8, 1997 that the Lis 
Pendens was still in place. See Exhibit B at fl 4. 
9. Plaintiffs have never had the opportunity to respond to the allegations set for by 
the affidavit of Beverly Swanson filed in support of the defendants' motion for partial summary 
judgment. See Exhibit B at fl 5. 
10. Plaintiffs were never provided with copies of most of the documentation or filings 
of Mr. Stringer, although plaintiffs continually requested status reports and action on this matter. 
See Exhibit B at 1f 6. 
11. Plaintiffs have been diligent in following up with Mark Stringer and his office by 
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phone and/or fax. See Exhibit B at ^  7. 
12. Plaintiffs first became aware of the partial summary judgment motion, and the 
entry of the partial summary judgment, on July 27, 1997, when Laurie Swanson personally went 
to the Fourth District Court and obtained copies of the Court's file. See Exhibit B at fl 8. 
13. Plaintiffs have been assured by Mark Stringer and his office that all necessary 
extensions to respond to discovery had been granted and no adverse actions had occurred as 
recently as June 10, 1997. Plaintiffs were never informed by Mr. Stringer or his office that their 
stock certificates had been voided by this Court's Summary Judgment. See Exhibit B at fl 9. 
14. As a result of this Court's entry of the partial summary judgment on December 6, 
1997, and the subsequent entry of this Court's summary judgment, plaintiffs have lost all of their 
investment in Swanson, Inc. and have lost the opportunity for an equitable resolution of the 
dispute between the parties. It would be an unconscionable injustice if this Court were to uphold 
the partial summary judgment which was entered as a consequence of the mistakes of Mr. 
Stringer, and not any mistake or failure on plaintiffs' part. See Exhibit B at 1f 12. 
ARGUMENTS 
L UT. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(7) IS SUFFICIENTLY BROAD TO PERMIT THIS COURT TO SET ASIDE 
THE DEFENDANTS' PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE GROUNDS OF INEFFECTIVE 
COUNSEL 
Ut. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(7) states in pertinent part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons:... (7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment, the motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
for reasons (1), (2), (3) and (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, 
or proceeding was entered or taken. 
The language of Ut. R. Civ. P. 60(b) clearly shows that the three (3) month time limit set 
forth in rule 60(b) does not apply to rule 60(b)(7). 
In Stewart v. Sullivan. 506 P.2d 74, (Utah 1973), the Utah Supreme Court held that Rule 
60(b)(7) was sufficiently broad to set aside an order dismissing a parties' complaint. In Stewart, 
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the appellant showed that the court's final order was entered upon the erroneous assumption 
that the plaintiff has procrastinated in the response to discovery. The facts in the Stewart are 
somewhat similar to the facts in the case at bar. In Stewart, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The plaintiff has no knowledge of the dismissal and subsequent motion made in 
respect thereto. It was not until several months after his counsel became 
incapacitated to represent him and the plaintiff had employed other counsel he 
learned what has transpired... In view of the above recited circumstances and the 
fact that there was not disposition of the case on the merits, we are of the opinion 
that the court below did not abuse its discretion in its determination that the action 
should be dismissed without prejudice. 
The provisions of Rule 60(b) are broad are sufficiently broad to permit the court to 
set aside its former order which appeared to have been entered upon an 
erroneous assumption and to enter a new order based on the record before it 
id. at 76. emphasis added 
In Gillmorv. Wright. 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993) the Utah Supreme Court strengthened the 
Stewart ruling that a "reasonable time" under rule 60(b) is based on the facts of each case, the 
reasons for delay , the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon 
and the prejudice to the parties, id. at 435, citing Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Ass'n. 657 
P.2dat1306. 
Clearly, the facts in the case at bar justify setting aside the defendant's partial summary 
judgment. The plaintiffs are the victims of circumstances well beyond their control. Such 
circumstances resulted in the nullification of their shares in a corporate entity that had a vested 
interest in. The facts are clear that the plaintiffs could not have learned about the individual 
defendants' motion for partial summary judgment until such time as they sought the question the 
representations of their attorney, Mr. Stringer. It is clear the maintaining the partial summary 
judgment would prejudice the plaintiffs by depriving them of their property without the opportunity 
to try this matter on its merits. 
In the case at bar, it is clear that this Court has entered a partial summary judgment 
based, at least in part, by the assumption that the plaintiffs were procrastinating in completing an 
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answer to the defendants' motion. It is clear from the plaintiffs' affidavit that plaintiffs had not 
abandoned their case, but that Mr. Stringer had, at least inadvertently, neglected to answer the 
defendants' motion. To deprive the defendants of their opportunity to try this matter on its own 
merits, due to the mistakes and mishandling of this matter by Mr. Stringer, would be an 
unconscionable miscarriage of justice. 
Conclusion 
Due to the above-stated facts and circumstances, the plaintiffs have been deprived of 
their opportunity to try this matter on its own merits. Defendants' motion and subsequent partial 
summary judgment was entered without the plaintiffs having the opportunity to respond to the 
facts asserted. The partial summary judgment entered against the plaintiffs is a result of a 
mistake, inadvertence and incompetence of which the parties had no control. In the furtherance 
of justice, this Court must set aside the partial summary judgment and allow the plaintiffs the 
opportunity to present the merits of their case to the Court. 
WHEREFORE; Plaintiffs' pray for the following relief from this Court. 
1. An order setting aside the Partial Summary-Judgement entered in this matter on 
December 6, 1996. 
2. An order providing the plaintiffs sufficient time to respond to the Defendants' 
motion for partial summary judgment. 
3. A hearing to be set in this matter in accordance with the availability of the parties' 
respective counsels and this Court. 
4. A joint hearing to be held in the matter of this motion, and the plaintiffs rule 60(b) 
motion to set aside this Courts Summary Judgment in this matter. 
5. The setting aside of the defendants' Rule 54(b) motion until such time as the 
plaintiffs' motions to set aside the summary judgment and partial summary judgment entered in 
this matter are heard. 
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6. Any and all other relief this Court sees fit to grant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this <j V ^day_of July. 1997. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This certifies that the undersigned has mailed a true and accurate copy of the preceding 
document to the following parties: 
Original to: 
Fourth District Court 
Attention Civil Clerk 
125 North 100 West 
Provo, UT 84603 
Copy to: 
Mr. John Valentine 
c/o Howard, Lewis & Peterson 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
Mr. Tom Seiler 
80 North 100 West 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
DATED this 33'—bay of July, 1997. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
JUL 2 llnzlH'81 
Jerry Schollian (6326) 
A Professional Corporation 
37 East Center Street, Suite 208 
Provo, UT 84601 
Tel: (801)-377-6500 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE COUNTY OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON & LAURIE SWANSON 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, et al. 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' RULE 60(b) MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE JUDGMENT AND REQUEST FOR A 
HEARING 
Civil No. 960400397 
Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
MOTION 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record, and hereby moves this 
Court to set aside the judgment entered in this matter on or about May 12, 1997, on the grounds 
that said judgment was entered as a result of inadvertence, mistake and excusable neglect on 
the part of the plaintiffs' former counsel, and on the grounds that it would be in the furtherance of 
justice to try this matter on its merits. This motion is supported by memorandum which is set 
forth below and incorporated herein by this reference 
MEMORANDUM 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about February 11, 1997, defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Defendant Corporation") filed a motion for summary judgment in this matter with supporting 
memorandum. 
2. Piaintifrs did not reply to Defendant Corporation's motion for summary judgment. 
3. On April 7, 1997, the Honorable Anthony W. Schofield entered a ruling, granting 
the Defendant Corporation's motion for summary judgment. 
4. On May 13, 1997, this Court entered Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law 
based on the Defendant Corporation's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs' failure to 
respond. 
5. On or around June 12, 1997, the individual defendants in this matter, (hereinafter 
"Defendants"), entered a motion for a Rule 54(b) determination. 
6. On June 8, 1997, Mr. Mark Stringer, former attorney of the plaintiffs, prepared an 
affidavit in support of a Rule 60(b) Motion to set aside the Defendant Corporation's judgment in 
this matter. See Exhibit A, a true and accurate copy of affidavit of Mr. Mark Stringer. 
7. On June 27, 1997, plaintiffs filed a notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-34, 
(1953 as amended), requesting that Mr. Stringer be removed as the plaintiffs' attorney in this 
matter and that the plaintiffs be granted twenty (20) days to retain new counsel. See Exhibit B, a 
true and accurate copy of Plaintiffs' request to have Mr. Stringer removed. 
8. On July 2, 1997, the plaintiffs' retained Mr. Schollian as their attorney, who filed 
an appearance of counsel on that date. 
9. The plaintiffs' were unaware that Mr. Stringer had not replied to the Defendant 
Corporations' motion for summary judgment. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THIS MATTER SHOULD BE SET ASIDE ON THE 
GROUNDS OF INADVERTENCE. MISTAKE AND EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
Ut. R. Civ. P. 60(b) states in pertinent part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party of his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, sunrise, or 
excusable neglect;.... 
The facts and circumstances in this matter are similar to the those in Interstate 
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Excavating v. Agla Dev. Corp.. 611 P.2d 369, (Utah 1980). In Interstate the Utah Supreme Court 
held that when defendant's attorney withdrew and the defendant received no notice to appear or 
retain counsel, and had no notice of trial until he [the defendant] received notice of default, that it 
was in the furtherance of justice to set the judgment aside. 
In the case at bar, the plaintiffs had absolutely no notice of any motion for summary 
judgment, and were unaware of Mr. Stringer's inability to respond to the motion until they 
examined the court file and discovered the entry of judgment on June 27, 1997. 
The plaintiffs have been deprived of their opportunity to try this matter on the merits due 
to no fault of their own. If the defendant's would have been make aware of Mr. Stringer's 
difficulties, they would have had the opportunity to either assist Mr. Stringer, or find new counsel 
to represent them in their cause of action. 
Conclusion 
Due to the above-stated facts and circumstances, the plaintiffs have been deprived of 
their opportunity to try this matter on its own merits. The summary judgment was entered without 
the plaintiffs having the opportunity to respond to the facts asserted by the Defendant 
Corporation. The judgment entered against the plaintiffs is a result of a mistake and 
inadvertence in which the parties had no control. In the furtherance of justice, this Court must 
set aside the judgment and allow the plaintiffs the opportunity to present the merits of their case 
to the Court. 
WHEREFORE; Plaintiffs' pray for the following relief from this Court. 
1. An order setting aside the Judgement entered in this matter on April 7, 1997. 
2. An order providing the plaintiffs sufficient time to respond to the Defendant 
Corporation's motion for summary judgment. 
3. A hearing to be set in this matter in accordance with the availability of the parties' 
respective counsels and this Court. 
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4. Any and all other relief this Court sees fit to grant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 3 ~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This certifies that the undersigned has mailed a true and accurate copy of the preceding 
document to the following parties: 
Original to: 
Fourth District Court 
Attention Civil Clerk 
125 North 100 West 
Provo, UT 84603 
Copy to: 
Mr. John Valentine 
c/o Howard, Lewis & Peterson 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
Mr. Tom Seiler 
80 North 100 West 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
DATED this 3. day of July, 1997. 
4 of 4 
Mark K. Stringer, #4418 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER, P.A. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
37 East Center, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: 375-7678 
Facsimile: 375-0704 
DEPARTMENT I, PROVO 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE SWANSON, : 
Plaintiffs, ; 
va 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, : 
et al, : 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S RULE 60 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT, ORDER, JUDGMENT 
'. CIVIL NO. 
: JUDGE: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
COMES NOW Mark K. Stringer, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says as follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the state of Utah. 
2. I am the counsel for the Plaintiffs. 
3. I was unaware of the Motion and Order for summary 
disposition until late in May, 1997, 
4. I recall being late on the responses to discovery, and 
seeking some extension for preparing and providing the responses. 
5. At the time of the Motion and Order summarily dismissing 
this matter, I was still under the impression that I had an 
extension to respond to discovery, and to further respond to other 
pending matters. 
6. In or about February, 1997, I was suffering from illness, 
and having trouble concentrating on work matters. I was relying 
heavily on my primary secretary, Linda, who was by that time 
serving essentially as a paralegal, and managing all of the 
communication, mail, and scheduling. 
7. My illness and the inordinate complication of several 
cases, combined to put an inordinate amount of pressure on both 
Linda and I. Unfortunately, I was forced to place even more 
responsibility on her. 
8. Both of us got behind in responding to mail and 
correspondence. As indicated earlier, we contacted opposing counsel 
and believe we made arrangements for extensions and notice on the 
more critical and immediate pending matters. 
9. In mid April, Linda received a calling/job offer from the 
LDS Church offices. She was interviewed and "hired" on Thursday, 
and asked to begin full time the following Monday. 
10#. Because of the source of the employment, we did not feel 
free to extend the starting time, or to refuse the opportunity. 
11. I immediately began to interview secretaries* 
12. I hired one secretary, who lasted about a week, and simply 
got overwhelmed and left without notice. 
13. About a week or so later, at the suggestion of a client, 
I hired his daughter, who stated that she would be able to work 
full time, and intended to remain at the job for the foreseeable 
future. She, too, left in about a week, leaving a note that she had 
accepted a job that had been pending since before she came to us. 
14. The difficulty in having two secretaries quit without 
notice was exacerbated by the fact that Linda's time for training 
was limited, and she had spent several days and evenings training 
both replacements, and had little time and energy left for repeated 
demands. 
15. Further, we discovered weeks later that both secretaries 
had become overwhelmed with mail and scheduling demands, and had 
simply piled away mail and phone messages, rather than bring them 
to my attention. It was not until weeks later, when we received 
notices and calls from counsel and the Court, that we realized the 
matters that had gone into the pile. 
16. My third secretary is working hard to correct these 
matters. 
17. We have hired a third year law student to clerk for the 
summer, and he is also working to organize and identify the more 
critical matters. 
18. Rose, with whom I practice, has separate staff, and we 
have routinely separated mail and scheduling, so that her staff 
does not handle mine. 
19. In the middle of all this, I was working longer hours, and 
succumbed to bronchial pneumonia and pleurisy in one lung. 2 0 . 
About a month ago, my wife became very ill, and was unable to 
manage the children, which took more of my time. Eventually, she 
was diagnosed with ovarian cysts and additional problems, which are 
then subject of a biopsy study. 
21 . Needless to say, I have been very burdened and distracted 
by all of these events. I have made every effort to remain on top 
of the more critical matters, and have transferred way cases where 
I felt that the transfer would not unreasonably impact on the case 
and client. 
22. In the midst of all this, the subject Motion and Order 
were entered. 
23. I never notified my clients, as the matter was not 
discovered until, late, and the communication from the office to 
clients was limited to known immediate and emergency matters, and 
the response to the Order did not require their direct 
participation. 
24. My clients have provided the responses to discovery, and 
they can be ready to serve on counsel within a week of having 
notice to do so. 
25. All of these several matters can be substantiated with 
medical records at the various doctors offices and medical centers 
in Utah County. 
26. Under the circumstances, it would be a significant 
disservice and injustice to the Plaintiffs to have their case 
dismissed due to the events which led to my own neglect and 
inadvertence. 
Signed this ff day of V^orxs- , 1997. 
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Kate A. Toomey, #6446 
Assistant Counsel 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)531-9110 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the j 
Discipline of: | 
MARK K. STRINGER, 44418 
Respondent. ' 
i ORDER FOR INTERIM 
| SUSPENSION 
I Civil No. 980403638 
I Judge Ray Harding, Jr. 
The Court having reviewed the Petition for Interim Suspension and the 
Stipulation To Interim Suspension, along with the Memorandum attached to the 
Stipulation, and having been fully advised in the premises: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law on an 
interim basis. 
2. This Order shall become effective on March 1,1998. 
3. The Respondent shall comply with all requirements of Rules 26(b) of 
the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
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4. Pursuant to Rule 26(e) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
willful failure to comply with Rule 26(b) shall constitute contempt of court and may be 
punished as such or by further disciplinary action. 
DATED this J day of '^fyfeud— , 1998. 
CHRIS AND LORI SWANSON 
102 5 N LOUISE ST 
GLENDALE CA 91207 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
District of Utah 
IN RE: Case No.: 97 -29189 
Mark K. Stringer and Linda B. Stringer 
Debtor(s). Chapter: 13 
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL 
You are hereby notified that an Order Dismissing the above 
case was entered on 5/13/98. 
Dated May 13, 1998 
William C. Stillgebauer 
Clerk of Court 
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Mark K. Stringer, #4418 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER, P.A. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
37 East Center, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84 606 
Telephone: 375-7678 
Facsimile: 375-0704 
DEPARTMENT I, PROVO 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, 
et al, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
PLAINTIFF'S RULE &Q 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT, ORDER, JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO. 
JUDGE: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
SS 
COMES NOW Mark K. Stringer, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says as follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the state of Utah. 
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2. I am the counsel for the Plaintiffs. 
3. I was unaware of the Motion and Order for summary 
disposition until late in May, 1997. 
4. I recall being late on the responses to discovery, and 
seeking some extension for preparing and providing the responses. 
5. At the time of the Motion and Order summarily dismissing 
this matter, I was still under the impression that I had an 
extension to respond to discovery, and to further respond to other 
pending matters. 
6. In or about February, 1997, I was suffering from illness, 
and having trouble concentrating on work matters. I was relying 
heavily on my primary secretary, Linda, who was by that time 
serving essentially as a paralegal, and managing all of the 
communication, mail, and scheduling. 
7. My illness and the inordinate complication of several 
cases, combined to put an inordinate amount of pressure on both 
Linda and I. Unfortunately, I was forced to place even more 
responsibility on her. 
8. Both of us got behind in responding to mail and 
correspondence. As indicated earlier, we contacted opposing counsel 
and believe we made arrangements for extensions and notice on the 
more critical and immediate pending matters. 
9. In mid April, Linda received a calling/job offer from the 
LDS Church offices. She was interviewed and "hired" on Thursday, 
and asked to begin full time the following Monday. 
10. Because of the source of the employment, we did not feel 
free to extend the starting time, or to refuse the opportunity. 
11. I immediately began to interview secretaries. 
12. I hired one secretary, who lasted about a week, and simply 
got overwhelmed and left without notice. 
13. About a week or so later, at the suggestion of a client, 
I hired his daughter, who stated that she would be able to work 
full time, and intended to remain at the job for the foreseeable 
future. She, too, left in about a week, leaving a note that she had 
accepted a job that had been pending since before she came to us. 
14. The difficulty in having two secretaries quit without 
notice was exacerbated by the fact that Linda's time for training 
was limited, and she had spent several days and evenings training 
both replacements, and had little time and energy left for repeated 
demands. 
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15. Further, we discovered weeks later that both secretaries 
had become overwhelmed with mail and scheduling demands, and had 
simply piled away mail and phone messages, rather than bring them 
to my attention. It was not until weeks later, when we received 
notices and calls from counsel and the Court, that we realized the 
matters that had gone into the pile. 
16. My third secretary is working hard to correct these 
matters. 
17. We have hired a third year law student to clerk for the 
summer, and he is also working to organize and identify the more 
critical matters. 
18. Rose, with whom I practice, has separate staff, and we 
have routinely separated mail and scheduling, so that her staff 
does not handle mine. 
19. In the middle of all this, I was working longer hours, and 
succumbed to bronchial pneumonia and pleurisy in one lung. 2 0 . 
About a month ago, my wife became very ill, and was unable to 
manage the children, which took more of my time. Eventually, she 
was diagnosed with ovarian cysts and additional problems, which are 
then subject of a biopsy study. 
21. Needless to say, I have been very burdened and distracted 
by all of these events. I have made every effort to remain on top 
of the more critical matters, and have transferred way cases where 
I felt that the transfer would not unreasonably impact on the case 
and client. 
22. In the midst of all this, the subject Motion and Order 
were entered. 
23. I never notified my clients, as the matter was not 
discovered until, late, and the communication from the office to 
clients was limited to known immediate and emergency matters, and 
the response to the Order did not require their direct 
participation. 
24. My clients have provided the responses to discovery, and 
they can be ready to serve on counsel within a week of having 
notice to do so. 
25. All of these several matters can be substantiated with 
medical records at the various doctors offices and medical centers 
in Utah County. 
26. Under the circumstances, it would be a significant 
disservice and injustice to the Plaintiffs to have their case 
dismissed due to the events which led to my own neglect and 
inadvertence, 
Signed this Q day of v, ccsntL- ., 1997, 
SWORN A£TD SUBSCRIBED TO BEFORE ME 
K K. STRINGER 
llS (^'DAY OF 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
LINDA STRINGER 
V HOWIYPVBUC' STATE of UTAH 
\V\ BLAKELOCK & STRINGER 
wv **w 7$} 37 EAST CENTER 2ND FL 
y§<Zz!x& PROVO, UT 84606 
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Jerry Schollian (6326) 
A Professional Corporation 
37 East Center Street, Suite 208 
Provo, UT 84601 
Tel: (801)-377-6500 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
. IN THE COUNTY OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON & LAURIE SWANSON 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, at af. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIS SWANSON AND ^ / i / r fcf-i 
LAURIE SWANSON "^ (I -> | l - r 
Civil No. 960400307 
Judge Anthony W. SchofieW 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA } 
COUNTY O F ^ 3 V 4 < J L ^ ^ } 
Chris Swanson and Laurie Swanson, being first duly sworn, do hereby collectively depose 
and state: 
1. We are of the age of majority and do possess the capacity and personal 
knowledge to attest to the facts stated herein; 
2. We originally retained Mr. Mark Stringer to represant us in this mattar. 
3. Mr. Stringer x\%y%r informed us of the motion for partial summary judgment filed by 
the individual defendants, by and through their attorney of record Mr. Thomas Sailer, on 
November 6,1996. 
4. We have never had tha opportunity to respond to the allegations sat forth in the 
defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. As a result of the partial summary judgment 
entered by this Court in this action on December 6, 1996, the Lis Pendens that was filed in this 
matter was released. We were told by Mr. Stringer as recently as June 8,1997 that the Us 
Pendens was stil in place. 
5. We have nw^r had the opportunity to respond to the allegations sat for by the 
affidavit of Beverly Swanson filed in support of the defendants' motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
1 of 3 Pages 
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6. We were never provided with copies of most of the documentation or filings of Mr, 
Stringer, although we continually requested status reports and action on this matter. 
7. We have been diligent in following up with Mart* Stringer and his office by phone 
and fax. 
8. We first became aware of the partial summary judgment motion, and the entry of 
the partial summary judgment, on duly 27, 1997; when Laurie Swanson personally went to the 
Fourth District Court and obtained copies of the Court's pleadings file. 
9. We had been assured by Mark Stringer and his office that all necessary 
extensions to respond to discovery had been granted and no adverse actions had occurred as 
recently as June 10, 1997. We were never informed by Mr. Stringer or his office that our stock 
certificates had been voided by this Court's Summary Judgment. 
10. We are confident that the findings of this court, entered as a result of Mr. 
Stringer's failure to respond to the motion for partial summary judgment, and the finding of the 
Court as a result of the summary judgment entered on May 13,1997, can be disproved if we are 
given the opportunity to present our own facts and evidence. 
11. It is in the interests of justice that this court set aside its findings and judgment 
entered in the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, and summary judgment, so that 
this matter can be tried on its merits. 
12. As a result of this Court's entry of the partial summary judgment on December 6, 
1997, end the subsequent entry of this Court's summary judgment, we have lost all of our own 
investment in Swanson, Inc. and have lost the opportunity for an equitable resolution of the 
dispute between the parties. It would be a terrible and unconscionable miscarriage of justice if 
this Court were to uphold the above-stated judgments which were entered as a consequence of 
the mistakes Mr. Stringer, and not any mistake or failure on our part. We now plead with this 
Court to do the only just thing in this matter, and set aside the partial summary judgment and the 
summary judgment in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 
Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED to and sworn before me on t h i s ^ 5 day of July, 1997. 
cJ^u 
Public Notary * 
CATERNIA SOLOMON z 
COMM. #1064641 S 
NOTARYKWJe-CAUKMNM D 
LOtAMOELtfCOUWTY . 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 15* day of July, 1997. 
e/Swanson 
SUBSCRIBED to and sworn before me on this £5_ day of July, 1997 
CATERNIA SOLOMON
 Z 
COMM. #1084841 s C ^AZ^L?Uns?•£? <^>fCr?70S~2. 
^tZEZLSZZT p P u b l i c Notary 
iOSAMOQCS COUNTY • " 
MrC«MiiE^plrMj«wy28. 2000 ' 
Public otary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAIUNO 
This certifies that the undersigned has mailed a true and accurate copy of the preceding 
document to the following parties: 
Original to: 
Fourth District Court 
Attention Civil Clerk 
125 North 100 West 
Provo, UT 84603 
Copy to: 
Mr John Valentine 
c/o Howard, Lewis & Peterson 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
Mr. Tom Sailer 
80 North 100 West 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1286 
DATED this day of July. 1997. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
CHRIS SWANSON 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
BEVERLY SWANSON 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 960400307 
HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 4th day of 
September; 1997, the HEARING was video recorded before 
the Honorable Anthony Schofield and was transcribed 
by Richard C. Tatton, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah at the 
Fourth Judicial District Court Building, Provo, Utah 84601 
(Exttia IT \N Y*) 
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2 
3 
4 | For the Plaintiff: Mr. Jerry Schollian 
Attorney at Law 
5 | Provo, Utah 84601 
6 
7 
8 | For the individual 
Defendants Swanson 
9 I and Shumway: Mr. Tom Seiler 
Attorney at Law 
10 | 80 North 1st East 
11 
12 
Provo, Utah 84606 
13 | For the Defendant 
Corporation: Mr, John Valentine 
14
 I Attorney at Law 
. 120:East 300 North 
15 I Provo, Utah 84606 
16 
17 THE COURT: This is in the matter of Swanson 
18 vs. Swanson Civil No. 9604400307, Counsel if you will 
19 I identify yourselves. 
20 
21
 I MR. SXHD'LLIAN: Jerry Schollian for the 
22 plaintiffs 
23 MR, SEILER: Mr. Thomas Seller for the 
24 individual Defendants Swanson and Shumway, Your Honor, 
25 I MR. VALENTINE: John Valentine for the Defendant 
corporation, Your Honor, 
THE COURT; Thank you. This matter is before 
the court on two motions a motion brought by the 
plaintiffs seeking under Rule 60B to set aside judqments 
and a motion under 54B to certify that the judgments as 
final judgments. 
MR. SEILER: Your Honor, I believe my motion 
is first in time, the 54B Motion and perhaps that should 
be the order that it be taken in. It is up to you, 
THE COURT: That will be fin*. I would urge 
you counsel, I have read everything in the file except 
the affidavits that were just handed to me in the last 
10 minutes. I have not read them. You don't need to be 
unduly long, 
MR. SEILER: We won't, Your Honor. Your Honor, 
Rule 54B provides that various types of orders can be 
certified as being finalized. The rule, a three prong rule| 
there has to be multiple claims for relief that the 
decision or ruling would be appealable except that there 
are other claims or others parties that haven't been 
fully resolved and there is no reason to delay the appeal 
I think that all three of those prongs are met. That thosj 
prongs are foundinMontaaue vs, Molly and we have quoted 
that case to the court and I am sure the court has had a 
chance to consider that. 
3 
Our motion was filed in June 12th of 1997, There 
was no response until after the request for ruling. We 
requested the ruling on July the 7th of 1997, The response 
finally came on July the 23rd of 1997. The response, as I 
read it, reads that simply and that is found on Page 5, 
Paragraph 5 that they are asking the prayer for relief tha 
the court set aside the Defendant's Rule 54B Motion. I am 
not sure what that means to set it aside, I assume it 
means that the plaintiffs would like the court to deny 
or to fail to grant that motion. There is no basis set forth 
in their memorandum and I think that is well taken becaus 
there is no basis to not have this court certify and 
we can get this portion of the case resolved and whatever 
is left, we can get in front of the court for trial 
purposes. This part of the case there is appealable issued 
can go-before the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals 
whatever is appropriate and we would be able to move this 
case along. 
One of the things that has happened here is that 
we had a yery broad complaint. There are 10 counts in this 
complaint and it is really a fairly simple transaction. 
The transaction is simply that the family started a 
restaurant and there was some property upon which the 
restaurant would be built and the whole issue surround 
whether or not the various family members are owners of 
A 
1 property and owners of an interest in the restaurant, It 
2 is a fairly simply case that has a very complex lawsuit 
3 filed, and it seems to me that the way to get this matter 
4 before a Judge or a jurv in a timely fashion is to have 
5 those matters which have been decided certified up under 
6 Rule 54B and that would be both the judgment that was 
7 a partial summary judgment that was issued on December the 
8 9th of 1996 and the partial summary judgment that was 
9 issued on May the 13th of 1997, The first judgment went 
10 in favor of the individual defendants and the second 
11 judgment in favor of both of the defendants. 
12 THE COURT: Let me ask, what issues remain 
13 undecided? 
14 MR, SEILER: There are still some issues of 
15 personal property. The plaintiffs 1 claim that the 
16 Defendant Shumway has some personal prooerty in her 
17 possession and they make some claims about that, I think 
18 they still make some claims that I don't believe are 
19 satisfied about monies that the plaintiff believes the 
20 corporation defendant owes them for wages and that type 
21 of thing. Many of these issues have been decided, I think) 
22 that those are the ones that we need, 
23 THE COURT: Mr,Schollian you respond to his 
24 motion, 
25
 MR. SCHOLLIAN:Let me give you some background., 
1 Q 
This case 
affidavit 
attached 
Swanson a 
throughou 
he had in 
of. That 
recorded. 
My c 
motion at 
this area 
found it. 
Mr. 
with the 
was being handled by Mr. Mark Stringer, The 
that you probably have read, Your Honor,was 
to the 60B Motion, the affidavit of both Mr. 
nd his wife Laurie Swanson and it indicates that 
t the period of their hiring Mr. Stringer that 
dicated to them that things were being taken care 
everything was well and that things are being 
lient never even knew about opposing counsel's 
; all until in June when Mrs. Swanson came to 
t, they both live in California, looked it up and 
Stringer, was going to file an affidavit which 
same motion indicating that he was sick and 
that he was ill and that he couldn't get to things. He 
did not get things done. 
In i 
address 1 
let them 
response to opposing counsel's motion, I should 
the Rule 60B7 Motion. 
THE COURT: I don't want you to right now and 
argue their motions. 
MR. SCHOLLIAN: The judgment shouldn't be 
final, because my client's position is the judgment 
should b e set aside because it was entered. 
THE COURT: Is that the only reason you think j 
should not be certified under Rule 54B is you think I shod 
t 
Id 
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grant your Rule 60B Motion? 
MR, S C H O L L I A M : Y e s . 
THE COURT: Any other reason, other than that 
that I should set it aside? 
MR. SCHOLLIAN: No. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. SCHOLLIAN: Because if the facts Rule 60B 
Motion are not found to be so, then there is no defense. 
The parties are not-well represented in this case and they 
relied on Mr. Stringer. 
THE COURT: Isn't their remedy not in this cour 
but against- Mr. Stringer? 
MR. SCHOLLIAN: Perhaps for the issues of their 
damages arising from him but as far as their equity in J 
this case it is here and they never had the opportunity 
to- -
THE COURT: What do you mean they never had 
the opportunity. They clearly had the opportunity. Their 
rightswere never taken away from them without them being 
parties to this lawsuit. They are parties to this lawsuit 
They have a claim that their attorney malpracticed, not 
that the court entered a judgment improperly, 
MR. SCHOLLIAN: Well, the court entered its 
judgment on the presumption that the plaintiffs had 
procrastinated and not responded to- -
^ S ? 
N 
1 THE COURT: On the record before the court that 
2 is exactly what happened, 
3 MR. SCHOLLIAN: That isn't what happened accordi 
4 to my clients1 affidavit which is before you. They had 
5 Kade continued - -
6 THE COURT: Go ahead and make your Rule 60B 
7 arguments. 
8 MR, SCHOLLIAN: I will start on Rule 60B7 and 
9 60B are two motions as you well know. My client is 
"•0 represented today and they are both here.They hired Mr. 
11
 Stringer sometime early last year in this case. They askecij 
12 him to represent them in a matter where their family had 
13 an argument over some very extensive property and my clientj 
14 Mr. Swanson had put a lot of his time and effort and 
15 personal resources into making this business start. Mr. 
16 Stringer represented to them that he had carried the 
17 case forward and that was all well writh this case. 
18 Now Rule 60B7 states that for any other reason a 
19 judgment can be set aside. Opposing counsel has stated th£t 
20 the controlling case in this matter is the Lincoln Case, 
21 I have wanted to present that case, Your Honor, because 
22 that case should not be the controling case in this matter 
23 because the court in that case specifically stated that 
2 4
 each case requires 60B7 the facts and circumstances of 
25 1 each case. In the Lincoln matter the defaulting parties 
8 
were the defendants not the plaintiffs, The defaulting 
party had received numerous service supplementary motions 
had been served orders to appear in court for several 
weeks. At that time, he asked the court six months after 
the judgment had entered to set it aside and fire his 
attorney and asked that his new attorney to go forward. 
I am reading to you from Page 674 and I will give it to 
you. The court also determined in view of the 
surrounding circumstances that he was with the defaulting 
party, his* negligence in continuing to rely on his 
attorney throughout the case. 
My clients were not negligent in this case. As they 
stated in the affidavit before you today made numerous 
attempts to contact them or both Mr. Stringer and his 
staff. It was represented to my client by Mr. Stringer 
and his staff that there was no Motion for Summary Judgmen 
That no motion for Summary Judgment had entered. In fact, 
in the affidavit which has been in front of the court sincfe 
July the 23rd, the plaintiffs certify that Mr, Stringer 
had told them on June the 10th of this year a lis pendens 
was still in affect when it had been dismissed and 
nullified several weeks earlier. 
They were living in California, They had no way of 
checking on things than through Mr, Stringer's office, Thejy 
reasonably relied on representations of what they believep 
9 
was a professional looking out for their best interests. 
THE COURT: Isn't their remedy against the 
professional? 
MR. SCHOLLIAN: In the damages that 
they have incurred but this court does have the discretior) 
to set aside the judgment in the interest of justice. The 
case law is replete with the policy that cases should be 
decided on the merits and not on a default judgment. Thes| 
parties have not had the opportunity to do that. Not 
for any fault of their own. It was the fault of Mr. 
Stringer, not the fault of their own. 
You look at the affidavit of Mr. Valentine which is 
replete with examples of how this man didn't do a thinq. 
THE COURT: Have they filed a complaint with th$ 
Bar? 
MR, SCHOLLIAN: They might do that, Your Honor. 
At the same time, Your Honor, Mr. Stringer is telling them 
that things were fine , What else would they do or what 
else would any other reasonable person do in this case 
then believe their attorney when they are a 1000 miles awa^ 
and that he is taking care of their case. 
Now the Lincoln Case is founded on two other cases-
which are vastly different then the case at bar. The 
Case of Pit
 Vs Mclelland and the Case of Law vs. 
Essential Utah Telephone Association. In the Pit 
i n 
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Case, the court again said that because of the surrounding! 
circumstances in their case that it was not justified to 
set aside the judgment. It said that unless you can show 
that there was excusable neglect that the failure to 
respond to the judgment or receive a default falls under 
Rule 60B1 and this is a 3 month dead line. They said 
that because he couldn't show excusable neglect and becabse 
the facts in this case are some what different. Just give| 
me a second. The Pit Case is a case where the parties 
are parties to a foreclosure judgment where they had 
received notice and the house had been foreclosed on. The 
facts of the case they wanted to change 1t around so they 
could have a better remedy. They had full notice of what 
was going on and my clients did not. 
In the other case, this was a matter where the partiej; 
had stipulated to judgment. They had all looked at it and 
signed it and stipulated and entered it into the court an<J 
when the affects of the judgment came down they wanted to 
second guess it. The court said that you had all the 
notice you need, six months is too long and it is to 
late. 
In this case it is a different story. My clients werfe 
represented to for months that this case was being moved| 
forward by Mr. Stringer and staff. Never served any 
personally served any notice of any judgment. They were 
never personally served any document that would give them 
the notice they would need personally to realize that this 
had happened. If it would have happened, they would have 
been here many months ago and they were not. The Lincoln 
Case does not control in this matter. 
I would ask the court and I would ask the court also to 
look at the affidavit of Mark Stringer which has been 
referred to you since July the 21st. That clearly shows 
that Mr. Stringer was either incompetent or dishonest. The 
case law is very clear that incompetency of counsel 
falls under Rule 60B7. 
Would you like me to go into Rule 60B Motion, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. SCHOLLIAN: Rule 60B Motion applies to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Mr. Valentine. This 
judgment does fall within the 90 day period. My client 
did file the motion before the 90 day period expired. 
Mr. Valentine has argued in his brief or his memorandum 
that we must show timeliness, excusable neglect and meritor| 
defense. 
Timeliness is not an issue. I have already told you 
the facts that are foundation for my client's excusable 
neglect. This was not their neglect. This was not their 
foolishness that got then into this position. 
10US 
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Mr. Valentine has asserted in his affidavit and 
in his memorandum that they were not diligent, The 
affidavits that I have given you today and one that I havej 
given you on the 23rd clearly shows that they were 
constantly in contact with Mr, Stringer, He represented 
things to them that were not true. They believed good 
faith and good faith of visitation on their part and that) 
was also good faith that there was no Motion for Summary 
Judgment and they were never informed of it. They were nelver 
even told by Mr. Stringer that extensions of time had been 
granted to him for answering discovery and that apparently) 
was not true. There is excuable neglect in this case. 
The third prong of this is there a meritorious defens|e. 
The case that is relied on by Mr. Valentine is the 
Musselman Case. The State vs, Mr. Musselmaw. That case 
says essentially that the proponent must show that they 
have a meritorious case and have to show that they have 
a reasonable likelihood to prevail. 
That case > however, was more thoroughly defined 
in the Case of Ericksen, That case was qualified by the 
Utah Supreme Court and this is what the Supreme Court says) 
about the meritorious defense standard. The standard set 
forth in the lead opinion, the opinion in Musselman, is 
limited to the extent joined by Justice Howell's 
concurring opinion. Justice Howell agreed with the lead 
11 
opinion that the trial court properly denied the 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment and 
also agreed that the dissent's decision of meritorious 
defense was the correct one. Specifically, Justice Howell 
agreed with the dissent that the court should only examine 
the defendant's proposed answer and determine whether 
it as a matter of law it contains a defense which is 
entitled to be tried. A defense is sufficiently 
meritorious to have a default set aside if it is entitled 
and tried. 
My clients are not the defendants. They are the 
plaintiffs. Their meritorious offense is clearly set 
forth in the complaint. If this judgment is set 
aside their meritorious defense is already included and 
set forth and very specifically set forth in their compla-j 
since the beginning of this matter. 
In summation, my clients have shown they have under 
Rule 60BZ excusable neglect and that Lincoln does not app 
They were not negligent in relying on Mr. Stringer. It i 
in the best interests of justice that judgment should be 
set aside. I won't bother to summarize what I have 
already said about Rule 60B1 Motion. I will just summari 
both motions by saying this, the law is clear throughout 
the case law in history of this state that causes of 
action are more justly determined on their merits not on 
nt 
fce 
14 
default judgments, My client should have the opportunity 
to competent counsel whether that is me or someone else 
to try this case on the merits, not on the procedural 
wrong doings of someone they had a good faith reliance 
on.who did not act justly with them, I would ask the cou|rt 
to set aside both judgments and allow my client to go 
forward with this case in a way that is according to the 
procedures, I will stick my neck out here and say that if 
there is any sanctions in this case on any party it would 
not be on my clients but on Mr. Stringer, 
THE COURT: Let me ask one last question. To 
what extent should I even read the affidavits that have 
been ftledtoday in view of the fact that you are the 
moving party and you could have filed those affidavits 
a long time ago when you filed your motions. 
MR. SCHOLLIAN: Your Honor, I apologize for tha 
My clients live in California. Two of the affidavits are 
not relevant to today's motion anyway. All those two 
affidavits are the affidavit, I believe, it is the secorld 
affidavit of Mr. Swanson, All that is is a reply to the 
affidavit in there. It really isn't relevant to today's 
hearing. All it is there for is to show the court that 
there is a legitimate beef here. 
The other affidavit which is an affidavit of Mr, 
Swanson which is a response to the affidavit of Betty 
i r 
Swanson, Again that isn lt offered to you to offer any 
support for this motion. Only to show that there is a 
legitimate beef on showing that he disaorass with her 
statement of facts. To go forward with this case, counsel 
can rely on his testimony and affidavit to go forward. 
The other two affidavits are only supplements to the 
affidavits already in front of you. The joint affidavit of 
Laurie and Chris. Those affidavits are intended to show 
you what they did to maintain their communications with 
Mr. Stringer. My intention of handing those two affidavits 
as I mentioned earlier is to show that there is a 
legitimate beef here. That my clients do have a very differ* 
view of the facts. You can look at those later. 
The other two are just supplements to the affidavits 
that you have already . They felt fas did Iras they arrived 
in town yesterday and that we needed to be more specific. 
Mr. Valentine stated in his motion that perhaps they weren 1 
diligent but they are diligent. They are here in the 
courtroom and I am just trying to save the court sometime 
and not, have :them testify. 
THE COURT: They are not testifying. That is not 
a motion that calls for testimony or requires it. 
MR, SCHOLLIAN: Mr, Seiler, 
MR. SEILER: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, 
as to the affidavits received today, I believe they are not 
16 
1 timely before the court both for the practical reason that 
2 I received my copy probably after 1:00 O'clock after 
3 the time this was scheduled and obviously I haven't had 
4 the time to review them with my client. Also for the 
5 legal reason that Rule 4-501 requires these affidavits 
6 to be filed beforehand and there simply has been no 
7 effort to do so. There is nothing in these affidavits 
8 that say where they found this information and this is 
9 newly discovered and this is a surprise anything Itke 
10 that. It is simply information that is brought to the 
11 court at this point so there is no time to rebut it or 
12 otherwise meet it. 
13 We believe that for those reasons that the 
14 affidavits should not be accepted and in fact should not b$ 
15 entered into this file. We believe that they are simply 
16 untimely and not properly before the court. 
17 I was reviewing the Lincoln Life Insurance Case at the 
18 time that counsel was indicating that- there was many 
19 differences, I suppose, therefore, we neel to spend 
20 a little bit of time with that case just toamake sure that 
21 the court recalls the various things that happened in this 
22 case, 
23 in the Lincoln Benefit Case, neither the defendants 
24 that the default were taken against filed an answer to an 
25 amended complaint, Then on February of 1990,the default wa 
entered by the clerk and the judgment was entered 
in May of 1990. It goes on to say that on that in 
July of 1990, there were supplemental proceedings signed 
by the court and that they were required, Mr. Hogle, who 
was the person if you will, the individual that is there 
and he was served with that. He then again contacted his 
counsel, Harold Stephens, and Mr. Stephens apparently 
got the supplemental proceedings continued to a date 
in August. That neither Hogle or Stephens appeared in 
August. Then apparently throughout the rest of the 
time Mr. Stephens continued assured Mr. Hogle that there 
was no problem with this. It wasn't until November 
of 1990 that Mr. Hogle through Mr. Stephens filed a 
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. 
In his affidavit, Mr. Hogle claims that he delivered 
the amended complaint to his former attorney Mr. Stephens 
and Mr. Stephens informed him that he was handling the 
matter. Stephens told Hogle in April of 1990 that the 
answer to the amended complaint had been filed. 
The affidavit of Mr. Hogle goes on to say after receiving 
the court's order in supplemental proceedings that he 
contacted Mr. Stephens again who assured him that he 
would take care of the matter. Finally, Hogle claimed in 
the affidavit, that he relied on Mr, Stephens professiona] 
skills throughout the case. 
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Those facts are strikingly similar. In this case, 
Your Honor, if you read the affidavit and if you take 
them at face value, Mr, Stringer was contacted from time 
to time from plaintiffs, He told the plaintiffs that the 
case was going along okay and he didn't mention to them 
that a Motion for Summary Judgment was filed and told them 
that other pleadings were being filed in a timely manner. 
The court looked at all the facts in what happened 
between Mr. Hogle and Mr, Stephens in the Lincoln Benefit 
Case and said that the reasons asserted by DSP and Hogle 
for setting aside the default judgment namely their attorney 
neglected to file an answer. That Hogle relied upon 
his attorney's assurance that an answer had been filed 
followed Rule 60B1. I don't think that there is any 
question about that. 
The court also stated that it refers to Rule 60B7 as 
the residuary clause and it says in order to make Rule 
60B7 work, there are three prongs. First, that the reason 
Bl other than those listed in subdivisions one through 
six. As the court knows,Rule 60B1 is the excusable neglecjt 
subsection, 
Second, that the reason that there is a reason for 
justifying relief and 
Third, that the motion be made in a reasonable time. 
We would submit, Your Honor, that this is simply if 
it is a motion that the court should even look at all has 
to be viewed under Rule 60B1 Motion, As a Rule 60B1 
Motion, it is simply outside the time, separate and apart 
from any issues. 
Then if you look for a moment at the issues in the 
case itself to this day there is nothing that meets the 
allegations and meets the things.in the affidavit that 
were filed with the Motion for Summary Judgment. Our 
partial Motion for Summary Judgment was filed in the Fall 
of 1990, I am sorry, 1996, in November of 1996. We 
requested a ruling and it wasn't until about two 
and a half weeks later that the court finally entered a 
ruling in that matter. The copies of the notice or copies 
of the judgment were mailed to Mr. Stringer before 
signature. Thereafter, he never made any effort. There 
was no effort by anyone to find out about any of this 
on the plaintiff's side, apparently, until clear around in 
June. In June they apparently took the time to come to 
town and check and see what the file said. 
I suppose that they could have from wherever they 
lived called the court and asked the court clerk while 
file number and what is happening with this case. The 
court clerk would have read those documents that were 
entered in the file and would have found that on December 
10th, I believe the judgment was entered, it was signed 
20 
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December the 9th and I don't think it was entered until thJ 
next day. On December the 10th it would have said 
partial summary judgment and then again on April the 24th, 
judgment rendered in favor of Mr. Valentine's client, TheM 
would have found findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and judgment which would have been mailed prior to signing 
to Mr. Stringer. 
Your Honor, it seems to me that the plaintiff's simplJ 
don't meet any of the prongs of the various tests, First 
of all they don't meet the prong that this is something 
other than a Rule 60B1 Motion. They are saying that 
it is excusable neglect, We relied upon our attorney. He 
didn't do what he was supposed to do and here we are in 
this posture. That clearly means that there is a Rule 60B1 
Motion, so it doesn't meet the first prong. 
Secondly, they have to allege that there 
is a meritorious defense. The court in the Lincoln Benefi" 
matter called that a reason to justify relief. They never 
told the court that this property somehow was Mr. 
Swanson's and was the plaintiffs Mr. Swanson. They don't 
allege any of that until we get to this affidavit that 
is filed today at the time of the hearing, 
Third, they must allege or must be the case that 
the motion was filed within a reasonable time. That didn't 
happen. We don't have this motion filed for 8 months afte 
the time that the judgment is entered in this matter. 
There is certainly nothing timely about that. Apparently, 
the only thing that even brings that to their attention,is 
they came to town in June and for whatever reason decided 
that they would ask the court clerk, at that time, in 
person when they felt like they couldn't ask then and th^v 
must assumed that because they represent to the court that 
they didn't know anything about it beforehand. 
We get in our memorandum, Your Honor, distinquish 
adequately the Stewart V. Sullivan and Gillmore v. Wright 
neither of those cases plaintiffs cited have any 
applicability and we think that is relatively clear by the 
reading of the facts in those cases and unless the court 
wants us to review them with you, I can go past that. 
Oust briefly, the 60B or Rule 54B Motion, Your Honor, 
to certify these cases or these decisions as final, I woul 
note that counsel agrees that the only reason not to certify 
is that he thinks that the court should grant the Rule 
60B Motion and that is not a reason that is set forth in 
Rule 54B. I don't know what it is. It is not a legal 
reason. It is the reason of counsel that doesn't have 
any backing in the law. For those reasons, Your Honor, 
we would submit that the judgment rendered in December 
of 1996 in favor of the Individual defendants should not 
be set aside. We would also submit that the Rule 54B 
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t motion certifying these matters as final should be granted 
2 so if there is any appeal being taken that they can get 
3 on with that and if and when this matter goes to trial so 
4 we will know what we are trying, 
5 THE COURT: Thank you Mr. Seiler, Mr. Valentine^ 
6 MR. VALENTINE: Thank you, Your Honor. I will 
7
 give you just those items that are some what different 
8 from those of the co-defendants. We do join in the 
9 54B Motion to have our judgment certified as final as wel 
10 as we filed previously in this matter, 
11 We also join in the objection to the affidavits whiciji 
12 we all have received today at approximately 1:00 O'clock. 
13 They were quite a surprise and quite lengthy and we haven' 
14 had a chance to get at them as well. 
15 A couple of points that are some what different 
16 situations for the corporate defendant and the individual 
17 defendants and that"4s that their motion is a Rule 60B1 
18 Motion and it is timely as against the corporate defendant 
19 The other two prongs of the test have not been met. In 
20 fact, as we outline in our brief, we believe that the 
21 I plaintiffs in this matter actually abandoned the case 
22 I long before Mr. Stringer talked about in his affidavit 
2 3
 I that he was having difficulties, It goes back right to th 
24 I initial pleadings when we filed a counterclaim asserting 
25
 I much of the things that are resolved in our Motion for 
Summary Judgment and he didn't respond to the counterclaim^ <> 
two different occasions by letter,, I reminded counsel thfit 
he had not replied to our counterclaim and this matter 
was ripe for default judgment. Those all occurred prior 
to the time that he purports in his affidavit that he was 
having difficulty trying to keep up with his practice. 
Finally, in frustration in February of this year, 
we filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. We gave him more 
time then was required by the rules. Why, I wasn't 
available. When I got back I saw that it still had not bee 
responded to thinking that the matterwould be resolved anp 
submitted for decision. We submitted it for decision and 
still nothing. We get the ruling back, We send him a copy 
of that. The clerk sent him a copy of that and still 
nothing. We prepared proposed findings, proposed judgment 
and send those over to him and still nothing. They get 
entered and the day after they are entered, I get a form 
letter by our Fax Machine saying that we would like 
you to vacate the judgment findings of fact as shown on 
our affidavit. That 1s clearly abandonment of the case. 
That is what the Supreme Court characterizes as 
abandonment. That is not excusable neglect. That is 
beyond excusable neglect, 
The court meant something when it says excusable rtegjlect 
as part of the Rule 60B1Motion, It didn't mean any kind 
24 
gf neglect totally abandoning the case. It meant 
something that was excusable. That is exactly what 
we don't have in here, 
Secondly* on the meritorious defense, counsel 
has raised an interesting argument that somehow he now 
has a meritorious claim, just because he has got a claim 
and a complaint that somehow gives him a meritorious 
defense but he hasn't even proffered even in his 
affidavits today responses to the Motion,for Summary 
Judgment, There is no meritorious defense until he 
proffers that and until he comes before the court and 
says that here is those items we admit* Here is the 
ones we dispute and here is the affidavit in support of 
that and here is the legal basis where we would prevail 
if we tried this case. He hasn't even proffered those, 
even untimely he hasn't proffered those. He has not 
purposed a meritorious defense that we can even respond to 
The court should, at this point, grant the Motion 
to have Rule 54B the certification of the two judgments. 
Let the Supreme Court argue with it if they want to but 
at this point and time we ought to finalize the case on 
just the issues that are left before the court, thank you, 
Your Honor, 
THE COURT: Thank you Mr. Valentine, 
Mr, Scho]11an fI will give you five minutes to respond, 
oc 
en 
MR. SCHOLLIAN: Just very briefly the Stewart 
Case in the memorandum I submitted under Rule 60B fn 
that case are broad and sufficiently broad to permit 
the court to set aside the order which appeared to have be 
entered upon an assumption and to enter a new order based 
on the record before it. This court ordered, entered 
the judgment of the individual defendants based on their 
assumption that the plaintiff had abandoned the case. 
It has clearly been shown before the court even if 
you eliminate the affidavits that was presented today, 
that Mr. Stringer did not present the truth to my clients. 
They were diligent in trying to keep up with him. 
Again, Your Honor, I want to talk about excusable negle| 
Was it excusable neglect from our clients to rely on Mr. 
Stringer. Not was it excusable neglect for Mr. Stringer 
not to do what he was supposed to do. My clients have a 
right to rely on him and yes they did. They are in 
California not in Utah. 
Of course, they could have called the court and asked 
but they were relying on the representations of Mr. Strinq 
that things were fine. They had no reasonable reason to 
do that. 
Finally, Your Honor, on the issue of meritorious 
defense. All of the cases cited by counsel are cases wher|e 
a defendant defaulted on a complaint and that is not the 
cr 
er 
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1 case here. 
2 If this court sets aside the, anyone of the judgments 
3 in this matter, our clients have a meritorious offense 
4 which is clearly set forth in the complaint, 
5 Let me with the remaining two minuts that I have 
6 distinquish Lincoln from my client's case, If you will 
7 look at Lincoln Page 673, the defendant was served , 
8 a default was entered on May the 29th, He was personally 
9 served with an order on July the 18th for supplemental 
10 proceedings. That is less than 60 days. He had notice 
11 during that 60 day period that there was a judgment: 
12 against him. He had no excuse not to ask the court to 
13 set it aside within the 60 day period. My clients had 
14 no such luxury. They had no idea what had happened 
15 to their case until Mr. Swanson came to this city in June 
16 of 1997, 
17 The facts in this case are clearly different and 
18 fairly distinquishable . I would ask the court to do what 
19 is equitable today. Let's give my clients the opportunity 
20 to present their case before this court . Let us not let 
21 them lose that case because someone else blew it. I 
22 can't think of any other words to say as far as that goes 
23 The law is replete even in the case which we have set 
24 forth today with the policy that the cases should be 
25 decided on their merits not on defaults, I would ask the 
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court to pursue that policy and set aside both judgments 
and have my clients continue on. 
THE COURT: I am going to take the matter under 
advisement and review the file before I issue a written 
ruling. I would say that Mr. Schollian that if your 
clients believe that they were mistreated by Mr. Strinaer 
they should file a complaint with the office of the Bar 
Counsel. I spoke on the phone two days ago with the 
office of Bar Counsel who suggested to me that if I 
had concerns about Mr. Stringer I should file a complaint. 
I simply pass that along as a suggestion of Bar Counsel 
speaking about this specific attorney. I think that they 
might be interested to hear what your clients have to say 
in that regard. 
I will take the matter under advisement and issue 
you a written ruling shortly. 
MR. SCHOLLIAN: Thank you. 
MR. SEILER: Thank you. 
MR. VALENTINE: Thank you. 
(WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WASATCH } 
ss. 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the HEARING was 
video-taped before the Honorable Anthony Scofield and 
was later transcribed into typewriting by Richard C. 
Tatton, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public 
in and for the State of Utah and that it was done to 
the best of my ability. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not of kin or 
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said cause 
of action and that I am not interested in the event thereo 
WITNESS my hand and official seal at Midway, 
Utah this 1st day of April, 1998. 
RICHARD C. TATTON, CSR 
My commissionexpires: 
June 15, 2001 
COMUEXPt+iMOOl 
Thomas W.Seiler, #2910 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
Attorneys for Defendants 
80 North 100 West 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo,UT 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE ] 
SWANSON, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs.
 ; 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON j SWANSON, NIKKI SHUMWAY ] 
individually; and BEVERLY ; 
SWANSON, CLINTON SWANSON ; 
and NIKKI SHUMWAY, all dba ; 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES; and ] 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES, INC., ] 
a Utah business, ] 
Defendants. ] 
> ACCEPTANCE OF DISCOVERY 
> Civil No. 960400307CN 
I Judge: 
COMES NOW the undersigned, counsel for the Plaintiffs, and accepts the 
answers to discovery filed by the Defendants Shumway and Swanson herein as being filed 
timely, pursuant to the agreement of the parties. 
£xtf/ft/r- ^2"^ 
DEC 31 19$ 
CARMA B. SMI i rt, occtiK 
DEPUTY 
DATED this /l^ day o f f ing 1996. 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER 
•ark K. Stringer 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE 
SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON 
SWANSON, NIKKI SHUMWAY 
individually; and BEVERLY 
SWANSON, CLINTON SWANSON 
and NIKKI SHUMWAY, all dba 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES; and 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES, INC., 
a Utah business, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY OF 
ANSWERS TO DISCOVERY 
REQUESTS 
Civil No. 960400307CN 
Judge: 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a correct copy of the Answers of Nikki 
Shumway, and the Answers of Beverly and Clinton S wanton, to Interrogatories, Requests for 
Admission, and Demand for Production of Documents, Propounded by Plaintiffs, was delivered 
^ 
this / 71—dav of July, 1996, to: 
(EXHIBIT NSAA/) 
Mark K. Stringer 
Blakelock & Stringer 
37 East Center 
Second Floor, Front 
Provo, UT 84606 
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Mark K. S t r i n g e r , #4~4l8 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER, P.A. 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f s , 
37 Eas t Center RflT n ^ " 
Second F l o o r , Front £\ 
Provo , Utah 84606 x 
Telephone: 375-7678 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, 
and CLINTON SWANSON, an individual, 
and NIKKI SHUMWAY, an individual; 
and BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON 
SWANSON, and NIKKI SHUMWAY, all dba 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES; and SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC. a Utah business 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS 
CIVIL m.?6O<*s**30?C)J 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs in the above entitled matter, by and 
through counsel of record, and hereby give NOTICE to all interested 
parties of an interest in and to the property held in the name of 
the DEFENDANTS, to wit: 
COMMENCING 22.44 FEET EAST AND 811.14 FEET NORTH 35 
DEGREES 22 MINUTES WEST ALONG EASTERLY LINE OF STATE 
HIGHWAY FROM THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF SECTION 26, 
TOWNSHIP 6 SOUTH, RANGE 2 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND 
MERIDIAN; THENCE NORTH 35 DEGREES 22 MINUTES WEST 
86 FEET ALONG EASTERLY LINE OF HIGHWAY; THENCE NORTH 
34 DEGREES EAST 76 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 35 DEGREES 22 
MINUTES EAST 86 FEET TO CENTER LINE OF WEST UNION CANAL; 
THENCE SOUTH 34 DEGREES WEST 76 FEET ALONG THE CANAL 
TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
This interest is the subject of this law suit above entitled, 
( t £xtilRl 
EHT 40379 BK 3968 PG 861 
and is based upon the fact that the Plaintiffs have received from 
the Defendant Beverly Swanson a Deed for this property, and that 
the Plaintiffs have provided consideration for the acquiring of 
this property and have an interest in the corporation to whom 
Beverly Swanson has attempted to make transfer. 
The Plaintiff has an interest in the adjoining property as 
well, through his corporate equity. These two properties are being 
developed as a restaurant site by the corporate Defendant. 
Interested parties should make inquiry at the Fourth District 
Court in Provo, or at the office of Plaintiff's counsel, Mark 
Stringer, 375-7678. 
DATED this ^ day of , 19j^. 
_ Stringer, 
rney for Plaintiff 
(,<o7^x LINDA STRINGER 
^/SSS^A mm WBUC • STATE o/ UTAH 
S A Z * 2 O ? * \ - , LOCK & STRINGER 
>FL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED certifies that as copy of the foregoing was 
mailed first class postage prepaid addressed to: 
Swanson Enterprises, c/o John Valentine, via fax. .377- V9^y 
Beverly and Clinton Swanson, 3707 Littlerock Drive, Provo, Utah 
Nil y, 140 W. 1880 North, Orem, Utah 
t 
i J & 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE 
SWANSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON 
SWANSON, NIKKI SHUMWAY, ET AL. 
Defendant. 
RECUSAL 
CASE NO. 960400307 CN 
DATE: MARCH 26, 1997 
RECUSAL- CASE REASSIGNED 
The Honorable Steven L. Hansen has recused himself from further involvement in the 
above-captioned case. This matter has been reassigned to the Honorable Judge Anthony 
Schofield for further proceedings. 
; F >/ 
DATED this J?/ day of March 1997. 
cc: Mark Stringer 
Thomas Seiler 
John Valentine 
>*»*>' ' 
(S=H 
9 6 \\ 
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ExM-IBlT CC* ) ^ 
JOHN L. VALENTINE (3310), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Our Rk No. 23,628 
Attorneys for Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE 
SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON 
SWANSON, NUCKI SHUMWAY, 
individually; and BEVERLY SWANSON, 
CLINTON SWANSON and NUCKI 
SHUMWAY, all dba SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES; and SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah business, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC.'S, MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 960400307CN 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc. submits this memorandum in support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs, Chris Swanson ("Chris") and Laurie Swanson ("Laurie"), and the 
individual Defendants, Beverly Swanson ("Beverly") and Clinton Swanson ("Clinton"), fonned 
EM/BlT *DD') 
Swanson Enterprises, Inc., March 9, 1995, ("the corporation") for the purpose of owning and 
operating a restaurant business. (See Complaint, 11 12 and 15). 
2. Originally the parties anticipated that the business would engage in a small 
remodeling project. The parties agreed that there would be four shareholders, Beverly Swanson, 
Clinton Swanson, Chris Swanson, and Laurie Shepard-Swanson, with 2500 shares, or 25% of 
ownership, each. (See Affidavit of Nikki Shumway ("Shumway Affidavit"), 1 3). 
3. The Plaintiffs were to contribute their services in exchange for their shares 
in the corporation. They have made minimal or no capital contributions to the corporation. 
Most of the capital has been contributed by Beverly and Clinton. (See Shumway Affidavit, 1 
4). 
4. The parties originally agreed that Chris would be president and a director, and 
Laurie would be secretary. The parties also originally agreed that Chris would manage the day-
to-day affairs of the business, and that neither Chris nor Laurie were to receive compensation 
until the business was open and profitable. (See Shumway Affidavit, 1 5). 
5. After commencing the remodeling project, the parties realized they would have 
to construct a new building altogether. This required that Beverly and Clinton contribute a 
significant amount of property to the corporation as collateral for a loan. The parties also agreed 
to include individual Defendant, Nikki Shumway ("Nikki"), as a shareholder and officer. Chris 
specifically requested her participation because of her experience in the restaurant industry. (See 
Shumway Affidavit, 1 6). 
2 
6. The parties then agreed to restructure the shares to reflect these changes. Of 
the total shares, Beverly was to own 39.5%, Clinton, 22.5%, Chris 19%, Nikki, 10%, and 
Laurie, 9%. The parties also agreed that Beverly would be president, Nikki would be secretary, 
and that Chris and Laurie would no longer be officers. (See Shumway Affidavit, 1 7). 
7. These changes are reflected in the Corporate Information sheet submitted with 
the application materials for an SBA loan in August or September of 1995. The loan application 
materials were entirely prepared by Chris. (See Shumway Affidavit, 1 7). 
8. After the parties made these changes, and after the corporation obtained the 
loan, Chris remained in control of the day-to-day management of the business and of the 
construction of the building until the time he resigned in December, 1995. (See Shumway 
Affidavit, 1 8). 
9. Chris retained Laurie as bookkeeper and paid her wages without the 
authorization of the board of directors. The checks were made payable to Laurie and himself. 
(See Shumway Affidavit, 1 8). 
10. Chris also made other disbursements of funds without the authorization of the 
board of directors. These transactions involving coiporate fiinds are documented in records most 
of which remain in exclusive control of Chris and Laurie. They have refused to relinquish the 
records and account for several unauthorized disbursements of corporate fiinds. (See Shumway 
Affidavit, J10). 
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11. On two occasions, Nikki discovered receipts of purchases made by the Plaintiffs 
with corporate funds, and found that the purchases did not add up to the amount the Plaintiffs 
reported they had spent. (See Shumway Affidavit, 111). 
12. Nikki has also recovered cancelled checks written on corporate accounts that 
the Plaintiffs had used for their personal purposes. (See Shumway Affidavit, 111). 
13. Around December of 1995, the individual Defendants confronted Chris about 
the unaccounted for funds, and he resigned. Chris and Laurie no longer perform services for 
the business by their own choice. They have since moved from the area. (See Shumway 
Affidavit, 1 12). 
14. Chris and Laurie have a key to the restaurant and the individual Defendants 
have not denied them access to the property. Chris and Laurie have never directly asked for 
disclosure of day-to-day operations of the business. (See Shumway Affidavit, 1 12). 
15. Beverly, Clinton, and Nikki had accountants examine what records they were 
able to retrieve from the Plaintiffs. The records revealed that Chris and Laurie transferred the 
funds back and forth between three separate bank accounts. Altogether, about $30,000 to 
$56,000 of corporate funds remain unaccounted for. (See Shumway Affidavit, 1 13). 
16. Stock certificates were issued April 15, 1996, according to the structure 
described in 16. No other stock certificates were issued before then. (See Shumway Affidavit, 
115). 
4 
17. The corporation is financially sound and free from any danger of insolvency. 
(See Shumway Affidavit, 1 16). 
18* Since the beginning of her term as an officer, Nikki has provided competent, 
ongoing service to the corporation. (Shumway Affidavit, 1 18) 
19. Chris and Laurie had stored some items of their personal property at the 
Shumway home. None of it was ever converted to the use of Nikki or of the corporation. It 
was always available to Chris and Laurie. They have since retrieved the property. (See 
Shumway Affidavit, 1 17). 
20. Over the past year Chris has contacted or threatened to contact a number of 
state agencies and business contacts, alleging that the corporation has engaged in a variety of 
violations of the law. Chris has stated that he has done this to force one or more of the 
individual defendants to "sit down with [him] and come to an agreement in principle," and has 
threatened that "there will be a point in the next few weeks that too much damage will have been 
done to go forward with the project." (See Shumway Affidavit, 1 18). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ANY SHARES OWNED BY THE PLAINTIFFS 
ARE VOID FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION 
Stock that is issued without consideration may be cancelled and treated as void. See 
Flprc v, Jphnwn, 199 P.2d 547, 555 (Utah 1948); Business Aviation of South Dakota, Inc. v. 
l ^ i l 
Medivest.Inc. 882 P.2d 662, 663 n. 2 (Utah 1994); 18A Am Jur. 2d Corporations § 505; Utah 
Code Ann, 16-10a-621 (1995). In Flore, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a finding that stock 
was subject to cancellation because it was fraudulently issued, the corporation receiving no 
consideration for it. In that case, the corporation issued stock in exchange for a down payment 
and a promise to pay the remaining consideration in installments. However, full compliance 
with the agreement was never accomplished. The trial court cancelled the stock and removed 
the parties elected as a result of the fraudulently issued stock. The Utah Supreme Court upheld 
this decision. 
Here, the stock issued to the Plaintiffs also lacks consideration. There is no record of 
the Plaintiffs making any capital contributions to the corporation. They were to contribute their 
services in exchange for their stock, but instead, they compensated themselves for those services, 
converted corporate funds to their personal use, and have not worked for the corporation in over 
a year. As a result, the Plaintiffs have provided no benefit to the corporation entitling them to 
the stock. Therefore, the stock should be set aside as void and submitted for cancellation as in 
Flore. Furthermore, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on each of the claims by 
Plaintiffs, identified below, which are predicated upon ownership in the corporation. 
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POINT n 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE CLAIM FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Under Count II of their Complaint, the Plaintiffs identify what they claim to be breaches 
of fiduciary duty committed by the officers and directors of the corporation, and request as relief 
that the Court reinstate the original officers and directors of the corporation. 
Plaintiffs may not recover under this claim as a matter of law because it is a derivative 
action. In Utah, claims of mismanagment or breach of fiduciary duty may only be brought 
derivatively by shareholders of the corporation. Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp.r 614 P.2d 
636, 639-40 (Utah 1980); Ut. R. Civ. P. 23.1. As discussed earlier, however, any shares 
owned by the Plaintiffs are void for lack of consideration. Because they are not shareholders, 
they may not recover the relief they seek under Count n. 
Even if Plaintiffs are found to be shareholders, their claim for relief is be barred by the 
clean hands doctrine. Courts in Utah adhere to the principle that 
equity does not reward one who has engaged in fraud or 
deceit in the business under consideration, but reserves its 
rewards for those who are themselves acting in fairness and 
good conscience, or as is sometimes said, to those who have 
come into court with clean hands. 
Jacobson v. Jacobson. 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1876); see also Bradford v. Alvey & SonsT 621 
P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980). 
7 
The remedy sought here is in equity, and the Plaintiffs have come into court with 
unclean hands. While operating in a fiduciary capacity as manager of the business, Chris paid 
Laurie wages without authorization of the board of directors, and otherwise converted corporate 
funds for their personal use. Chris and Laurie have withheld corporate records from the other 
shareholders, officers, and directors, and have failed to account for $30,000 to $56,000 of 
corporate funds. Furthermore, they engaged in the very activities they now claim to be breaches 
of fiduciary duty. Chris participated in the decision to restructure the organization of the 
corporation, specifically requesting the addition of Nikki as a shareholder and officer. He was 
primarily responsible for the loan application which reflected the changes of which he now 
complains. Chris was also responsible for the construction of the building he now claims 
encroaches on adjacent property. Furthermore, over the past year, the Plaintiffs have made 
various negative allegations about the corporation to several state agencies and business contacts 
in an effort to enhance their bargaining position in this matter. In general, the Plaintiffs have 
engaged in acts of bad faith which now prevent them from recovering the equitable relief they 
seek. 
Furthermore, the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents the Plaintiffs from denying the 
validity of the current office holders. The doctrine of equitable estoppel applies when there has 
been: 
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action 
or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the basis 
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of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; 
and (3) injury to the second party that would result from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
statement, admission, act or failure to act. 
Avila v. Winn. 794 P.2d 20,22 (Utah 1990). Here, Chris represented in the loan application 
that the individual defendants were officers of the corporation. He is now contradicting those 
representations to the detriment of the individual defendants and the corporation, and should be 
estopped from making this claim. 
Finally, even if Plaintiffs were found to be shareholders, they would not be able to 
recover under this claim because they have not complied with the statutory requirements for a 
derivative action. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 23.1 (1996), governing derivative actions by shareholders 
requires, among other things, that "the complainant [sic] shall be verified" and 
[t]he complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, 
if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires 
from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, 
from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his 
failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. 
The Plaintiffs complaint was not verified, and did not allege that they had made efforts 
to obtain the action they desire from the others in the corporation, and did not explain the failure 
to make the effort. Since they have failed to satisfy these statutory requirements, the Plaintiffs 
are not entitled to the relief they seek. Caley Investments v. Lower 754 P.2d 793 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1988). 
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POINT m 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE CLAIM FOR INDEMNITY 
Under Count HI of their Complaint, the Plaintiffs claim to be entitled to indemnity from 
any claims that may follow from the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty identified under Count 
II. The Plaintiffs may not recover under this claim as a matter of law for the same reasons set 
forth earlier. They are not shareholders, and even if they are, they are barred by the doctrine 
of clean hands and by equitable estoppel. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have no right to indemnity either under common law or 
statute. A common law indemnity action does not arise until the party seeking indemnity pays 
a claim, judgment, or settlement. Davidson Lumber v. Bonneville Inv.r 794 P.2d 11, 19 (Utah 
1990); see also Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984). Likewise, 
the provisions within Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-901 to 909 (1995) regarding indemnity of 
directors, officers, and employees of a corporation, each presuppose that an action has been 
brought against the party seeking indemnity. Here, the Plaintiffs have made no payments for 
a claim, judgment, or settlement, and have not been made a party to any action growing out of 
the activities of the corporation. 
On the contrary, the Plaintiffs appear to be seeking a judgment declaring that they shall 
be entitled to indemnity in the future. However, when seeking a declaratory judgment "the legal 
controversy presented must be a current one rather than one that may arise at some future time." 
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People v. Ford. 773 P.2d 1059, 1070 (Colo. 1989); S£& SlSSt Baird v. State. 574 P.2d 713 (Utah 
1978); Jenkins v. Finlinson. 607 P.2d 289 (Utah 1980). Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief 
they seek because a cause of action for indemnity has not arisen and there is currently no legal 
controversy against the corporation that would give rise to a right to indemnity. Therefore, the 
Plaintiffs may not recover the relief they seek under Count HI. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE CLAIM FOR REMOVAL OF AN OFFICER 
Under Count IV of their Complaint, the Plaintiffs request that Nikki be removed from 
office and enjoined from competing with the business. The Plaintiffs may not recover under this 
claim as a matter of law for the same reasons set forth earlier. They are not shareholders, and 
even if they are, they are barred by the doctrine of clean hands and by equitable estoppel, and 
they have not satisfied the statutory requirements for a derivative action. 
Furthermore, while there is a statute permitting judicial removal of a director, Utah 
Code Ann. § 16-10a-809 (1995), there is no statute permitting judicial removal of an officer. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Flore v. Johnson. 199 P.2d 547 (Utah 1948), acknowledged that 
a court of equity usually may not remove an officer unless such relief flows naturally from the 
determination of other issues properly before the court. Here, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to 
any equitable relief because of their unclean hands. Also, removing Nikki is not in the best 
interest of the corporation. She provides competent, ongoing service to the corporation and 
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removing her would unnecessarily disrupt the corporation. Therefore, the Plaintiffs may not 
recover the relief they seek under Count IV. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE CLAIM FOR CONVERSION 
Under Count V of their Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that their personal property has 
been converted to use of the corporation, and they seek various forms of relief. However, their 
claim is not supported by the facts. "A conversion is an act of willful interference with a 
chattel, done without lawful justification by which a person entitled thereto is deprived of its use 
and possession." Allred v. Hinkley. 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1958). Here, the Plaintiffs 
voluntarily stored their personal property in the Shumway home. It was ever withheld from 
them, and was never converted to the use of the corporation. Since the filing of their 
Complaint, the Plaintiffs have retrieved their property from the Shumway home. Therefore, 
there is no basis for the recovery Plaintiffs seek under Count V. 
POINT VI 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE CLAIM FOR RECEIVERSHIP OR INDEPENDENT MANAGEMENT 
Under Count VI of their Complaint, Plaintiffs request receivership or independent 
management of the corporation. The Plaintiffs may not recover under this claim as a matter of 
law for the same reasons set forth earlier. They are not shareholders, and even if they are, they 
are barred by the doctrine of clean hands and by equitable estoppel. 
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Furthermore, this relief is only appropriate where a corporation has been dissolved, is 
insolvent, or is in imminent danger of insolvency. SfiS Utah. R. Civ. Pro. 66 (1996); 
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corporation. 614 P.2d 636, 638 (Utah 1980). Here, there is no 
evidence of imminent danger of insolvency. In fact, the corporation is financially sound. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek under Count VI. 
POINT VH 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE CLAIM FOR CONSPIRACY AND FRAUD 
Under Count VH of their Complaint, Plaintiffs make general allegations of conspiracy 
and fraud. However, they have provided no factual support for their allegations. According 
to Utah R. Civ. Pro. 9(b), in a claim for fraud, "the circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall 
be stated with particularity." Here, the Plaintiffs have failed to provided particular facts which 
would satisfy the elements of an action for fraud. In Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin. 377 
P.2d 189 (Utah 1962), the Utah Supreme Court held that a claim consisting of general 
allegations of false representations, and containing "no allegation whatever of the contents, 
nature of substance of any alleged false statement" failed to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted. Also, in Heathman v. Hatch. 372 P.2d 990 (Utah 1962), the Court held that use 
of the terms "fraud" and "conspiracy" were general accusations which, without more, could not 
constitute those actions. Here, the Plaintiffs have made only general accusations regarding fraud 
and conspiracy. Furthermore, they permitted or engaged in the very activities that they now 
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claim deprived them of their status in the corporation. Therefore, the Plaintiffs are not entitled 
to the relief they seek under Count VII. 
POINT vm 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE CLAIM FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS 
Plaintiffs also request permanent injunctions enjoining the individual defendants from 
restricting the Plaintiffs from the property and from access to the books and enjoining them from 
diminishing the assets of the corporation. The Plaintiffs may not recover under this claim as a 
matter of law for the same reasons set forth earlier. They are not shareholders, and even if they 
are, they are barred by the doctrine of clean hands and by equitable estoppel. 
Furthermore, there is no factual basis for rewarding such relief. The Plaintiffs have not 
been denied access to the property or the books of the corporation. Indeed, there are some 
corporate records that the Plaintiffs have withheld from the corporation. Therefore, the 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek under Count VIII. 
POINT IX 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
Under Count I of their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek damages for breach of an alleged 
agreement between the parties to employ the Plaintiffs as managers of the business or as officers 
of the corporation. Even if such an agreement existed, the Plaintiffs may not recover because 
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the corporation did not breach the alleged agreement. The Plaintiffs voluntarily resigned and 
moved from the area. 
Similarly, under Count IX of their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek specific performance of 
the alleged employment agreement. Again, even if such an agreement existed, and if they had 
not resigned, Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, would not be entitled to specific performance. The 
agreement they describe is a contract for personal services. Personal service contracts will 
generally not be specifically enforced. Delivery Service and Transfer Co. v, Heiner. 635 P.2d 
21 (Utah 1981). "Courts generally will not specifically enforce an employment contract between 
an employee and a corporation.- O'Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders § 9.07 (1985) 
citing Williston, Contracts § 1423F (3rd ed. 1968). In addition, specific performance is an equi-
table remedy, and Plaintiffs have come into court with unclean hands. 
Therefore, the Plaintiffs may not recover under Count EX. 
POINT X 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE CLAIM FOR JUDICIAL EVALUATION OR DISSOLUTION 
Finally, under Count X of their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek judicial evaluation or 
dissolution of the corporation. The Plaintiffs may not recover under this claim as a matter of 
law for the same reasons set forth earlier. They are not shareholders, and even if they are, they 
are barred by the doctrine of clean hands and by equitable estoppel. 
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Furthermore, under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1430(2) (1996), a shareholder may seek 
dissolution of a corporation only by establishing either that the directors are deadlocked; the 
directors have acted or are acting in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent; the 
shareholders are deadlocked; or the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted. Here, 
neither the directors nor the shareholders are deadlocked, and there are no facts supporting the 
allegations that the directors are acting in an improper manner or that corporate assets are being 
misapplied. Therefore, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek under Count X. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the Defendant respectfully requests the Court to grant its Motion 
for Summary Judgment on Counts I - X of the Plaintiffs, Complaint. 
DATED this of February, 1997. 
JOH^L^ALENTINE,lo7: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant Swanson 
Enterprises, Inc. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE 
SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON SWANSON, NIKKI SHUMWAY, 
individually; and BEVERLY SWANSON, 
CLINTON SWANSON and NIKKI 
SHUMWAY, all dba SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES; and SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah business, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 960400307CN 
Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
The above-captioned matter came regularly before the Court on Defendant Swanson 
Enterprises, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. No objection to the motion has been filed, 
although it has been served upon counsel for Plaintiffs in accordance with the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Therefore, the Court now makes 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
7- ( EYUIRIT- >
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs, Chris Swanson (MChrisM) and Laurie Swanson ("Laurie"), and the 
individual Defendants, Beverly Swanson ("Beverly") and Clinton Swanson ("Clinton"), formed 
Swanson Enterprises, Inc., March 9, 1995, ("the corporation") for the purpose of owning and 
operating a restaurant business, 
2. The Court finds that the parties originally anticipated that the business would 
engage in a small remodeling project. The parties agreed that there would be four shareholders, 
Beverly Swanson, Clinton Swanson, Chris Swanson, and Laurie Shepard-Swanson, with 2500 
shares, or 25 % of ownership, each. 
3. The Plaintiffs were to contribute their services in exchange for their shares 
in the corporation. They have made minimal or no capital contributions to the corporation. 
Most of the capital has been contributed by Beverly and Clinton. 
4. The parties originally agreed that Chris would be president and a director, and 
Laurie would be secretary. The parties also originally agreed that Chris would manage the day-
to-day affairs of the business, and that neither Chris nor Laurie were to receive compensation 
until the business was open and profitable. 
5. After commencing the remodeling project, the parties realized they would have 
to construct a new building altogether. This required that Beverly and Clinton contribute a 
significant amount of property to the corporation as collateral for a loan. The parties also agreed 
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to include individual Defendant, Nikki Shumway ("Nikki"), as a shareholder and officer. Chris 
specifically requested her participation because of her experience in the restaurant industry. 
6. The Court finds that the parties then agreed to restructure the shares to reflect 
these changes. Of the total shares, Beverly was to own 39.5%, Clinton, 22.5%, Chris 19%, 
Nikki, 10%, and Laurie, 9%. The parties also agreed that Beverly would be president, Nikki 
would be secretary, and that Chris and Laurie would no longer be officers. 
7. The Court finds that these changes are reflected in the Corporate Information 
sheet submitted with the application materials for an SBA loan in August or September of 1995, 
and that the loan application materials were entirely prepared by Chris. 
8. After the parties made these changes, and after the corporation obtained the 
loan, Chris remained in control of the day-to-day management of the business and of the 
construction of the building until the time he resigned in December, 1995. 
9. The Court finds that Chris retained Laurie as bookkeeper and paid her wages 
without the authorization of the board of directors. The checks were made payable to Laurie 
and himself. 
10. The Court finds that Chris also made other disbursements of funds without the 
authorization of the board of directors. These transactions involving corporate funds are 
documented in records most of which remain in exclusive control of Chris and Laurie. They 
have refused to relinquish the records and account for several unauthorized disbursements of 
corporate funds. 
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11. On two occasions, Nikki discovered receipts of purchases made by the Plaintiffs 
with corporate funds, and found that the purchases did not add up to the amount the Plaintiffs 
reported they had spent. 
12. Nikki has also recovered cancelled checks written on corporate accounts that 
the Plaintiffs had used for their personal purposes. 
13. The Court finds that around December of 1995, the individual Defendants 
confronted Chris about the unaccounted for funds, and he resigned. Chris and Laurie no longer 
perform services for the business by their own choice. They have since moved from the area. 
There is no further evidence of a conspiracy on the part of the corporation. 
14. The Court finds that Chris and Laurie have a key to the restaurant and the 
individual Defendants have not denied them access to the property, and plaintiffs have never 
directly asked for disclosure of day-to-day operations of the business. 
15. Beverly, Clinton, and Nikki had accountants examine what records they were 
able to retrieve from the Plaintiffs. The records revealed that Chris and Laurie transferred the 
funds back and forth between three separate bank accounts. Altogether, about $30,000 to 
$56,000 of corporate funds remain unaccounted for. 
16. Stock certificates were issued April 15, 1996, according to the structure 
described in 1 6 of these Findings of Fact. The Court finds that no other valid stock certificates 
were issued by the corporation. 
4 
17. The Court finds that the corporation is financially sound and free from any 
danger of insolvency. 
18. The Court finds that Nikki has provided competent, ongoing service to the 
corporation since the beginning of her term as an officer. 
19. The Court finds that Chris and Laurie had stored some items of their personal 
property at the Shumway home. None of it was ever converted to the use of Nikki or of the 
corporation. It was always available to Chris and Laurie. They have since retrieved the 
property. 
20. The Court finds that since March 20, 1996 Chris has contacted or threatened 
to contact a number of state agencies and business contacts of the parties, alleging that the 
corporation has engaged in a variety of violations of the law, in an effort to enhance plaintiffs' 
bargaining position in this matter. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Any shares of stock once owned by the Plaintiffs are void for lack of 
consideration. Any certificates issued by Swanson Enterprises, Inc., to the Plaintiffs shall be 
recalled and cancelled as void. 
2. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek under Count I of their 
Complaint, including the allegation regarding breach of employment agreement, because any 
such agreement was breached first by the Plaintiffs. 
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3. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek under Count II of their 
Complaint, including the allegations regarding breach of fiduciary duty and reinstatement of 
officers and directors, because the Plaintiffs are not shareholders, they are barred by the doctrine 
of clean hands and equitable estoppel, and they have otherwise failed to comply with the 
statutory requirements to maintain a derivative action. 
4. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek under Count HI of their 
Complaint regarding indemnity because they are not shareholders, they are barred by the 
doctrine of clean hands and equitable estoppel, and an action for indemnity has not arisen. 
5. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek under Count IV of their 
Complaint regarding removal of an officer because they are not shareholders, they are barred 
by the doctrine of clean hands and equitable estoppel, have failed to comply with the statutory 
requirements to maintain a derivative action, and the court lacks statutory authority to remove 
an officer for the grounds alleged in the complaint. 
6. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek under Count V of their 
Complaint regarding conversion because their personal property was never withheld from them, 
was never converted to the use of the corporation, and has been retrieved. 
7. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek under Count VI of their 
Complaint regarding a receivership or independent management of the corporation because they 
are not shareholders, they are barred by the doctrine of clean hands and equitable estoppel, and 
T^ 
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the Plaintiffs have failed to show that the corporation has been dissolved, is insolvent, or is in 
imminent danger of insolvency. 
8. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek under Count VII regarding 
conspiracy or fraud because they have failed to provide particular facts to support such claims. 
9. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek under Count VIII of their 
Complaint, including allegations regarding a permanent injunction enjoining the individual 
Defendants from denying the Plaintiffs access to the property and the books, and enjoining the 
individual Defendants from diminishing the assets of the corporation, because the Plaintiffs are 
not shareholders and they are barred by the doctrine of clean hands and equitable estoppel. 
10. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek under Count IX of their 
Complaint, including allegations regarding specific performance of the alleged employment 
agreement because they breached first, and because such an agreement may not be specifically 
enforced. 
11. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek under Count X of their 
Complaint regarding a judicial evaluation or dissolution of the corporation because they are not 
shareholders. 
12. The Court hereby grants judgment in favor of Swanson Enterprises, Inc., on 
the Second Cause of Action (Failure of Consideration) of its Counterclaim, consistent with the 
ruling under paragraph 1 above. 
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13. The Court does not reach a ruling on the Third Cause of Action (Declaratory 
Judgment) of Swanson Enterprises, Inc.'s, Counterclaim since it has ruled the Plaintiffs own no 
stock in the corporation. 
14. Defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc.'s, right to recover under the First Cause 
of Action (Accounting), and Fifth Cause of Action (Malicious Prosecution), of its Counterclaim 
are hereby reserved for further ruling. 
15. Defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted, denying all claims of the Plaintiffs' Complaint against Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, orders that 
judgment be entered in accordance therewith. 
DATED this \l day of 4*§ft 1997. 
BY THE COURT 
ANTHONYlW. |SCf ^ ^ ^ , \f< \ 
D I S T m C T C O U R X 9 ^ ^ ^ ^ t r f > , ^ $ 
^ cousr - • •£ 
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NOTICE TO PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEY 
AND ATTORNEY FOR THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON SWANSON, AND MKKI SHUMWAY 
TO: MARK K. STRINGER, ESQ. 
THOMAS W. SEDLER, ESQ. 
You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for defendant Swanson 
Enterprises, Inc., will submit the above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
to the Honorable Anthony W. Schofield for his signature upon the expiration of five (5) days 
from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed 
prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration of the State 
of Utah. 
DATED this 2^\ day of April, 1997. 
L\. (W i V-— 
JOHN L. VALFJSntTNE, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
UjtX 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this 2Ar day of April, 1997. 
Mark K. Stringer, Esq. 
Blakelock & Stringer 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, UT 84606 
Thomas W. Seiler, Esq. 
Robinson, Seiler & Glazier, LC 
80 North 100 West 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
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(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by 
affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such 
service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an 
additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply 
affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which 
it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is 
pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move 
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has 
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 
3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This rale does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, 
order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
(Amended effective April 1,1998) 
Advisory Committee Note 
The 1998 amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion the following: "(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not 
been personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said action." This basis 
for a motion is not found in the federal rule. The committee concluded the clause was ambiguous and possibly in conflict with rules 
permitting service by means other than personal service. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court 
or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to 
the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which 
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment. 
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment. Execution or other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue immediately upon the entry of the judgment, 
unless the court in its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs. 
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment. In its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the court 
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a 
judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a motion for judgment in 
accordance with a motion for a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for amendment to the findings or for additional findings 
made pursuant to Rule 52(b). 
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the 
court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon such conditions as it considers 
proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party. 
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise 
prohibited by law or these rules. The bond may be given at or after the time of filing the notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedeas 
bond is approved by the court. 
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. When an appeal is taken by the United States, the state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or 
by direction of any department of either, and the operation or enforcement of the judgment is stayed, no bond, obligation, or other security shall be 
required from the appellant. 
(f) Stay in quo warranto proceedings. Where the defendant is adjudged guilty of usurping, intruding into or unlawfully holding public office, civil or 
military, within this state, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed on an appeal. 
(g) Power of appellate court not limited. The provisions in this rule do not limit any power of an appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to stay 
